INTERNAL DEFENCE.

Hawke's Bay Times, Volume 14, Issue 717, 13 September 1869, Page 3

INTERNAL DEFENCE.

COLONEL WHITMORE'S SPEECH. [continued from our last.] to the seeond point, the organization of the force aa a constabulary, I think the honorable gentleman will find that }ie has only to push on in the direction taken by the late Government, and he will obtain a force more effective than the Irish Constabulary. Then he says the material prosDerity of the country is to be developed. I do not know exactly what that means, but I presume he refers to fostering the Provinces, but I will not import that question into the present discussion. I do not, however, think the honorable gentleman acted altogether fairly towards us when he asked us to swallow all those measures, if we had a general approval of the policy of the Government, without making the smallest alterations, and with out any objections. Holding as I do a general approval of some things in the resolutions now before us, I nevertheless feel very unwilling to accept them without change. He says the circumstances under which the Government took office entitles them to our forbearance; they turned out their prcdecesso-sin a time of difficulty and danger, and those circumstances give them a claim upon the Legislature. I cannot see myself how far, when one Government upsets another in fair fight, it has any such claim upon the I egislature. These are not times for striving to get men in or out of place; but I think there is another very great claim upon our consideration, and upon the consideration of everybody no matter on what side he may be —and that is, that the Colony is in difficulty, and we should get it out of it. I tell the honorable gentleman that I intend to try to amend th se resolu tions. I cannot accept them as they stand, und I wish to see them anv-nded, and at the proper time I shall introduce th^ N amendments I propose. I daresay, how ever, it would make what I have to sa} more distinct, and be more satisfactory to honorable gentleman, if I stated now the direction in which 1 wish to see these re solutions altered. I would support any honorable member who wished to omit the Commissioners from No. 3, but I fear it would have no chance of being carried here, nor do I think, after the party strug gle that has taken place in another place on this subject, that it would be accepted there. However, I cannot pass that reso lution without sawng that 1 think we have not been straightforward in the matter We have no choice but to accept the two first resolutions, but I do not think we are straightforward about the Commissioners We do not tell the Imperial Government, as wo ought to do, that we are sending these Commissioners home to commence their task on credit ; th t they are going home without money to pay for the troops; and taking that as a point of departure, they are going to make unwelcome pro pos;ds. 1 think we oujjht to have allocated a certain sum, which should have been put upon the estimates, and I think it will be very unfair on the part of the present Government to leave to their successors the task of providing the expenditure that th; se Commissioners are to incur ; and I think the Commissioners themselves should not have been put into the position in which they will be. They should have taken the money then due with them, and made an offer to pay for the troops, even if they should at the same time confess th it in future we must be twelve months in ar rears. Then, I do not see why two Commissioners should be sent instead of one ; and if two be better than one, then, on the Bume principle, three will be better than two, and, in fact, why should not as many as desire to go be sent. There will be no dilliculty in finding persons to go. I do not like the five years part of that resolution either; I think it is a pity that it was introduced, and that it would have been better to leave the matter open on both sides for cither to give notice when the necessity was past. Let us see what Victoria did. I have the papers on the subject with me, and they show that the people of Victoria went much more seriously to work, and the Commissioners were perfectly successful, which I very much doubt if ours will be. This was the course the Victorian Parliament took.—They first of all passed resolutions, then they agreed to a humble address to the Throne, then they introduced a Bill, then they put a sum on the estimates, and lastly one of the Ministry went home. That course succeeded, and there was something I think practical and forcible, and at the same time quite resnectful, in that course. Our financial statement is quite silent as to how that money is to be paid, while we sec that the charge is relegated to next year, although the expenditure is in the present year, which will be very satisfactory, no doubt, to the Treasurer when he comes down with his financial statement. Besides I cannot help thinking that these unhappy Commissioners, wren they goto the Colonial Office or the War Office to make enquiries aOout those troops, wdl get a very unsatisfactory response when it is found that they are only making the same proposal as has been made and refused before, without the means of paying for the men. Of course I know Cabinets have obligations to their party as well as to the Legislature, and this is one, perhaps'; therefore 1 shall Waive my objection, though if I thought there was any person in the Council who had a party to support him which agreed "with me, 1 would move the omission of the commissioners. To the fourth resolution I have a strong objection, it is so indefinite. It talks about enquiries. The Commis sionera are to be instructed to state " the grounds upon which the Colony feeJa itself justified in asking for assistance, and to as-J

