SENTENCED TO DEATH

Hawera Star, Volume LII, 17 November 1932, Page 6

SENTENCED TO DEATH

Jepson Guilty of Murder RECOMMENDATION TO MERCY Conclusion Of Three=Day Trial JURY'S BRIEF RETIREMENT HIS HONOUR’S SUMMING-UP. A verdict of guilty, with a strong recommendation to mercy, was returned by the jury at the conclusion, in the New Plymouth Supreme Court yesterday, of the* trial of Hubert Cedric Jepson, charged with the murder of his. wjfe and two children at their home in Frankley Road, New Plymouth, on September 15.

There was a stilled silence in the court as His Honour, Mr Justice Reed, donned the black cap and said: “The jury has found you guilty, prisoner. There is only one sentence •that can be imposed by this court; that is that you be taken to tne place of execution and there be hanged by the neck until you are dead.” Asked previously if he had had anything to say why the sentence of death should not be passed upon him, Jepson had, in a steady, quiet voice, replied “No.” He showed no visible signs of emotion as he turned in the dock and was led away. The evidence in the case was concluded at 11.10- a.m. Mr A. K. North, who was associated with Mr J. H. Shoat in the defence, then addressed the court for 50 minutes, being followed by tlio Grown Prosecutor, Mi* 'E. H. Quilliani. The court rose at 12,50 and at 2.15 Mr Justice Reed .summed up. The jury retired at 2.50 and retired at 4.6 p.m. The trial, which liad lasted almost three days, arose out of the tragic discovery on the early morning of Sep- j tember I‘s. Jepson .Called at the police J station about 6.35 and it was as a l result of information he gave that the police later called at his house in Frankley Road to find the dead bodies of his wife and younger sou, aged IS months. The elder boy, aged 12, had been so badly injured that he died at the hospital -the same day. All three had been struck on the head with an axe.

THE FINAL STAGES

ADDRESSES FOR. DEFENCE

11l addressing: the jury for the defence, Mr North said they recognised the jury had patiently listened to the evidence and the defence had no complaints to make as to the conduct of the trial, which had been perfectly fair to the accused. This was a case of wilful murder or not and short of the crime of treason was the most serious crime known to the law. Wilful murder involved the wrongful killing of someone. It was; admitted, as had been pointed out in opening, that Jepson had killed his wife and two children; but it would be a terrible thing for him to be found guilty of a, crime for which he was not responsible. The law presumed a man to be sane until the contrary wa/s proved. He submitted that the' defence had established, and established beyond doubt, that Jepson was not responsible fop hi S' acts of that morning. To establish this they had not tO' i>rove that lie was insane, but that he was the victim of an attack which rendered him at the time incapable of Knowing the nature and quality of ids acts. It was necessary in all such cases to prove a -guilty intention, and it liad to be asked if Jepson knew what he was doing and whether it was right or wrong. They must distinguish between a mere glimmering knowledge and that capacity for determining between right or wrong. Otherwise it would be necessary to establish absolute unconsciousness before there could be an acquittal in such a case. Counsel then cited some authorities in support of his submissions as to the insanity of Jepson at the time of the crime. Hie said that independent of all the medical evidence, which, after all was. only opinion, the surrounding circumstances of the crime were sufficient of themselves to justify the jury in finding Jepson insane at the time. And, subject to His Honour’s direction, it was within the province of the jury, by what method they liked to follow, so, to find from those circumstances. Counsel made special reference to the evidence of Hr. Walker, who took all those surrounding circumstances, and also to that of Constable Mitchell, who frankly did not believe the man when he came to the police station and made this startling confession.

Counsel was referring to the question. of delusions, when His Honour said ihe thought. he would have to direct the jury that there was no evidence of delusions in this case. Continuing counsel said Jcpson believed lie was doing his family a. kindness, and also, in spite of the Crown’s evidence to the effect that all the victims of the tragedy were well nourished, he persisted in his statements to Constable Mitchell that his family was in want.

