SIR S. CRIPPS

Grey River Argus, 2 May 1942, Page 3

SIR S. CRIPPS

ON INDIAN PROBLEM Negotiations Reviewed [Aust. & N.Z. Cable Assn. I LONDON, April 28. Sir S. Cripps, opening the debate in the Commons, on his mission to -India, said: “Unfortunately, events brought disappointment, but no one in Britain need feel regretful that the Government proposals were put forward, of need blame the Government, or the British, for the failure to reach an agreement. The moment was difficult. Many things that might have usefully been discussed and negotiated in more peaceful times, could not be dealt with because there was the overriding need to do everything in our power to carry out our duty to defend India against the foreign invader. Owing to events in the Far Eastern theatre of war, accompanied by highly-skilled though grossly misleading propaganda from Axis sources, an atmosphere of anti-Bri'tish sentiment showed itself in certain sections of Indian opinion. With the approach of self-government, or Dominion status, as a reality, communal difference of view as to 'the I form of government suitable for the future of India, tended to become more definitely crystallised. It was the need for a' clarification of the situation, and for consultation with Indian opinion in a favourable direction, that impelled Britain to decide some positive step must be taken quickly. Britain’s objective and hope was that she might use ithese very difficulties to bring together all the main leaders of Indian opinion, for? the double purpose of solving India’s future, and reinforcing her defence against the invader. ' The future is inevitably .linked with the present, and I am conftlemt that no .mere temporary arrangement could have- been reached without some exposition of our future intentions. Had we attempted to deal only with the present, we should have immediately been met with the demand for a clarification about the future.

“I was most anxious there should be no suspicion that the Government was hand-picking those whom I saw and 1 consequently I asked the main organisations themselves to appoint those they wished to meet me. I believe that on the fundamental vital points, self-government and -self-determination, there was not a single case of disagreement. “I was alone responsible for what was put forward to the Indian leaders, in amplification of the details of the draft declaration.” Referring to the talks with Colcnel Johnson, Sir S. Cripps said there was no question of any American intervention, but only personal help from a very able American citizen. “I do not believe it was possible to find in the existing circumstances a fairer solution of the problem than the Government’s declaration. There ■was a distinct division of opinion among the Indians on the question of defence, but practically unanimity that the mechanical conduct of the war in India and the control of the fighting force must remain under the British Commander-in-Chief. “Differences of opinion came when responsibilities of the Government of India, anart -from those of the British Government, were considered. It was impossible for the Government to go further with safety, and no risks could be taken at such a moment as the present, on so vital and immediate a matter as the defence' Ci India.” Discussing the difficulties in the way of acceptance of the 1 draft declaration, Sir S'. Cripps said that although he thought the Congressleaders themselves appreciated no restriction would be imposed on the power of the Indian Union, in its future relationship to clher Stales of the British Commonwealth, they were afraid (their followers would attach undue importance to the apparent limitations included in the definition of “Dominion.” The words had been accepter as making it perfectly clear that India could, in fact leave the British Commonwealth of Nations should an Indian Government, under the new constitution, decide.

Referring to the problem of defence, Sir S. Cripps said he took the '.lew, in which the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief agreed, that it would be difficult for representative Indians of the Viceroy’s Executive, to rouse the peoples of India to their defence, unless they could say with justice that at least some part of that defence, was the responsibility of representative Indians, and so of the Indion people. Various suggestions were made, and several formulae tried, until eventually that one was worked out which became the final suggestion. Its object was quite simple, to allocate to the Com-mander-in-Chief as the War Member of the Viceroy’s Executive, all those administrative functions in the Government of India, vital to the efficient carrying on of the war, while, at the same time, leaving to representative Indians, other functions of the defence member, together with several other important functions. He felt pretty sure that had Congress leaders accepted the final draft declaration, they would have been able to rally their followers behind them. It was not on this that the final break came. The possession of complete power asked for ’by the Congress, and not demanded by any other section in India, would have left them in an impossible situation. He was confident that none of the minorities would have accepted such a position, least of all the Muslims. It was on that issue that the final break came, followed by the rejection, as he expected, by the Muslim . League, for reasons the precise opposite of those stated by Congress, but all were concerned with the future, rather than the present. Six' S. Crinps said there was much to be placed on the credit side Advantage had come from the evidence that Britain desired to give India self-government at the earliest pract’cable moment, and wished her to determine the form it could take. The whole discussion had also .served to brine to the front the oeterminPtion of the Ind’an people to defend their own country. _ Many Indian leaders would do their best to arouse the Indian peoples hi their own defence, and he hoped bv co-operation in defence, they would be a step nearer to a solution of the problems.