certain to what extent aid, either in men, or otherwise, will be afforded." It would be much batter for us to say at once what we mean. The Home Government should undertake to assist in getting ihem, and we should look for a contribution towards the expenditure of a war which it has brought to a great extent upon the Colony. 1 think we should make definite proposals, and therefore I shall introduce something to that effect into this resolution. Then, Sir, in the filth resolution it says that the Com missionera art? to confer with the Hortiv Government as to the description of force. I do not think that is very desirable, and the whole resolution is, to my mind, rather too big a pill to swallow. There are honorable gentlemen here who think as I do in the matter, but who wi'l nevertheless vote for it rather than disturb this existing state of affairs, bat [ tell them they need not be in the slightest degree alarmed at amending this to the fullest extent, even it thev amended it out of the Paper altogether. It will not aff'ct the Government itself, and I do not think it would give them anv alarm. The proposition to which a great many honorable members besides myself have a great aversion is that part about the G loorka regiments. I think there is a great prejudice against tho Guoorkas, and I think there is great deal to be said in favor of those men, whom I do noc wish to under-rate. On the contrary, I think one regiment or battalion of them might be of great advantage under certain circumstances. But there are so many drawbacks to the employment of Ghoorkas iu j .New Zealand —in the way of administration, and. incidentally—which do not appear be considered at all, that I cannot understand how tho honorable gentlemen could hnve introduced into this resolution such a proposal. There are not only many difficulties, in the first place, to be got over in the Colonial Qtßce, but there is also the Indian Minister who has a little say in the matter, and the Government of India, and lastly there is the Ghoork* himself. Supposing these honorable gentlemen met with a favorable reception in England, and from the Indian Minister; then they will have to go to the Government of India, and to the Ghooika, who will not be persuaded in a short time. In the meantime, nothing will be done towards raising this force or towards carrying on the wnr here. I think this is a foolish if not a vicious fauit in the resolution, and it would have been better to leave.he Ghoorkas out altogether. I will state some of tho objections to the Ghoorkas which are not generally thought of. First of all, the Ghoorka has to bj asked for his consent, and he is almost sure not to come. The sea is his greatest abhorrence, and wj have heard that not long ago, when a Ghoorka regiment was to be employed in Burmah, the men preferred to march 1,800 miles to going there by sea. Then, if the Imperial Government is persuaded over, what about the Government of India? If a disturbance should lake place amongst one of the hill tribes, is it at all likely that they would let one ol their regular Ghoorka regiments go away ? and even if there was no disturbance, is it likely they would part with their frontier police, which the Ghoorkas are ? The Ghoorkas, Sir, are like the Swiss, a race coming also from a mountainous country, or like the French, and to some extent like the Maoris themselves, for thev ae subject to nostalgia* I have seen some of the effects of this disease, and I believe that it has been truly said that it destroyed something like 20,000 of the French army before Sebastopol, and if that army had not been removed as speedily as it was probably 10,000 more would have succumbed to the same disease. That disease, which nobody has yet accurately defined, and which is known as trial du pays, heim, weh, and home-sickness, is totally beyond medical aid, and there is one peculiarity which distinguishes it, as I have seen it, and that is, that it attacks men more generally aud fitally in a country very different from their own, and I can conceive no country more different from India than this. They are very likely then to suffer from this disease if they come. There is another point to which I should like to call the at-, tention of the Council in connexion with the Ghoorkas. Some years ago, when I was thrown amongst officers who had served with Ghoorkas, and more especially during the time of the mutiny, I made it my dut_> to make inquiries upon the subject. I was then Military Secretary to General Cameron, and many officers urged upon me the ; advisability of sending for Ghoorkas or Sikhs. When Mr Cracroft Wilson made his speech upon the subject, in 1861, I heard the matter argued out by fifty or sixty officers who had much more experience than even that honorable gentleman, and it was the universal opinion of those officers that if you could get the Ghoorkas into the field against the Maoris the) would excite terror in the minds of the Maoris; but the difficulties which I have mentioned, and others which I shall mention presently, struck them, and they all admitted besides that if once the Ghoorkas met with a panic it would be impossible to briug [them to the scratch again. If this panic occurred at the beginning—and nobody can foresee that the first battle would not be the one in which that panic would occur —it is quite possible they could never again be of use for any military purpose against the same enemy. To say they would not take a panic becauie they are brave men is absurd.; The bravest men I take to be British sea-j men and soldiers, and even they often take a panic. In this country some of the bravest men in the world took a panic at the Gate Pa There is an objection to Ghoorkas, which, in my mind, is a very serious one, because it would be very painful if, after crouching behind these Asiatics in the idea that they would do