PROOF OF DISORDERED MIND Counsel then dealt with the question of epilepsy, and said that from the evidence there could be no doubt that Jepson suffered from an epileptic attack in November last and that brought them to one definite and tangible piece of evidence of a disordered mind. It was clear that Jepson had a, problem, and il that problem reached a certain stage there must be a giving way o' the mind. The question of memory had an important bearing on the matter of dissociation and it had been admitted that there were cases of dissociation in which memory had come through, though some of the witnesses said dissociation was followed by complete loss of memory. Jepson never had made any honok about the tragedy, and even now showed no appreciation of the enormity of the tragedy. Counsel referred to gaps in the story of the crime as told by Jepson at the police station and submitted he at that time made a perfectly frank statement and had no purpose in hiding small and insignificant details when Ihe had given himself up and said he had lulled his wife and children. But it showed that there were these gaps and that he. remembered only the salient features of the crime.

PERSONAL HISTORY OF ACCUSER

Counsel then dealt with the personal history of the accused and said how fine a thing it was to see- his old war comrades rally round and come here

to say what a fine chap they had found him to be. lie -spoke of the marriage and the affectionate relations between husband and wife, and father and children and said no one could contemplate the horror of the crime that had been committed without the deepest feelings of emotion. He then dealt with the difficult position into which Jepson had got, in which he was unable to satisfy his creditors., and the hopelessness of his prospects which was the thing which caused the breakdown of his mind and led to the.commission of the crime on the morning of September 15. The crime itself, in spite of what some of the doctors said, was one of great violence, and the I only suggestion that came to the mind •of the average man that its severity stamped lit as the outburst of a madman.

Pie submitted the defence had fully discharged the onus of proving that the accused was insane at the time and did not understand the nature and quality of his acts and he was entitled to an acquittal on the grounds of insanity. Counsel said the jury had nothing to do with the penalty or with what would happen to Jepson if he were found not guilty on the ground of insanity, The position in New Zealand was different from that in England. In' England in such cases, jf insanity was proved, the verdict was: “Guilty, but insane.” In New Zealand the verdict would he : “Not guilty oil the ground of insanity.” That meant that a person was considered not responsible for acts and was therefore not to be convicted of the crime charged. He concluded with an appeal for a. verdict in accordance with the evidence, which it was submitted had proved conclusively that Jepson was not at the time capable of knowing the nature and quality of his acts, and that those acts were wrong.

ADDRESS FOR. THE CROWN Mr Quilliani, in opening for the Crown, said'that the onus of proof was on the prosecution, which had completely proved that the accused had killed the members of his family. Then came the responsibility on the part of the accused, because the Jaig assumed the sanity of men and it was for him to prove that die was insane. It was for the defence to satisfy the jury that the accused had been so affected by disease of the mind that he was not responsible for his actions. Three definite conditions liad to he filled: ( 1 ) That the accused suffered from a. disease of the mind; (2) that the disease existed to such an extent as to render him incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the act; (3) that he did not know that the act was wrong.

In many cases a man went night “off his head,” with no knowledge of what he was doing, hut if he knew that he was killing a human being he must he deemed to. understand the nature and quality of his act. The law was definite on the matter—it had to be. Everyone concerned with the case would sympathise with the accused, but that was not proper law and could not he used in defence. Everybody in the world had liis own problems and for men to be in financial difficulties was common and, in itself, could not be suggested as a de- ’ A DEFINITE MOTIVE. Accused had had the definite motive that lie was helping liis wife and children. Nobody could agree with that, but the jury had to ask “Did he know what he wars doing?” and “Did he know it was wrong?” Dr. Walker had said that the- fact of the crime was ,conclus(ive of a effanged niiiid. He contended that that doctrine could' not be accepted. The nature fo the crime could never be held to prove insanity. For years and years lawyers had been debating the question of insanity in crime, but had never' been able to improve on the simple tests outlined by the Act and put to the jury by the .speaker. Excepting th e November occurrence of the supposed fit and the murder there was not one thing in accused’s history to suggest that he was insane or to denote abnormality. Therefore the case was peculiarly one to he- viewed from the standard “.imposed by the law.

