From Week to Week

Grey River Argus, 18 March 1942, Page 7

From Week to Week

(By

H. Winston Rhodes)

The Axis V the Soviet Union: Few would be willing to deny that the Soviet Union is to-day the most dangerous and most powerful adversary of .the Axis countries. It is almost axiomatic that, if the Nazi military machine is broken in Europe, the whole strategy of Germany. Japan and Italy will be defeated.

The Japanese must know this as well as the Nazis. They have followed the plan outlined in the famous Tanaka memorandum as faithfully as Hitler has followed his own far-reaching schemes, but both have preferred in the early stages of their campaigns to leave the Soviet Union until last. There can be no doubt at all that sooner or later the Japanese militarists will discovei- once again that the maritime provinces of Asiatic Russia are included in their plan for a Greater East Asia.

Will it be sooner or will it be later? The answer to this question is to be found in a discussion of Axis world strategy and of the measure of Japan’s co-operation with Germany. In view of the determination, strength and offensive power of the Red Army, in view also of the announced intention of Britain and America to regard the Russian front as of first importance, it is clear that both sides are staking almost everything on the success or failure of Hitler’s spring campaign. It is certain that the Axis powers will do their utmost to blockade the vast expanse of the Soviet Union. Three routes for supplies are still open—the route to Murmansk, the route through the Persian Gulf and, for Soviet ships, the route to Vladivostock. Three Routes to Russia:

It is the task of the Nazi Navy to block the way to Murmansk, and already efforts have been made not only to do this but also to protect the coast of Norway against invasion. To Japan falls the task of blocking the way to the Persian Gulf and to Vladivostock. The latter can be performed only by war against the Soviet Union.

Japan’s drive to the Persian Gulf will depend on whether or not she can force the British fleet from the Indian Ocean. It is significant that she is already angling for bases in Madagascar, and has made preliminary attacks on bases in Northwest Australia.

The conquest of India might not be regarded as immediately necessary, but its isolation and the capture of bases in the Sea of Bengal and the Arabian Sea would be : essential. An attack in this direction would be of advantage to the Axis powers because it would cut off another source of oil supplies; it would involve a country with a vast native population and a national grieyance, and it would not necessarily imply a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union.

The blockade of Vladivostock would mean war, but it is important to remember that victory for the Axis powers depends on the destruction of Soviet resistance, and this resistance would be made more difficult if Japan decided to attack.

It is true that by attacking Japan would lay herself open to devastating blows from the Soviet Air Force and fleet of submarines. It is true that by attacking she would automatically x give America the use of extra bases from which to operate. Nevertheless, her chance of defeating the Far Eastern Red Army would be greater if she struck at a time when the Western Red Army was engaged in a desperate struggle with the Nazis. Her chances of victory would be increased if She struck at a time when America is unable to make full use of any Soviet bases thrown open.

From the point of view of the Japanese militarists, the clash with the Soviet Union must come sooner or later, and the risk of the Soviet attack must be faced. It would seem that their wisest course would be to accept the risk sooner rather than later.

Britain and America:

Turning to British and American strategy, it can be said that only a policy working towards capitulation or suicide could consider anything less than full co-operation with the Soviet Union. That this is at least partially understood is probable from the preliminary steps taken to open up a western front.

America has made it clear that the European situation is her chief concern, that the success or failure of Hitler’s Spring offensive is of first importance. The presence of American troops in Northern Ireland can hardly be connected with fear 'of German invasion, but rather with the intention of opening a new front. Popular opinion, army morale as well as Hitler’s intended drive to the Caucasus, demand it.

If what has been said remotely resembles the immediate strategic possibilities, it follows that the direction of an American attack upon Japan is likely to be by way of the Aleutians. This is because of distances, the preparation of bases for offensive operations, the importance of direct attack and the likelihood of Soviet bases being available if Japan strikes against Vladivostock.

What does not necessarily follow from all that I have said is that Australia and New Zealand ■ will have few-er risks to face. Although it is possible that the main tide of war will flow in other directions, that does not mean that the dangers which surround us are lessened. On the contrary the Japanese will wish to secure their rear before turning to the main theatre of war; they will wish to remove all danger from possible 'offensive bases in the south.

The Japanese know that in attacking Australia and New Zealand they will be lenthening their lines of communication, but they will be helping to disperse American forces. They know that they will be faced with a determined white population

unhampered by a huge majority of coloured people-with national grievances. They know that in Australia they would be fighting space and distance as well as men.

Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand are in great peril and that peril is all the greater if Britain and America have decided to use their main reserves of energy in

opening a western front and operations from the Aleutians. There is need for us to exercise greater determination. Whether the help that comes to us be large or small, the morale of the people must not fail.