Hawke's Bay Herald. TUSDAY, MAY 15, 1877.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XX, Issue 3906, 15 May 1877, Page 2

Hawke's Bay Herald. TUSDAY, MAY 15, 1877.

Since last week, when the intelligence arrived of the interchange of more or less unfriendly communications between Lord Derby and Prince Gortchakoff, together with the intelligence of extensive British military and naval preparations, the thoughts of the colonial public have been turned with more earnest attention than hitherto to the Eastern question ; and, to judge from the contents of the newspapers elsewhere, the one question that every one is asking is the questions, Whether Great Britain is likely to be involved in the Russo-Tuvkish war, and, if so, why 1 In referring to the latter question, as bearing on the problem of 1853, the historian of the Crimean war writes : — "It might be a complex task to prove that the rule of the English in Hindostan is connected with the stability of the Sultan's dominions in a far distant region of the world, but whether the theory of this curious interdependence be sound or merely fanciful, it is certain that the conquest of the shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, by one of the great continental Powers, would straiten the range of England's authority in the world, and, even if it did not do her harm of a positive kind, would relatively lessen her strength. The effect too of Bussia's becoming a Mediterranean Power could not be so clearly foreseen and computed as not to be a fitting subject of care to English statesmen."' It is the realization of this last possibility, viz., that of Russia's becoming a Mediterranean Power, which British policy in the East has been, for the last half century, directed to avert, the dread being that, in that event, our communication with India, by way of Suez, might at any moment be cut ofT. It should not be forgotten, however, that a French alliance would, at any time, make Russia to all intents a Mediterranean Power, by giving her navy the freedom of the French seaboard ; and the opinion is coming to bo very generally entertained that England's true policy is to protect her communication with India by securing her command of the Suez Canal ; as also, that if this were once done, she might cease to concern herself about the fate of Constantinople. The Czar Nicholas, in his famous conversation in 1853 with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, showed that he entered into the situation of Great Britain in the matter, and understood her true interest better than many of her own statesmen did. In discussing what should be done with the various portions of the Ottoman Empire in the event of its dissolution, he remarked that Servia and Bulgaria might be constituted independent states under his protection. "As to Egypt," he said, " I quite understand the importance of that territory to England. I can then only say that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession on the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objection to ofier." Sir Hamilton Seymour replied that he always understood that the English views upon Egypt did not go beyond the point of securing safe and ready communication with British India, and this, no doubt, expresses the precise truth. What England wants is a Gibraltar at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. She need not necessarily be the proprietor of any great extent of Egyptian territory, or, indeed, of any Egyptian territory at all, beyond a port for her ironclads and a site for her arsenal. Her position, however, in Egypt must be such as to give her the right to exclude any other Power. That this end should be attained, is coming to be the view of the most far seeing, both of the Liberals and Conservatives ; and we are much disposed to think that its realisation will be one of the ultimate issues of the present complication s. A\istria and southern Germany have an infinitely closer interest in keepin" Russia away from Constantinople than England has. The watery highway for their commerce lies, by way of the Danube and the Euxine, through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It is quite certain that, in 1854, if Russia had persisted in pushing on her invasion of Turkey in Europe, Austria would have poured in on her Hank and rear the troops which she had assembled for the purpose in the Banat and Transylvania. Austria now, we are informed, is neutral, but holds herself free to operate as she thinks best. There is little doubt that, in spite of the unpopularity of a war against Russia, on the part of her Slavonic subjects, if her interests were touched in so vital a part as the command of the Danube and the Straits, she would not hesitate to go into it. From the 'last telegrams to hand, we gather that ■it is all that Russia can do to hold her own against the Turks single-handed. Austria's opposition would be immediately and utterly fatal to her hopes of success. As this opposition is certain to be offered in the event of Constantinople being threatened, and as, in that event alone, is it to be imagined that England will intervene, the chances of her intervening appeal* to be somewhat remote. To this it is to be added that, even should Constantinople ultimately fall before the Russian arms, and should Austria and Germany

quietly look on, it is even then far from certain that Great Britain wovdd enter the arena of hostilities. It appears, indeed, far more probable that wiser counsels would prevail, and that she would content herself with securing her position at Suez, a stop to which, probably, neither l^ussia nor any other European Power would ofier opposition.