DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

Grey River Argus, 20 September 1945, Page 5

DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA

MORE SELF-RELIANCE

U.N.C.1.0. Not Certainty

SYDNEY, Sept. 18 According to a Sydney “Herald” correspondent at Canberra, referring to Australia’s defence, said: “Two happenings of this year—the advent of the atomic bomb and the U.N.C.1.0. decision for the world security organisation—have introduced incalculable elements into the planning.” Firm decisions on Australia’s postwar defence policy are not likely to be taken'for some time. The stage is arriving where the Service departments can begin to plot their ideas of future defence establishments for consideration by the Government. No clear idea exists in Australia of the extent to which the atomic bomb will make other methods of warfare obsolete and involve complete changes in the present ideas of proper defence strategy for this country. The broad Australian lines of postwar defence were outlined by the late Prime Minister (Mr. Curtin) last March. The security of Australia, or any part of the British Commonwealth, in the future world, he said, rested on three safeguards. These were the system of collective security which could, be organised on a world and regional basis; the degree of Empire co-operation which could be established, and national defence; and the policy which was purely the responsibility of the Government. concerned. The extent and nature of a Government’s policy would be influenced by the degree of reliance that, could be placed on the oilier two safeguards. Mr. Curtin thought that the security of Australia and New Zealand could be nest achieved by a system of defence eased on an island screen to the north of both Dominions requiring sea power, air power, and military facilities such as docks, aerodromes, and defences. In actual practice, he neld it impracticable for Australia and New Zealand' to defend the area unaided, and co-operation with Britain, the United States, and other Powers with Pacific possessions became essential. The “Herald” correspondent said: “U.N.C.1.0. has left two distinct problems. One is that of the type 'and size of the contributions which Australia can be expected to provide under the security scheme. The other is the extent, to which Australia can rely on the scheme for filling her announced objectives. There is scepticism in some Government quarters on whether U.N.C.1.0. will work as well in practice as os paper. - . It is understood that estimates already are being prepared of the air strength required in peace-time against the possibility of aggression directed at Australia. The Army plans for peace will be evolved in the long transition pbriod, during which the demobilisation of the war-time army will be proceeding and occupation will have to be maintained of some previous Pacific occupational areas. Three schools of thought appear to he arising on the most efficient peace-time system of land defence. One favours a professional standing army. The opponents of this proposal suggest that, the Government may have to ensure that such an army, if constituted, will not. function chiefly to provide employment for too high a proportion of. wartime officers. The second wants a continuance of compulsory military training on more efficient lines than those ol the system which obtained aitei the last war. The third is inclined to minimise the importance, of the army in this air and atomic bomb age.