AEGEAN LOSSES

Grey River Argus, 30 November 1943, Page 6

AEGEAN LOSSES

BRITISH MINISTER’S STATEMENT. ’ RUGBY. Nov. 24. Mr Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, in the Commons, made a statement on the Aegean operations. He said they were a two-fold objective, first, to help in the attack in Italy, by causing the Germans to disperse forces. Secondly, to take advantage of the fleeting opportunities which the collapse of Italy had brought. Early in September Crete was held 1 by 55,000 troops, including 30,000 Germans: and Rhodes by 9000 Germans and 40,000 Italians. There were Germans on other Aegean islands but only- Italian in the Dodecanese except Rhodes and Scarpanto. Here was an opportunity to extend and harass the Germans and obtain strategic gains of great value. The night when General Alexander landed at Salerno. General Wilson dispatched a small party to Rhodes. Despite their overwhelming numerical strength the Italians made no effort to deal with, the Germans and noth-

ing could be accomplished. Attention was then given to Kos and Eeros, though well within range of enemy fighter activities. Kos was important for an airfield and Leros as a naval base. Very good work was done by the Navy running troops and transport in heavy disadvantages of narrow’ waters. Its work was augmented by transport aircraft. The immediate result was to attract the enemy’s air resources. First line aircraft which might, have been used in Italy, Sardinia and Corsica were retained for the Aegean. Some 35 per cent, of the German air force including some brought from the Eastern Front had been used in the Aegean. Kos was lost by only a narrow margin, but the loss affected.,the defence of Leros. which might have been evacuated, but with knowledge of the effect of such course, the Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, with the support and .approval of the Government, decided to hold the island. Unfortunately unfavourable weather curtailed air attack by heavy bombers. The British garrison at Leros totalled 4000. Counter-at-tacks which at' first succeeded, later failed in face of constant air attack, and the incessant attacks by German troops landed at night created, weariness too great for the garrison to resist. The loss of Leros was a matter of' profound regret, but the operation contained enemy forces during a critical period of the invasion cf Italy, and inflicted’serious losses on the enemy. Had the attack not been made.' we should have been blamed for lack of enterprise in not trying to exploit the situat'on which offered opportunities. Arguments against operating beyond range of really effective air cover were con-

sidered. but were, disregarded because other eons'derat’ons and hones were held to outw’eigh them.