The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, December 2, 1943. BIG FOUR MEETING.

Grey River Argus, 2 December 1943, Page 4

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, December 2, 1943. BIG FOUR MEETING.

The. principal significance of the meeting of theii* leaders is that the biggest. of the United Nations are now more united than ever. The course of the war, while it may not demonstrate complete strategical unison, is such, that any greater degree of co-ordination might not guarantee any greater measure ot success. .In. fact, when Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt, and Mr. Stalin now foregather in Persia, questions as much, of a political and economic character as ones of military policy, are what must come under discussion. The feeling that Germany’s capacity to resist is now failing becomes more pronounced week by week, and although not officially acknowledged on the part of the Allies, there is evidence that Germany is taking soundings as to what terms she might obtain by terminating her resistance immediately. Therefore conditions for an armistice cannot fail to be discussed by the Allied leaders, and probably have already been discussed at Cairo when the British, American and Chinese leaders m<et there during the past few days. Japan also, must have figured prominently in those talks, and Jhe latest news sug gests that now offensive measures against her are on the eve of being launched. At the same time, Chinese forces are facing a, hew difficult situation, the enemy having bitterly penetrated the Rice Bowl region. However, American air bases are being advanced, against the Japanese in China as well as in the South Pacific, and it is at least as much to air attack as anything that the Allies are now looking for ultimate victory. It is even now being mentioned in America and Australia as the lever that will hasten an end in the Pacific tvar. Russia, of course, remains neutral in that regard, and the Allied conference being held in Persia or thereabouts will relate naturally to

Eastern. Europe, where the, Russians presently may begin to occupy territory beyond their own borders. The German and Japanese forces, although on the defensive, remain very great, and it is for that reason that the enemy must be given no moral eneourag'i?meit, to maintain resistance, such as might accrue from lack of Allied unity. Even in the matter of terms, differences among the United Nations could be exploited by the enemy, not only before, but also after an armistice. On the other hand agreed conditions, based on energy capitulation, could probably be made such as to induce the German, if not even the Japanese, masses to jettison their war lords, under continued pressure from without, and thus hasten a cessation of military hostilities. The pressure, at anyrate, is there already, and the best evidence of its effect is the slow, but steady, constriction of the Axis forces in to a more defensive not to say difficult, position. Those forces are obliged to fight entirely independently, and their common interest is now limited to putting off the day of defeat for both by putting off the day of surrender for either. What hew decisions are being taken by the .Allies must meantime remain .undisclosed, but it is suggested that there are. matters on which agreement remains to be reached. r l he main thing is that there is a determination to reach agreement. That determination spells a victorious conclusion to the war, and perhaps an earlier one than is yet indicated merely by the military situation.