The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, November 26, 1942. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE.

Grey River Argus, 26 November 1942, Page 4

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, November 26, 1942. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE.

Expectations that the winter, combined with the diversion of forces by the enemy to meet the now situation in the Mediterranean, would be utilised by the .Russian Army for offensive motion have been already realised. Not only has the initiative been taken from the enemy, but. this in a manner giving rise in the London press to expectations yet greater than when the Russian attack was launched. The Germans had evidently concentrated upon Stalingrad itself so large a part of the strength they had mustered to reach the Volga that they were surprised on their flanks by the strength which the Russians were able to muster. It is now evident the Red Army retained greater reserves in view of winter possibilities than the Germans anticipated, especially at the time that Hitler said they would capture Stalingrad. Between the Volga and Don Rivers, | where in midsummer the enemy made his powerful drives, his I forces to-day are regarded las being in danger of being completely (■nt off from their bases and supplies, whilst the Axis army of the Caucasus is likewise threatened with the cutting of its communications. From the north-west of Stalingrad the Russians have advanced until they are over 70 miles due west of the city, on the south of which also the Russians have made a drive of fifty miles., Though the advanced forces of (he two pincers are nearly 70 miles apart, the gap between them is in some places only fifty miles, a gap which they will continue the utmost efforts to narrow still further until their heavy artillery may be able to span it completely. This war admittedly has not. revealed the German Army unequal to emergencies, but sudden has been the change on the southern Russian front, it js not to be assumed that it cannot be further exploited to such an extent as very largely to undo the advantages which the Germans had gained in the course of the past summer’s campaign. These have included the acquisition of oilfields in the Western Caucasus and a close approach to

others hi the Eastern Caucasus, as well as the severance in sonic degree of Russian supply lines from the Caucasian region. It had been last year shown that the Russians are more at home than the Germans in winter conditions, during which interference with German supply lines must mean greater hardships than ever for the men at the front. Evidently the Russians 'have timed their attacks so as to catch the enemy not fully prepared for the winter, and yet preoccupied at the same time with the Anglo-American initiative in North Africa. For one thing it is no simple matter even in Stalingrad for the Germans to withdraw quickly, should that be necessary, although in actual fact the enemy there continues his operations as before. Au army suddenly disengaging itself is left open to quick pursuit, so tlwat its retreat, is apt to become chaotic, and . therefore slow instead, of speedy. It is reported that in the Caucasus there still are Axis attacks, though they may not be in much strength, |as they have made, no gains; but lit may be necessary for purposes of defence to maintain an offensive. Should the Russians be able eventually to reach Rostov, from the north-western side, oil Stalingrad, half of the German forces in Russia would be faced with the necessity of getting away, and with a very difficult passage out of it via the Black Sea. At anyratc, the siege of Stalingrad is in process of being lifted. In the present circumstances, it is hard to see there any offensive objective which the enemy can retain. He has admitted the force of the Russian attack, and his losses, .as recorded by the Russians, arc alone sufficient to prove how the struggle goes. Especially important is the number of prisoners reported to have been taken by the Russians. Leadership and morale aVe in some degree defective. when forces are cut 'off to that extent, although it must also be conceded that Russian tactics are largely responsible. Before, however, jumping to the conclusion that Russian initiative is destined for a certain and momentous victory, it is as well to bear in mind that the Russians have hitherto distinguished themselves more in defensive than in offensive strategy, and it may depend upon some further conceivable defect in German strategy whether the Red Army can defeat the enemy completely. In any event, however, the Germans have now more trouble facing them generally than at any previous stage of the war, and it ought to be a reasonable inference that as far as the Russians hurl them back will remain in future the farthest point of their easterly penetration. • They will elsewhere have too much to handle to allow of their coming at Stalingrad and perhaps the Caucasus again.