our fighting for us, we were to find we leant upon a broken reed. Moreover, the climate might not suit them, or compel a more generous diet, which would be opposed to their religious scruples. It might necessitye their being fed with beef, which, T am led to believe, they would not touch. 1 I [ am speaking of the detribalized Ghoorkas. I am not afraid of their going over to the enemv ; but what would become of U 9 if we raised other Ghoorkas, who, seized by •a desire for plunder, might not be contended with a brass ring here, or a bed-blanket !there, and were to turn on us? There i 9 ano'her thing to bs 9aid. If this Sirraoor bat-taHon—which I think we may put out of the question, for it is a body of too much value —could be obtained, there is this to be said about them ; they always have their women with them, and if we went to the expense of importing their wives and children, we must have to pay large pensions lo the widows. I cannot bring myself to believe that the Q-hoorka would come and fight for the prico offered. In his own country he buys everything he wants for a few small coins, smaller than any we have here ; but here, where everything is at famina price, will he come and serve at a twentieth part of the price paid to men in garrison in Auckland ? It would be most unlikely, and most unfair to expect it. I have already spoken of tho difficulties connected with the employment of Ghoorkas, without in any way detracting from their merits as fighting men. I have alluded to their liability to a disease culled nostalgia, to (heir having so tnany impediment i, and to the necessity of treating then as regular soldiers when diffK-ul ties might arise ; but I did not explain many of those difficulties which might be experienced on account of their peculiar organization. We could not guarantee the lives of their officers, and how could we replace them with others, if they fell, who could speak their tongue? They would be entitled to full and half batta, and the same allowances as in India, ancJ so would the Royal regiment in garrison, and with what face would the Colonial Treasurer refuse special allowances to our men who shared the fighting? These are difficulties which cannot be easily overcome, and they apply mo'e particularly to the regular Q-hoorka. If we detribalize some of the subjects of Jung Bahadoor, and organize for ourselves, we should first have to ask his consent, then we should have to render our proposals acceptable to his people, and when we got them I du not know whv we should regard them differently than they did at Lucknow, they were looked on with much suspicion. They did nothing there, but went away with miles of loot, which was all they came for. If they came here they might transfer their allegiance to the Maori king, who could give them more liberty, and less contemptuous treatment than they would receive from our settlers and soldiers, more especially the former. But I do not think it probable that those we will address will be lured by the charms of one, two, or three Commissioners whom we may send. I do not think they will succeed in inducing Lord Granville, one of the most diplomaticof English statesmen, to depart from a policy which he hn3 pre viously advocated, or the authorities in placing any restraint on the Government of India. If they do so it will be less likely that they would bring the Jung Bahadoor to adopt their views, or induce his subjects to follow their drum. There are difficulties in the way, and I say with these difficulties it would be unadvisable tor us to wait till these people came to place ourselves in a state of thorough efficiency for the campaign which will probably come on in the spring; for I am not of opinion that, because we have had a limited number of weeks without a shot being fired, it gives a sure promise of a peaceful summer. I know that the restless leader To Kooti, who is at this moment in the Waikato, is not a person of that consideration among his countrymen that he can long maintain his position except by further enterprises of arms, and he must, and will before long, make further descents, if only to maintain his own position. I believe that the enemy is thankful for the leisure afforded him. I believe that no greater godsend could have befallen him than the rest of the last two months ; and I think it exceedingly improbable fhat war may have been averted by that which, to my mind, gives him a better prospect of having fresh men to fight, for they will have recruited their spirits and refilled their cartridge-boxes. The Hon. Mr Hawjdon : Are you aware if Te Kooti, who was a prisoner at the Chatham Islands, is the same man who has been engaged against us ?

