Hawke's Bay Herald. TUESDAY, APBIL 28, 1885. THE AMEER'S LOYALTY.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXII, Issue 8148, 28 April 1885, Page 2

Hawke's Bay Herald. TUESDAY, APBIL 28, 1885. THE AMEER'S LOYALTY.

Very conflicting statements appear from time to time as to the loyalty of the Afghans to the British. On the one hand Reuter represents the Ameer as cordially co-operating with the English authorities iv India, while the special messages to the Press Association are apparently of a very different tenor, as from that source we have been repeatedly assured that the loyalty of the Afghans is suspected, and that the Ameer would make large concessions to Russia rather than let the British enter; Afghanistan. These two seemingly conflicting representations may, however, both be true. Reuter's agent has strictly confined himself to the personal attitude of the Ameer, while the special messages of the Press Association refer rather to the attitude of the Afghans as a whole— and the two are by no means synonymous terms. The personal fidelity of the Ameer may well be believed in, for he was placed on his throne by the British, and he has held it largely through British influence. When in the last Afghan war Ayoub Khan's power was finally crushed at Kandahar by General Roberts, the present Ameer, Abdurrahman Khan, was elevated to the throne because he was known to be friendly to the British, and, for an Eastern monarch, of a liberal and temperate disposition. At first he met with no slight difficulty in keeping his unruly subjects in check, and to enable him to hold his own the Indian Government has since paid him a large yearly subsidy towards the support of his army. It may thoreforo be expected that both the Ameer and the regular army are in accord with the British. Yet, though Abdurrahman's loyalty may be of true gold, it may yet be the fact that he would be very loth to see British tsopps in hig dominigufl. TUogo

troops could only be there in the event of war with Russia, and various considerations may cause the Ameer to view that posibility with the gravest apprehension. He may doubt the power of the British to fulfil their promises to repel the Russians, and even if he believes in the ultimate success of the British arms he may naturally look to the probability of being afterwards reduced to a vassal of the Indian Government, with only the shadow of power left to him. More powerful than either of these fears may be a conviction that he is yet far from firmly seated on his throne, and that his rivals would seize the opportunity of a war with Eussia to foment an internal rising. Abdurrahman has been a fairly enlightened ruler, he hasdone much in the way of internal reform, and year by year he has gained in power and influence. The maintenance of peace would afford him further opportunities of strengthening his seat on the throne, and peaco may be in his eyes so desirable as to be purchased at almost any sacrifice which does not involve actual vassalage to Russia or England. War, on the other liand, would place him in a position of great danger. The opposition to his rule is only smouldering, and under favorable circumstances it is quite possible and even probable that the open firea of rebellion would burst out, unrepressed by patriotic feelings. His enemies would, we may be sure, make the most of his alliance with the British to make it appear that he was in league with them to reduce Afghanistan to the position of a dependent State, if not an integral part of the Indian Empire, and thus the national feeling may see true patriotism in repressing the Ameer instead of repelling the 'Russian. Of course we do not know that the Ameer is influenced by the considerations we have briefly sketched, but we offer them as a probable though speculative explanation of what are, looked at only on the surface, irreconcilable statements as to the attitudo of the Ameer.