Then, after the offence, it would have been strange for an Insane man to go to the police station. Constable chell had behaved with the greatest consideration and ifairnesS and the man had volunteered a good deal. There were many features denying insanitv because they were so rational, orderly and usual. He had told the police of many .small details. Was there any sign whatever of losis of memory? Re seemed to have volunteered every detail land from that the speaker would have though it impossible for lack of memory to be suggested. Regarding the axe and the tea, counsel isubmittecl that small tietails might be overlooked in times of great emotion.

PREMEDITATION QUESTION. Although accused had himself mentioned premeditation Dr. J. M. Allen had not attached much importance' to it. Could the jury, however, afford to disregard this and his admission that he had not been able to kill himself at the end? A great deal had been made' of the November incident. Dr. Williams had said that he had assumed it to be epilepsy and then considered whether it, could heli> an the formation of an opinion on subsequent happenings. That was the fairest way of looking at it. It would he unreasonable to expect a definite conclusion on the question, as all there was to judge upon was the description of laymen of Jepson’s condition. It was difficult to imagine? that there could be any iimportance in accused's remark to Gibson during a. game of chess about “doing himself in.” Gibson, a man with affection for accused, had not regarded at of importance. Regarding the medical evidence, he submitted that if the jury was satisfied that there was no loss of memory, Dr. J. M. Allen’s evidence became Valueless. That admission by this witness himself was the outstanding feature of his evidence. \et at the police station accused had given a clear account of what had taken place, so that if the jury accepted Constable Mitchell’s evidence Dr. Allen’s was ruled out. Dr. Walker had never said that he had found loss of memorv. Thcv know that Dr. Thomson had formed the opinion that the accused knew what he was doing Dr S. Allen had not found loss of meroorv, nor had th 0 two outside doctors who saw him later. That preponderance of evidence would seem to show unanswerably that there was no of memory.

POSSIBILITIES NO PROOF. Dissociation was the symptom of a mental disease. When Dr. J. M. Allen said that he did not attach much importance to the accused’s admission 'chat he had been thinking of what lie finally did. laymen would wonder what they were going to work on. If they could not consider the man’s own statements they were simply up against a blank wall. In his conclusions Dr. Alen had made it- plain that he thought that accused had known what he was doing but had not appreciated to the full nature and quai-

ity of his actions. Epilepsy furore had seemed to Dr. Allen just, a possibility that could not be excluded. That did not amount to proof that the eon- | dition had existed ancl the witness had said that lie did not attribute the crime to that condition. Regarding Dr Walker, counsel suggested that his boundless sympathy had been evident in his eloquent evidence. The jury had to ask whethere he agreed with Dr. J M. Allen. ' Dr. Walker had been the only one to introduce, the possibility of ’ a delusion and he liad said that lie could not u rulers tin id the crime unless it was that of a. lunatic. That was neither the law nor a scientific explanation. On the matter of unnecessary violence it was plain that in a case'where a man “ran amok” lie slashed senselessly with no order or system, so that lie would batter an object beyond recognition. In this case there was no suggestion of unnecessary violence in that sense. Had the defence proved that presence of mental disease? If so, what was it? At the close of its case, he submitted the defence had failed to icstablish insanity. After that surely the evidence for the Crown by four doctors proved that there was no insanity. If they excluded Drs. Allen and Thompson, Drs. Russel and Williams, the two alienists, had a wise knowledge of such things. Both had formed definite opinions and given their reasons for them. According to the conclusions come- to by Dr. TV i!lianis, he would in such cases he on the side of the Crown or the defence. Counsel sumitted that the whole matter should be viewed in a simple wav. Laymen were not precluded from exorcism,<r tlieir own judgment. The jury fdiould take the occurrences of the day in question and ask whether insanity had been established. there was no need for him to l emphasise the responsibility falling unon both the Crown and the jury. The latter vas called upon to fulfil one of the most important tasks of citizenship. He knew that it would do its duty conscientiously and in accordance wit a the evidence. Counsel finallv paid a tribute to the very able defence. Everything possible had been done for the prisoner and the way in which the trial had been conducted was a tribute to the system of justice in this country.