The Hon. Colonel Whitmoue : I cannot undertake to say that it is the same man, but this I know, that a native who knew him well, and who was with me on one occasion in front of the enemy, when a Hauhau called out from them about twenty or thirty yards off. My native said instantly, " I'hat is Te Xooti." Another native also pointed him out to me on another occasion, and said, *' I know that man; it is Te Xooti; I was his prisoner, and escaped a few weeks ago." The handwriting of a letter left by le ICooti at Opipi was recognized to be the same as that oi a letter of his from the Chatham Islands. With regard to the fourth resolution, 1 propose to move the following amendment lat the proper time. I have yielded the ipoint of Commissioners because 1 believe the sense of the Council is for them: — " That the Commissioners be instructed to represent to the Juiperul Covernment the Grounds upon which the Colony feels justified in asking for assistance, and to make the following proposals, either of which they are authorized to accept: —

" (1). That the Home Governme-1 should, until peace is restored, subsidize the,Colony to somo extent towards the actual co.-t of its internal defence, the direction and control of the operations against the insurgents being undertaken by the Colonial G vernment. *' (2). That the Home Government should take over the entire control and management of the military operations requisite for the complete suppression of the rebellion, the Colony paying one half the cost —or such proportion as the Commissioners may agree. "(3). That the Home Government should grant its guarantee to a loan of one million sterling towards the expenses already incurred and hereafter to be incurred by the Colony in the suppression of the existing rebellion." That, to my mind, is the direction in which we should frame such a resolution as this. We should define something like what we mean, and leave the Commissioners a certain latitude in arranging it. I should be glad to see that clause improved in some such direction as that. With regard to the fifth resolution, we shall know something of its history, and can form an idei of what we are expected to do with it in this place, now that it has served its turn. But I see something in it that is advantageous, at all events in spirit, t would like to leave out what I consider impracticable and dangerous, and bring into stronger relief what I consider the useful part of ihe resolution. I should also like to provide means for the Commissio ers to carry out their duties instead of sending them home empty handed. 1 cannot see, myself, what advantage can arise from enquiries ; they never cjme to anything. There is some correspondence on the table, fivo or six inches thick, on the subject of defence, which shows how much good has arisen from our enquiries on the subject of' harbor protection, x'he proposed enquiries we shall be none the better for, for I may say. with regard to the military authorities, and that no two officers could be found to concur as to what would be the best and cheapest force for New Zealand warfare; it is almost impossible they should know from the little experience some of them have had of New Zealand warfare, and this point of Ghoorkas used to be debated amongst them at the time of its first mention by Mr Wilson without being settled. Ghoorkas, Sikhs, and troops in some res pects more like a guerilla corps, were talked of, and various proposals were made and met with a certain amount of adherents among the senior officers of the army, but I cannot say that I feel satisfied that any of the proposals would suit our circumstances or means. Our pockets are too shallow for any such kind of warfare as the authorities at the Horse Guards would recommend. We have a fair idea of what we can do, and I presume the gist of all we can do will be seen in tha new police force, which Mr Branigan is going to bring to perfection. Why should we bring out from home a new system or have two systemV? I can understand what is said of the strain on the labor of the country being too grievious, and that we recruit rather from England than make any further drafts on the laboring classes in this country, Therefore, I propose t» amend the fifth resolution in that direction, leaving out all that refers to Ghoorkas. I do not believe that we want for men — in the offensive sense which I read in the English newspapers —to put down the rebellion, but it may be impracticable and inadvisable to take them ; and there is something to be said in favor of bringing recruits to the country, as not only would ihey increase our population, but give us good selected men to begin with. The honorable member said something about making the Colonial recruit into the highly organized soldier, but the recruit you have to deal with here is a man who for a time has been his own master —has been independent, and chafes against all restraint on his actions. It cannot be expected that in so short a time ca six months, half the time considered necessary in England to make a soldier, wo should convert that man into a machine; for whether he is a policeman or a soldier, ho is machine as far as his free will goes, and that is unavoidable. I feel that the great drawback to the subjugation of the natives is the political element iu this country. It is not so much a task we cannot carry out, but we never agree to finish it as we begin. We do a little, and then leave off. I say it without hesitation, that the present inaction of our force has postponed the restoration of peace at least one year, unless the enemy was subdued when it began. My grounds for that opinion I will state to the Council, that they may judge between me and those who say "No, no." When the late Government went out of office, as is explained by papers on the table, they happened to be carrying out the largest operation they had ever undertaken in this country. They had not quite finished on the West Coast, and they were carrying on operations on the East. The reason was, the season was drawing to a close, and it was desirable to make the most of what remained of it. It was never contemplated to maintain euchafoico as that then on pay, and that was well understood by the late Government and others, for it was bey*nd our means; but it was neeessiry while we were carrying on war at several points at once along the ciicuuifereiice of the island. I therefore proposed, and it was the object of the late .Government, to put the bulk of the force in the centre ot the island, because in that position the troops would be able to move in any direction to aid the settlers and friendly natives, and bo easily kept informed by telegraph of any outbreak, or any movement to commit massacres, or any projected attack on

