BRITAIN’S NAVY

Hawera Star, Volume XLVII, 16 March 1928, Page 9

BRITAIN’S NAVY

SHARING THE BURDEN. • DISARMAMENT EFFORTS. THE GENEVA OOFERENGE. BY CABLE—PRESS ASSOCIATION—COPYRIGHT Received 12.25 p.m. to-day. LONDON, March. 15. In the House of Commons, the First Lord of the Admiralty (the Hon. W. C. Bridge’nutn), presenting the naval estimates, pointed out that the total almost exactly corresponded with the expenditure of 1914. If they allowed for the increase in the rates of pay and the prices of materials, the estimates really showed a saving of thirtyseven per cent. Most of the delegates at the last Imperial Conference had been much impressed with Britain’s burdens, to which Australia and New Zealand’ had made considerable contributions. He hoped the burdens would be recognised throughout the Empire and that others would follow their example Since ’ the Armistice, Britain had scrapped 1538 ships of a total tonnage of two millions. Nobody could say that we had not done our share; it was more than our share of disarmament, considering that we were the only nation dependent on the free passage of the seas for our very existence. The present naval expenditure was only seven per cent, of the whole Budget, as compared with 24.5 before the war. The United States’ present percentage was B|, Japan’s 14§. An agreement had not been reached at Geneva chiefly because America wanted size of cruisers and we wanted numbers. Since the Geneva, conference, during America’s consideration of her programme, we had reduced ours by three cruisers, partly to meet financial needs, and partly to show that nothing occurred at Geneva to drive us into naval building competition with the United States or anybody else. Too much stress had been laid in relation to the failure at. Geneva. America’s programme contained two cruisers less than the United States had asked for at Geneva. There was no more reason to suppose that the American fleet was going to be used for aggression than ours. lie did" not agree for a moment with the view that the Geneva Conference had 1 done harm and had hindered future limitations, and lie hoped- that the members of all parties would not suggest that Geneva had led to strained relations or the utterance of bellicose views, which was untrue. A great deal of common ground had oeen found- at Geneva in a difficult problem owing to the nations’ divergent needs-. He agreed with President Coolidge’s view that interest and common sense in both countries.- would lead, before long, to further efforts in the direction of the limitation of armaments. He concluded with paying a high tribute to Earl Beatty’s services.—A.P.A. and “Sun.” Mr. C. G. Amman urged the necessity of co-ordination in the fighing .services. the appointment of a committee to examine the whole question of the Ministry of Defence. He deplored the expenditure on Singapore base. Britain at the next Washington Conference ought to propose the abolition of both capital ships’ and submarines and a reduction in cruisers. Major Hore-Belislia. said that the Admiralty did not submit any rational proposal of disarmament.. A better formula than that made at Geneva would be that the country with, the largest maritime trade should possess the largest navy. The Dominions were not hearing an adequate share of the laval burden.

Commander Kenworthy said that if Stir Austen Chamberlain ‘went to Washington following the Presidential election, and explored the position of the next naval limitation conference, hewould do more good for disarmament than all endless tact at Geneva.