The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 22, 1942. WAR INITIATIVE ON THE BALANCE.

Grey River Argus, 22 May 1942, Page 4

The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, May 22, 1942. WAR INITIATIVE ON THE BALANCE.

Accounts from Germany as well as Allied sources, agree in regarding the remainder of the present year as the decisive period of the war. Goering tells the Germans of their hardships during the past winter, and, in promising victory, says, it can only come by fighting out the war to the bitter end On the other hand, Allied observers are more confident each day. that if the enemy can achieve no decision before 1453, the ultimate ruin of Hitler’s i.-ystem is certain. Meantime there is greater publicity given to discussions in the Allied war camp, which contrasts with the fact that the Axis expects the forces and peoples to measure their success entirely by the. extent of their sacrifices, and to fix faith, not in their own judgment, but entirely in that of. their dictators. It is really a good sign that the Allies arc

ready' to throw the spotlight upon every aspect of their war effort, and thus enable all to sec that the best possible is being 'done for each and all. The enemy is now stretched to the limit, and in scarcely any respect is able to augment his means of aggression. It is true, as General Smuts says, that Allied confidence reposes largely on the assumption that the side able to draw upon the rescr'woir of men and material Jin ' the United States is bound to be victorious, but that such a confidence is warranted is not due to the potentialities of America .alone. It also is due t« the fad that, first, Britain, and then Russia, have stood the strain while the enemy has been undergoing a steady and very ’evident wearing down precess. As in the last war, America, to rise football parlance, “comes on at half-time,” and is now contributing to the light, a constantly swelling flow of men, ships, aircraft, munitions and other essential materials. For long there has been an Allied shipbuilding shortage, and, while it has been in course of being mitigated, a great leeway in planes, armaments, and forces, has been made up. To-day German air fighting strength is actually weakening. Japan’s, air strength is probably at its zenith, while it must be admitted that she has far greater shipping resources than some Allied observers have been disposed to concede. Sir Stafford- Cripps promises an invasion of the Continent before very long, and would scarcely be able, to do so if Britain not a dertainty that air support will be more than adequate. It is only to be expected that the enemy , offensive in Russia will soon become more general, and it is with an eye to that probability that the Allies are projecting a second front, so that, before the Germans can work up. to their maximum

potential on the Eastern Front, they will be obliged unceasingly to divert the strength to another front. Hence it is a reasonable inference that the Axis is already relying definitely on Japan. to create’ a parallel diversion icn the Asiatic and Australian Fronts. The Allies cannot ignore that aspect of the situation, whereas we in this quarter can scarcely expect to be considered to the extent of postponing an invasion of the European Continent. The United States is now represented in some degree in every war theatre, if only by material in Russia; but has a definitely greater commitment in the Pacific than anywhere rise, so that it may be expected at. the. earliest opportunity intensify activity against Japan with every arm. There is, meantime, one question of global strategy which is for us a vital interest, even if not one as to which we can exert much influence towards, a decision. It is as tb which direction Axis designs may influence Japan to make her next main drive. She is credited with ability to strike simultaneously at India and Australia, and is already in the position to do so. All depends on whether the Japanese prefer first to strengthen theii’ new situation by occupying Australia, or, instead, to isolate or merely neutralise Australia whilst striking at India with the object of occupation and a possible junction with the other Axis forces. If Japan could effect such a ]ink-up, there is no denying that the effect would alter the whole, complexion of the war. But, as, remarked, that objective is subject to frustration, first, if a second European offensive is started on that. Continent; and second, if a successful offensive from cut i-nto the ese flank and virtually severed the advanced wesward forces from their bases. Hence Japan may logically he obliged to attack Australia. It can no longer be said the initiative has remained with the enemy. It is no wonder Goering can console Germans only, with the advice to hang on grimly.