friendly natives. These were the aims of the Government, and they had so far succeeded that I think, at this moment, there were 300 of the Ngatiruanui tribe in our power, and a small remnant 01 ly remains to come in. Titokowaru and his men were then at Ngatimaru, and it was in order to capture him that we were main* taining a force of 1,000 men on pay. Had that force continued vigorously to oppose Titokowaru, we might, by this time, have crushed his hapu aud destroyed his power. I know arguments are raised against thi* notion on account of the season of the year being winter, but let honorable members reflect that the campaign in winter ia harder to the natives than to ourselves, and our men, if only encouraged, would not have grumbled, if Titokowaru was within reach, at bping called on to crush him. That is my opinion ; the Natives find the winter hard to bear, and there is a depression, after a long period of excitement and defeat, among them, during which they are easily defeated, and if they are not allowed to rest after defeat, they are easily crushed. On the West Coast there is an enemy without ammunition : I do not think it is so easy to get now as formerly. Ido not say he has not a round, but he lias far too little to maintain an engagement of any duration. Te Etoti's force has made several outbreaks from the mountains to get ammunition, and I know it must, be difficult for him to get any in :he Urewera country. But, whether through friendly natives, or whether tl)rough Europeans unworthy of the name, we know that, in process of time, the Natives do obtain ammunition if they are left at rest ; and therefore for another reason, it would have been desirable to have pressed on our operations. I admit that it was novel, but I do not think that wo iiave any right to say that it would have failed. We had gone a great length already, and we stood in a position then to give it a fair trial. Of course, when the VVaikari Moana expedition had attacked and reduced the Urewera strongholds, the expanses would have been reduced in the saine manner that they have been now reduced, but with this difference, that the force would have been reduced after It had carried out the object for which the expense had been undertaken, instead of exactly at the moment when it had reached the point at which it could strike with effect. I have been for many weeks here, and I have been unwilling to state my impression on the suhjjct, because I had not access to the information in a way which, would entitle me to mention it, but I have now read in almost every newspaper in the Colony what I am now saying, and I have heard civilians, who had not obtained their knowledge from official sources, declare that the expedition at Waikari Moana was ready to attack about the tiraj it was ordered to return. It is true that, as stated in the papers before the House, L had received orders once before to withdraw the expedition, but upon Colonel Herrick's representing that within a few days the preparations would be completed, the late Government reconsidered its decision. I have good reason to believe that the labor waß completed when the expedition was withdrawn, and although the God of battles alone knows what the ond would have been, it was a bitter disappointment to a large number of Englishmen who had gone through so much, to be called off at the moment they were ready to strike. I think it is a pity that the operation was not carried out, because it will have to be done again some day That is one reason why I say that the war has been prolonged by the (course which has been adopted: With regard to Titokowaru, it is true that the present Government are in no way responsible for the fact that the officers did not wish to fix the responsibility upon any person, but theie is the fact that Titokowaru, with a small force, was within thirty miles of the mouth of the Waitara river, and with every ally who could assist him he could not have brought one man for every three we could have employed any day wo liked, against him. Besides this we know that he was dejected, without ammunition, and that every hapu of the tribe except his own had most ingloriously surrendered to us at discretion. Under these circumstances, I think that a person must be very prejudiced to say that it was advisable to reduce our forces before they had struck that blow. The fact of the rivers being up, which detained Colonel Lyon two months ago, might not have occurred again, and I cannot believe that it has been continuously the case ever since. I am aware that Mr Parris and Mr Kichmond were opposed to it, as I have found them invariably opposed to anything like enterprise against the enemy, highly as I respect both gentlemen ; but there was not a soldier, not a man of experience, who knew the country, who was not convinced that the work was easy of accomplishment, and I myself would gladly have gone as a private soldier, rather than that Titokowaru should ho allowed to recruit and give turther troupe to this country. So much with reference to two of the foroes which were recalled.