The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, December 23, 1943. ALLIED STRATEGY.

Grey River Argus, 23 December 1943, Page 4

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, December 23, 1943. ALLIED STRATEGY.

Now 'that a winter offensive has been, started by ' the Bed Army, it may be assumed that the timetable for a corresponding attack against the Germans from the west will be finalised, klonths ago the tip for the command of the invasion forces was General Marshall, the Staff Chief of the American Army, but his recent journey homewards from Teheran by way of the Pacific is interpreted as indicating he will remain in Washington to exercise an influence over the whole strategy of the Allies, rather than to direct British, American and other Allied forces on a western front. The Teheran Conference is now stated to have chosen General Eisenhower as invasion leader, with General Montgomery as his associate, and possibly commander in the field, where he would once more encounter Marshal Von Rommel. The latest Russian initiative has been reported to be aimed at the Baltic, and it certainly is a stroke of large dimensions, but it must be recognised that the Germans have still the great 'bulk of their ground forces available for action on the eastern front, and that a drive towards the Baltic must be accompanied by the maintenance of Russian forces elsewhere in a degree to contain and press the enemy, On the other hand, what will be calculated to facilitate Russian efforts, not merely to hold the enemy, but to expel him from all Russian territory, is a. -western invasion such as now is approaching. General Eisenhower’s presence in England is significant. No secret is made of the fact that the undertaking of w’hich he is the prospective leader will be a mighty one, in which British officers must play a big part, because of their past experience, compared with which that of the American Army leaders is not great. In air and naval operations, familiarity with West European conditions. • as well as Avar experience, dictates that Britain should provide the leadership. So much seems to b'e recognised in the United States. Occasional reports over a lengthy period have indicated the progress in Britain of invasion preparations, and it may assumed that the forces there available are now very great. The forces at present, engaged in Italy are substantia], but they will be a mere fraction of those that are likely to be employed in an invasion across Channel and perhaps in other directions as well. When it is pointed out, therefore, that the coming year is likely to sec lighting on a scale as great as any yet, the launching of an invasion as soon as winter begins to pass is. what evidently is in mind. Meantime, General Marshall’s Pacific tour is quoted as the forerunner of a major offensive against Japan, and this must be regarded as including action by ground forces on the Asiatic mainland, as well as sea and air operations in which the main part will.be played by the Americans. The possession of control of the z Mediterranean must greatly facilitate the Allied strategy, alike against Germany and Japan The encouragement being given the Yugoslav forces of Marshal Tito is calculated to pre-ocicupy German forces, and it must'be assumed that there, will-, also be-a ■ move'against the Balk-

ans in due course by other Allied forces. The Allied air raids are now being directed against southern as well as northern and western Germany, so that in addition to destroying sources of niunitionmeht, there is doubtless the idea of a softening up in preparation for ground action in that direction. Bearing in mind the opportunity which the Allies have had for preparation, the invasion planned for the coming year must be on a vast scale, and, while it may entail a considerable sacrifice, the natural presumption is that there will be such a superiority in force as to make success a certainty.