GERMAN HARDSHIP

Grey River Argus, 22 May 1942, Page 5

GERMAN HARDSHIP

Stated by Goering LONDON, May 20,

Reich Marshal Goering in a speech, said: “This war is the hardest that Germany ever has had to fight. There are two fronts, the external front and the home front. The winter campaign has been terrible. The Fuehrer has suffered deeply for his troops, but he knew that he must not yield. He had to hold the front. Only those who have experienced this know what it has cost. There was a veritable stream of bad news from the Russian front during the winter campaign. Russians penetrated our rear on every front; guerrillas blew up railways, and cut our supplies; and terrible cold almost froze our troops. The weather also interfered with our railway communications. Our front was cut off from munitions, food and clothing for days. Men and women on the home front must' understand that, sometimes there is harshness only to achieve triumph. The last harvest was bad. We need more rain for our coming harvest. It is necessary for the arms workers to go on straining every nerve. We must become harder until victory has been won. Our war decrees must be obeyed. Your leaders know what is necessary. They do everything for you. They have the right to expect that you will do what they ask.”

GERMAN HOPES. (Rec. 1.20). LONDON, Mav 21. In his statement, Marshal Goering added: “This war must be fought to an end, and at the end there will be victory. That is all that matters. Do you think that Providence would plav such silly tricks as to give us a great leader, who has saved us and led us to greatness, only let us fall back into the abyss? The German people’s confidence and faith win help us achieve victory.”

Ex-War Secretary

ATTACKS BRITISH WAR DIRECTION LONDON, May 20. Mr. Hore-Belisha (ex-Minister for War) in the debate in the Commons said; The first requirement is t 0 realise we are not fighting the Germans alone, but a formidable Axis combination. We must meet its unified strategy with a unified strategy of our own. There should be a 'Ministry of Defence. We have reached the stage where Chiefs of Staff are guided and directed by a political Minister. This change was made before the disaster in Norway and you cannot divorce the almost unbroken sequence' of strategical disasters from this mixture of political strategical military elements in the war-directing machine. Who told General Wavell to stop at Benghazi. Who decided to send an army to Greece without adequate air support’ We are told it had the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff but SSrenee Is very different torn advice. We have reached an extraordinary pass, when in a war debate we have neither the benefit of the Service Ministers, or the presence ol the Minister of Defence. While Stormoviks are shattering German defences and two thousand Stukas are roaring over the Russian position at Kerch there is no such weapon as a dive-bomber in the British Army. The Japanese passed swiftly .through Malaya with a dive-bomber designed specially for army use. Java was taken by modern tactics, not superiority of arms. General Alexander in Burma, conducted a retreat without cover. Is this to be tolera e after nearly three years of war? it must be stopped.