The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, January 11, 1944. INVASION PREPARATIONS.

Grey River Argus, 11 January 1944, Page 4

The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, January 11, 1944. INVASION PREPARATIONS.

The latest information regarding the projected Allied invasion of Western Europe leaves the matter naturally one of continued conjecture for the ordinary individual. It has, however been now stated officially that dates for an invasion have been set. One naval expert commentator, pointing to the shipping aspect, has suggested the month of April next, stating that that month is reckoned by the enemy to be the one most favourable for the Allies. That the date is at least several weeks distant may be also inferred from the declaration of a 'responsible American marine official that many thousands of invasion craft require yet to be completed in the United States. One inference from these indications 1 ! seems to be warranted. The sitfiation is such that the Allies are. able to choose, hot only their ownltime, but their own sites for beacn-heacls. In a considerable degree, this scope is a reflex, of the situation on the Eastern Front, whk’e the enemy is in growing danger of having his forces split, and separated to either side of the Pi’ipet Marshes. Thus the Russians Retain the initiative, and have (consequently less reason to look fbr an early western invasion than they had when the enemy retained a measure of the initiative in the region near Kiev. From the German admission that! one hundred divisions are required to'be ready to stem a western invasion,

it may be inferred that the main problem of the Germans in Russia is not that of deciding whetherto retreat over along stretch, but how to do it. There are obviously little or no enemy reserves available for'the eastern front, because as many as possible must be built up for a new front. Should it happen that Germah forces in large numbers aim captured in the Dnieper Bend, and sixty divisions are said to remain there, the western invasion may .thereby, be hastened to take advantage alike of the military and moral effect, but the wisest conclusion is that the British and American attack will not begin until all is ready. When it is considered that the plans are likely to embrace not merely landings in one particular sector, but successive ones in sectors possibly far apart, the necessity of adequate preparation is evident. Apart from the Balkan areas, such as Greece - and Yugoslavia, which would at least eventually figure in the invasion, many sections of the western and northern European coast are likely to be designed for landings. Each separate one of these would require a distaht organisation, embracing all three arms, even if they should not be conceived as simultaneous attacks. Possibly the most pointed indicators so far have been the direction of the Allied air attacks, which have latterly beeh especially concentrated upon- Northern France. Landings thereabouts wmild also be predicable on the score, that, in addition to being the nearest points, the Allied air forces are so familiar with the terrain all the way to Western Germany that they could blaze the trail the more readily for armies coming in from the beaches. The Germans speak of their Atlantic Wall, the location of which likewise has appeared to have been indicated by the Allied bombing targets. The European war theatre, taken as a whole shows the enemy to be facing a threat of compression which, unless it can be withstood, must crush resistance in a rapidly growing ratio. However, it is in Italy that the Germans are now making their sticest stand, the Allied forces having to fight for every inch of ground. Until the enemy is driven further north the position will not be as favourable as desirable to co-ordinate an invasion of Northern France with one in the South. By April, at the latest, a marked change in the whole situation may be anticipated, and in that event the invasion will, be the finale of the European war.