MISSION TO MOSCOW

Grey River Argus, 26 November 1942, Page 7

MISSION TO MOSCOW

Excerpt from Letter T o Senator Rey Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Brussels. March 24, 1939. “The next few weeks will disclose which door Hitler will attempt to get closed first: The door on the East or the door on the West. It is axiomatic in German military strategy that Germany must not fight on two fronts at the same time. That he will not 4 be content to remain passive for long is a foregone conclusion. The reports which have been published by the German General Staff in the technical magazine, discribing the power and effectiveness of the Russian Army, seem to have dulled Hitler’s i taste' for the DRANG NACH OSTEN. iil “From information I get from most responsible sources and that I think as reliable, Hitler is making a desperate effort to alienate Stalin from , France and Britain. Unless the British and French wake up, I am afraid he will succeed. If he does, he can turn his attention to Western Europe without any concern as to an attack from behind.” Excerpt from dispatch fo « retary of State, Brussels, March 24, 1939 “The diplomatic representatives from the smaller states of Europe here generally point out that although a whole week has gone by sinlce Prime Minister Chamberlain s speech at Birmingham wherein he condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Germany, the Government of Great Britain has not been ' able to create a ‘united front’ even as amongst Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R.—in comparison with the rapid action of the German Fuhrer in the Balkans.” Diary. London, April 3, 1939. Came over here for a week-end to see Winston Churchill a‘t his country place. Had a long visit with Joe Kennedy this morning. Talked about the European situation at length. Joe is very pessimistic. So am I. Took the opportunity of going into the Russian situation at length with Kennedy and suggested he could tell Chamberlain from me, that if they are not careful they would drive Stalin into Hitler’s arms. Britain and France had snubbed Russia, then ally, by excluding the Soviet from Munich; that the Soviets did not trust them anyway, and feared that Britain and France were trying to Use Russia as a cat’s-paw, and would leave them to fight Germany alone; that Stalin wanted peace for Russia above all else; that he might decide to take Hitler as the best bet for his security, at least for the time being. I asked him if he had read the copy of my “Brief on the Facts” report to the Department, copy of which I had sent him. He said he had. He 1 recognised the value of Russia in the military situation; but, as a matter of fact, Russia would have to light for Poland or Rumania anyway, and regardless whether there was a formal agreement with France and Britain or not, because it was vital to Russia’s self-interest. I told him that in my opinion that was a wrong

theory. It was “first things first” in Russia. The Soviets were desperately trying to keep out of war, unless they could feel assured, through specific realistic plans and obvious preponderance of strength, that they, in combination with France and England, could beat Hitler in the event of war or scare him off before hostilities, by serving notice upon Hitler that he would have to fight ah three. From a 1 number of important and reliable sources, I was convinced that Hitler was bending every effort to wean Stalin away from Britain and France, because it was vital to his military success that he close his eastern door before he made his attack on the western front. Somehow or other it seems impossible to make an impression on this London atmosphere. About the only man who really appreciates the real imminence of disaster over here is Winston Churchill. It was reassuring to have him tell me yesterday, that by the middle of the year this “damnable blackmail menace from the air will exist no longer, because we will be prepared. — Ambassador Davies.