JUDGE’S SUMMING UP. His. Honour commenced liis summing up at 2.15, immediately after the luncheon adjournment, and concluded it 35 minutes later. He joined. with, counsel in saying it was satisfactory to have observed how attentively and with what patience the jury had followed the evidence. He had not the slightest doubt that the jurymen would do their duty well and in accordance with the terms of their oath, however unpleasant that duty might be. He said the case had been well presented from both sides, and he agreed with the Crown Prosecutor that the defence had been conducted in an able manner by counsel, who had very evidently made exhaustive inquiries into the matter. They had not failed to present any aspect in favour of Jepson. Owing to the fact that the case had been so well presented his task had been lightened considerably. His Honour then proceeded to deal with the duties of himself and the jury in the matter. It was the duty of the jury to consider all the evidence carefully and to give its finding on the facts, of which it was the sole judge. He propose?} to draw attention to certain facts brought out in evidence, but if he appeared to lean one way or the other he asked the jurymen to disregard such an impression and to j judge the case according to their consciences and their own weighing of ! the evidence. \

Killing under the circumstances that had been described to the court amounted to murder, said his Honour. First of all it rested on the Crown to prove that Jepson had done the killing. 'There w T as no real dispute as to that, and he thought the Crown had discharged that onus. Jepsons’ wife and two children had been found killed early on the morning of September 15. Jepson was the only other occupant of the house at the time. Blood was subsequently found on bis hands and clothes. He volunteered a statement that be bad killed bis family. There could therefore be no doubt that be bad committed murder, unless some special defence were set up to tlie satisfaction of the jury.

ONUS OF INSANITY PROOF. The Crown had had to. satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that Jepson was the person who bad done the killing, but when it came to the real defepce—that he did not realise what be was doing—the onus rested on the defence of proving to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time of the commission Jepson was ; insane to that extent. The law presumed a person to be sane until proved otherwise.

Tliis 1 case was of considerable importance because* next .to treason, murder was the most serious crime known to law. No one desired that a person proved to he insane .should be punished for an act for which he was not responsible, and if the evidence satisfied the jury the man was insane when lie performed the acts it was a iplain duty to bring in a verdict of not guilty on the grounds of insanity; but it wa.s equally imnortant for the jury to see that- a- guilty man should not escape the consequences of his act. Murder was a verv serious crime, and it was the duty of the court and the jury to see that protection was given to human life, and therefore not to bring in a verdict of not guilty unless the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that there had been insanity at the time of the act.

His Honour proceeded to review the development .of the law in relation to insanity as a, defence to a crime. Eighty-nine years ago, he said, the law in England on the defence of insanity was in a rather doubtful position. There was no code in England that dealt with the point and the decisions of judges varied considerably Then a man named Norton attempted to murder an official high in the Government service. He was tried and acquitted on the grounds of insanity. From a consideration of the case it appeared that the jury had come to. the right conclusion, lint- public feeling was running so bisdi at tlie time that the House of Lords exercised its right to summon the judges to the House of Lords' to answer a number of questions recording insanity and murder. Tim judges answered the summons and with one exception gave unanimous answers that were afterwards used in the framing of the law on the suhiect and later adopted in the codified law of New Zealand.

