PRIVATEERING IN CASE OF WAR.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XX, Issue 3905, 14 May 1877, Page 2

PRIVATEERING IN CASE OF WAR.

(From the " United Service Gazette.") It is no secret that ;i very strong feeling pervades the Russian people in favor of attacking British commerce by privateering in the event of war. We are informed through the Russian Press, as also by "our own correspondents," that large sums would be forthcoming from private sources alone for the purchase and equipment of privateers in different parts of the world. There is no reason whatever to doubt the truth of such information. The Treaty of Paius is certainly not likely to bo respected by Russia, in the face of what has already been repudiated by her. Treaties and solemn assurances are treated as matters of no moment by Russia, when they are found to stand in the way of

foregone intentions and conclusions. Never, perhaps, has any power exemplified to the full the doctrine of the end justifying the means as - has Russia. As a naval power she has, so . far as her fleet is concerned, acknowledged her impotence to contend with even that of Turkey. The squadron she has in the Mediterranean has been ordered to America. Safety from capture may be her motive, but there is also another that it is as well, taking the chapter not only of possibilities but probabilities into account, should not be overlooked. The Russian ships of Avar, while In the waters of the United States, need not have on board their full complement of men and officers to insure their safety in those neutral waters. Other or more effective work would be ready to their hands in the event of war. The electric cable would no sooner have conveyed the news of hostilities between the two countries having been proclaimed, than the scheme which has been fully organised would be put in force, which is nothing more nor less than the manning of a fleet of privateers with officers and men from the Russian squadron. The Russian admiral, with the power conferred upon him of issuing letters of marque, would thus be able to act almost instantaneously, and before even a sufficient number of English men-of-war could be collected upon the station, a terrible commercial blow would have been struck at English commerce. It is useless to talk of the neutrality of the United States and of neutral ports. A fleet of Russian Alabamas would be abroad and at work. The first intimation of the fact would be the English merchant vessels sent in as prizes. It was not solely for the safety of the Russian Mediterranean squadron that the Emperor ordered it to proceed to the United States. Russian prescience saw that the naval officers and men could be more effectually employed than in defending their ships. To run the risk of attack by an ironclad squadron would have been to in-siu-e the Russian ships finding secure moorings in an English habor. To send them to America was not only to insure their safety from any such attack, but to make their valuable personnel available in the direction Aye have foreshown. There are other ports in which the safety of the ships could have been equally well assured, but there are none other than the ports of the United States, whence the force on board them could be so readily dispersed in vessels already selected for service as privateers. But this is not all. Let us turn our glance from the Atlantic and the United States to the shores of Eastern Asia and the North Pacific Ocean. Here are ports of which we hear little. There is neither press nor special correspondent to tell us what is doing. Occasional rumors only reach this country as to Russian activity at the mouth of the Amoor at Petropaulovskit — a name that certainly does not bring back the pleasantest of reminiscences to either England •or her navy. The mouth of the Amoor too — say Castraes Bay — has also unpleasant memories connected with it. Then there is the southernmost of the latest of Russia's territorial acquisisitions in the China Seas. If we glance at these we find sufficient cause for anxiety. In each and all these ports, Russia will be found to have vessels fully armed and equipped, of great sail-power, that could keep the sea for months, ready to launch forth against our ships sailing from California, India, and Japan. This is no ideal picture ; it is a realty. And what vessels of sufficient sail and steam power have we at present ready to catch these Russian Alabamas ? We accept for granted that when overtaken they would be captured, notwithstanding they would be well armed and manned. But we repeat, what vessels have we that would stand any chance of successfully competing in sail-power and speed Avith the clipper Russian privateers ? Possibly the Admiralty may be able to answer the question ; for ourselves Aye cannot.