The Secretary of State for India, (Mr. Amery), reolving in the Commons debate, said the sending of Sir S. Cripps to India marked in ”a 1 pe’ul'ar degree, the unitv of outlook and policy with regard to India, which bad been reached by the Government, P'a-JjiamerAfj a.nd public opinion. RUGBY, lA.nr.il 28.

The Secretary of State for India, sneaking in the Commons said that Sir S. Cripns’ miss'on, and the unanimous policy for which Sir Stafford endeavoured to secure acceptance, were not a sudden improvisation to meet, the critical external situation—a death-bed repentance of unrelegrted Imperialism in the f-ace of the Japanese menace. They were the natural and inevitable culmination of the steady development during the past few years of thought and feelings about Indian aspirations.

Cur ideal remained.unified India, sufficiently united at least to present, a common front to the outside world; but we would sooner see India divided arid free, than keep the various elements for ever chafing against us an against each other, under a sense of impotent frustration. Mr. Amery said that, within the limits of the ultimate responsibility of the Viceroy and Parliament, Sir S. Cripps was given wide latitude, and went to the utmost length to meet the wishes of Congress, but the Indian leaders made no attempt to reach an agreement among themselves. In spite of this, the mission was far from a failure. It. was the epilogue to an old chapter, in which the contending elements strove to attain their ends by belabouring the Government, and the prologue to a new chapter, in which the Indians were beginning to realise that the key to India’s problems was in their own hands. We had certainly not withdrawn what was our main object and purpose, namely that India should as soon as possible attain full freedom, under constitutional. arrangements of her own devising, and suited to her peculiar conditions.

Congress Split

INDICATED BY A RESIGNATION. (Rec. 9.45). LONDON, April 30. The London “Daily Express’s” New Delhi correspondent says:—The Indian National Congress is meeting at Allahabad. The Congress has ratified the rejection of Sir S. Cripps’ proposals. The Congress now faces a crisis, which is shaking the Party from top to bottom. Rajogopalachari has resigned. This Has brought the situation to a head. The Congressmen admit that the crisis may strengthen the hands of the two whom they regard as their bitter opponents, namely, the Moslem leader, Dr. Jinah and Mr. Leopold Amery (British Secretary of State for India).

Opposition to Cripps Plan

ONLY TEN MILLION STRONG. SAYS BRITISH OFFICIAL. (Rec. 9.45). NEW YORK, April 30. Mr. Graham Spry, personal assistant to Sir S. Cripps, said: “The door is still open for further British and Indian negotiations.” He explained that of a total of three hundred and ninety millions of Indians, there onlv were thirty millions who were oolitically minded. From that number, there had to be taken fifteen millions of women and children. There were of. the number five millions of Sikhs and Moslems, and only ten millions were Orthodox Hindus. Hence- only ten out of three hundred and ninety millions of the people had expressed opposition to the proposals of Sir S. Cripps'.'

Indian Army

MILLION STRONG. (Rec. 9.45). NEW YORK, April 30. Mr. Graham Spry, personal assistant to S't S. Cripps, said: “The Indian Army already totals one million. It is increasing., by the new recruiting of fifty thousand monthly.” He added that Indian war industry was producing satisfactorily ammunition ahead of schedule, but it lacks tanks, artillery, and aircraft. _____ .