INSANITY DEFINED

Asked what were proper questions to he delivered to a jury when insanity was pleaded as a defence to the commission of a crime, for cxaninlc, murder, the judges answered the House of Lords to the effect that juries should he told in all cases that a man was presumed to be sane until the contrary was proved and -that to accomplish a defence of insanity the accused person

must he proved to be so insane as not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing, or that it was wrongful. ... If the accused were con-

scions that his act was one he ought not to do and one against the law his offence was punishable. His Honour referred to a charge to a jury given by Sir Robert Stout at a trial for murder not dissimilar in its circumstances from the present case. A man had murdered his child because the conditions in liis homo were unhappy and he believed it to be in the child’s interests to kill him. Sir Robert had pointed out that the code placed on the defence the burden of proving that the man being tried for murder was insane at the time of his act. Doctors might differ regarding the nature of insanity. Some persons might say that no man was sane who committed a crime, but that was not the law. The law was that for insanity to succeed as a defence it must be shown that the mind was diseased to such an extent as to render the man incapable of realising the nature or quality of his act and the difference between right and wrong. . . It was not the opinions of doctors that mattered, Sir Robert had said, but the answer to the question: Did the man at the time know the nature and quality of his act and that he was doing wrong? Mr Justice Deed said he could. not improve on that. Jepson had considered he was right in putting his wife and children out of the way, but that did not answer the question whether he knew he was doing wrong. In the States ‘ ‘ uncontrollable impulse” was recognised as an excuse, but in England it was considered dangerous to admit that as a defence, and the law laid it down that the disease of the mind must be such that the man was incapable of understanding the physical nature and quality of his act —in other words, did he know that ho was hitting Iris wife | with the axe, that such act was-wrong, and that he was doing something forbidden by law?

NOT CERTIFIABLY INSANE, It had been admitted Jepson had not. been ccrtifiably insane; nor, according to his own witness, Dr. Allen ("Wellington), was lie insane before or after tlie act. The defence was practically that, owing to sonic peculiar action of the man’s mind, lie had been temporarily insane; the jury had to be satisfied on that point. It was a horrible crime and it was hard for persons of ordinary feelings to understand how the details could have been calmly thought out. The fact that Jepson had said he thought about the matter for weeks did not necessarily show lie was insane. He had said lie now regretted the deaths, in the same manner as if they had been brought about by accident, or natural causes. The doctors called by the Crown had said lie was not suddenly rendered insane at the time so as to cause him to do tlie acts. It was for the jury to decide, said his Honour after recalling "Jepson’s early statement to Gibson that there was "no other way out.”

After reviewing tlic evidence of Jepson’s actions and statements immediately after the crime, His Honour pointed out that the police officers had found conditions at the house were in accordance with wliat Jepson had said. There had been a conflict of medical evidence, but after all the doctor’s opinions were based on theory, for they could not sec into a man’s mind. One side had said Jepson was suffering from mania, or that his mental power had been destroved by an epileptic condition. The doctors on the other side had said he was sane at the time and knew what he was doing. His Honour gave all the doctors credit for saying what they honestly believed to bo true, and he recalled Dr. Williams’ statement that his duty had been merely to report on Jepson’s mental condition without favouring one side or the other. After all, all the medical evidence was a question of theory, and the jurymen would probably decide that to reach a conclusion on the point of sanity or insanity they were thrown back to a consideration of the man’s acts and the manner i/i which he gave the information to the police. The .jury could bring in one of three verdicts. If it were decided Jepson was not the man who killed his wife and children—and that seemed out of the question—the verdict would be “Not guilty.’’ If it. were found lie committed the crime, and at the time know what he was doing and that it I was wrong, the plain duty of the jury was to bring in a verdict of “Guilty.’’ If, on the other hand, it were decided that it had been proved lie was at the time of his acts insane according to the law, the verdict would be “Not guilty ,on the grounds of insanity.’’ His Honour concluded by saying he 1 was sure the jurymen would do their duty® and would 'not fail to remember that the proper performance of that duty was important in the public interests and the administration of justice. ;