The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, Aug. 24, 1946. U.S. ULTIMATUM TO TITO

Grey River Argus, 24 August 1946, Page 4

The Grey River Argus SATURDAY, Aug. 24, 1946. U.S. ULTIMATUM TO TITO

Quick compliance with the American ultimatum by Marshal Tito denotes more than a mere “liquidation of the incident’’ of the shooting down of United States air transports by Yugoslav fighter planes. Release of the captive crews and passengers is accompanied by a promise not to do it again, to give “full satisfaction”, and to allow an American inspection of the aircraft. * An eagerness to extend the Communist regime in Europe had characterised the Yugoslav leader sijice the days before his participation in the Spanish civil wai, or his entry into Yugoslavia. One immediate factor in the . Yugoslavs’ air attack certainly may be their occupation of Venezia Giulia and the wisffi to extend it to Trieste, but behind this Britain aiid the United States see the Soviet’s plan of consolidating a bloc throughout Europe east of a line from Trieste to the western Baltic. This doubtless explains the objection to the Soviet claim for control of t'he Dardanelles along with Turkey only. The Soviet logically compares British control of Suez Canal (and migi’ include Gibraltar Straits) and American control of Panama Canal with the Russian design for a similar relation to the. Turkish Straits. The action of Tito’s aircraft is being generally attributec. to t'lm Soviet desiring to demonstrate its bloc is everywhere dominant east of the aforementioned line which Mr Churchill qhristened the curtai l. That obviously is the British and American official estimate, explaining |

Choir very denunciatory Notes to Tito, and their demands for an instant reversal of policy. . Britain’s Government asserted it is aware that it is the policy of the Yugoslav Government to do . its utmost to discredit the .British Government and the British and American forces in' Trieste”, adding that a Yugoslav Note contained anti-Allied propaganda and wholly. unfounded charges by Marshal Tito. The. reason America and Britain have acted, together in this matter is manifestly due to a conviction that behind Tito stands ihe Soviet, wherefore both have sent considerable squadrons towards the Adriatic. Incidentally, that quarter is characterised by a Communist regime in Albania as well as in Yugoslavia, and the same goes also for Bulgaria, and further east in Rotunania. not to mention Poland, and Czechoslovakia, while Hungary and a

large part of Austria are within the present Communist sphere of influence. It has been noteworthy that Britain is, ab last, disposed to question the subjection of Poland to a Communist regime, and question particularly t'he bona fid.es of the ballots there. Recollecting the several Big Four talks

at vzhicli the Soviet’s objectives were apparently sanctioned, the latest development indicates a growing reaction against that policy on the part of the Western Allies, and the Yugoslav “try out” is only a straw in t’he wind. There had been no question raised when the Communists’ nine to one majorities in .Yugoslavia had reflected their ninety-nine to one majorities in Russia, but now that it is a question of military action beyond the borders, the Western

AJles take note of the maintenance of the large Yugoslav army w'hilst the country lacks an adequate labour supply, and is by no means half as united as the quoted nine to one voting figures would suggest. On the other hand, Tito accuses Britain and America of the same imperialistic design that others attribute to Russia. The fact that America to-day claims, for the first time, to ‘have an interest in the Black Sea might lend colour to this charge. Yet it is evident America is working in with Britain because she has in mind Greece, Austria, Italy, and qtJier East European countries, which fringe t'he Soviet’s sphere of influence. There, of course, is no reason to run away with the idea that events are heading for hostilities pther than diplomatic or political, as no Power is really looking for military hostilities, but suc'h is the famine-stricken, disrupted, and undecided state of 4i great part of Eastern Europe that until something like a settlement is reached, advantage'can be taken of the present weakness of the semi-derelict peoples. Within Germany is seen the radical spiritual and social conflict between two ideologies. Before there is real progress towards the peaceful solution and stability to b? desired, there must be some reconciliation morally between the East, and t'he West.