FROM WEEK TO WEEK

Grey River Argus, 18 August 1944, Page 7

FROM WEEK TO WEEK

(By

H. Winston Rhodes)

CHINESE GUERRILLAS. If we do not have adequate information, at least we have been kept reasonably well-informed of the way in which Chinese troops are fighting in the south. Both because of the Chinese blockade of the north and because of the different method of fighting, we have been able to learn very little about the activities of the Chinese guerrillas. And this is all the more unfortunate because political capital is being made out of the alleged fact that China’s northern troops have been inactive. Michael Lindsay, who was formerly a teacher at ths Yenching University has been the only Englishman who has been in touch with the guerrilla

troops since 1939, and his report published in America is the first comprehensive statement by a Westerner on the Chinese guerrillas in action. “The criticisms of the guerrilla's for not fighting” he insists, “have been largely based on ignorance of the circumstances. Without adequate supplies of ammunition and explosives, the guerrillas cannot make large-scale raids and destroy the railways and it is difficult for them to capture Japanese forts. On the other hand there are continual small-scale operations.”

He gives a great deal of illuminating details about the military organisation and achievements of the guarrillas, about the way in which they mobilise mass support, and about Japanese military strategy and political warfare. He mentions the steady drain on J'apanese manpower, and states that “it is still true that the Japanese can only exploit the areas within a few miles of their garrison posts. This has prevented them from getting any really large supplies of cotton, of which North China was a larger producer before 1937.” Owing to the fact that no supplies are sent to the guerrillas and they must capture everything or almost everything which they use, their base

areas have been reduced in size ana are now intersected by the Japanese lines. And their movements are hampered because the Japanese have been able to build many more forts and garrison them. Nevertheless although at times the main forces of the Chinese have had to be withdrawn leaving only small guerrilla bands and the underground movement, they have been able to return at other times when the Japanese have been forced to withdraw their men. This indicates how precarious the Japanese defence lines really are Michael Lindsay gives an interesting account of some of the tactics employed by the guerrillas. In Central Hopei, he says, “the villagers started by making underground shelters where they could hide when the Japanese came; later these were joined up by tunnels inside the village; 7.nd finally tunnels were made connecting several villages. These tunnels make it possible to escape from Japanese encirclement or for the Chinese troops to appear in a village which the Japanese considered deserted. The tunnels are protected by land mines above ground and by various forms of man-traps underground so that the Japanese do not like to dig for them or venture into them. He explains why it was that in the pariv stap-es of the war against Ja-

pan, the Chinese guerrillas had more adequate supplies of war material. This was because the retreating Chinese armies abandoned large quantities of equipment. But to-day the guarrillas have to rely upon what they capture from the enemy .or upon their mountain arsenals where _ mainly hand grenades and land mines are produced. Sometimes they have been forced to allow a surrounded J'apan-

ese detachment to escape because they had insufficient ammunition to prevent the arrival of Japanese reinforcements. Owing to what Michael Lindsay calls 'the democratic mass organisation’ not only do the Eighth Route Army and the guerrilla detachments receive a constant flow of information about the activities of the Japanese, but also the backward peasantry of North China have learnt 1 to understand the objects of the war

and to continue resistance in spite of all they have suffered. Even in the remote mountain villages, people will ask questions about the war in Europe, and in the areas near the front there is no doubt about the eagerness of the people to help the a v my.” The Eighth Route Army.is a-volun-teer organisation in which the term of service is for three year's, but .owing to inadequate supplies of arms, it- has a long waiting list of recruits who are given part-time training until they can be used. Michael Lindsay’s conclusion is: ‘‘lf the Chinese had better supplies of ammunition the whole situation in North China would be changed. A few light machine-guns or even extensive rifle fire could make the communication lines in the mountains impassable except by large forces, and the new motor roads on the plain with a deep blockade ditch on either side would be death traps for any small Japanese force if the Chinese could use cross fire from machine guns, if the Chinese forces had a good supply of cartridges and s number of light mountain guns, the J'apanese would lose all that they have managed to gain in North China.”