GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Hawera Star, Volume XLIX, 12 April 1929, Page 5

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

AN OFFICIAL HISTORY.

VALUE OF ENTERPRISE. CAUSES OF NON-SUCCESS. •’nited Pres*- Association— By Electric TolegrapD Copyright.) -United Service) LONDON, April 10. The first volume of the Official History of the Gallipoli Campaign, with an admirable preface by BrigadierGeneral C. F. Aspinal Oglander, gives full credit to the Aimacs’ superb cooperation with the British troops. The composition of the Australian and New Zealand units and tlieir States of origin are fully detailed. The preface points out that the campaign’s lack of success was due great Iv to the neglect of age-old principles of war. All the belligerents displayed heroism and self-sacrifice reaching the topmost pinnacle of human endeavour. It. is contended that a wiser policy in 1915 would have been to regard the importance of the western front as latent, and cancel the spring offensive in France in favour of a temporary defensive while striking a strong sudden blow at the Near East to destroy Turkey, succour Russia, and rally the Balkans to the entente. When the crucial decision had to be made the British Government lacked an authoritative General Staff at the War Office to supply a broad general view, of the military situation. For this reason, with barely enough munitions for one theatre, offensives were simultaneously undertaken in two, neither attaining success.

Tt is doubtful whether any army ever operated under more demoralising conditions than those which faced Sir lan Hamilton’s forces at the Dardanelles. The problem of 1915 was not incapable of solution. Thrice the: issue hung in the balance. A combined naval and military attack, carefully planned before embarkation and carried out under surprise conditions, could scarcely have failed. As it was, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in Gallipoli, with a smaller casualty list than was incurred on the first day oi the battle of the Somme in 1916, destroyed the flower of the Turkish army, safeguarded the Suez Canal, and laid the foundation of Turkov’s final defeat. It is stated that the first estimate of the Turkish forces opposing the 15,000 Anzacs on April 25, 1915 was 20,000 men. Later statistics placed this number at 13,000. Something not previously disclosed is the service rendered in the nick of time by the Australian submarine AE° During the landing of the main Anzac bodv a Turkish battleship intermittentlv shelled the anchorage and compelled the transports to change their positions. But to the amazement of the watchers it ceased fire just when it was causing most annoyance. It was later ascertained that this was directly due to the passage of AE2 up the Narrows. The Turkish battleship sighted her periscope near Ghanak and incontinently ran for safety. Thus the, submarine directly assisted m the Anzac landing.