From Week to Week

Grey River Argus, 18 February 1942, Page 7

From Week to Week

(By

H. Winston Rhodes)

Fighting the Past You will very often find in the “Tribune” a page devoted to comments on the conduct of the war heard by a special reporter in train, bus and street, over the bar and shop counter. I mention the “Tribune not because it,, is the only paper o publish such a feature, but because Siir Stafford Cripps was associated with it and to-day his observations are being quoted in all the places I have mentioned.

If we had a few more special reporters who sincerely tried to put their ears to the ground in this fashion, it might possibly people from burying their heads m the sand. Wherever I move I find discontent in unexpected places, and, as far as I can guess, the discontent arises from the fact that there is a bland and official refusal to admit what people are shouting in trains and barbers’ shops.

The trouble is that in the Pacific we are fighting much more than the Japanese army, navy and air force. We are fighting an official silence on past errors, present necessities and future duties.

The results of appeasement are plain for all to see. Oil appeasement and scrap-iron appeasement strengthened Japan against China and built up her reserves ready for southern expansion. Retreat before Japan meant the crippling of China at the time of the shutting of the Burma Road. It meant that Hong Kong was surrounded, that Indo-C'hina was gained, that the road to Singapore was opened, that the Philip pines were out-flanked. Japan had won more than the first two rounds before the war had started.

The excuses made for the policy of appeasement are many, but with all the weight that can be given to these excuses it must be remembered that patriotism and profits make poor companions, and that if time was bought by selling the sinews of war the time was also wasted in the pursuit of self-interest and the luxury of competitive muddle. It must also be remembered that the Japanese rulers have known how to profit by the fact that reactionaries in all countries believed that Japan for a price might be persuaded to attack the Soviet Union. National Majorities The failures of the past, the sms of imperialism haunt us to-day. They will not be brushed aside by a gesture. Official silence is no remedy, but official recognition followed by official action would not only bring new recruits from India and elsewhere, but it would help to disperse the discontents in train, bus and street.

Every broadcast from Tokyo shows that the Japanese are cleverly and cynically profiting by the hatied generated for decades between native races and their overlords. We know how Japan was able to encourage riots in the south of Indo-China and create fresh difficulties for the unhappy French administrators. We know that Japanese agents have found a sympathetic hearing both in Thailand and in ißurma. We know that their successes have been made possible by the failure to remedy grievances and the lack of sympathy and understanding for national aspirations.

Read the story of India, of Burma, of Thailand, of Indo-Cihina, of the Philippines, and you will see that we are not only fighting the Japanese imperialists, but are also fighting the sins of the past. A failure to recognise this is a failure even to seek a remedy. For victory we need a speedy and satisfactory solution of the problem of National Majorities. Muddle or Victory The Empire of Muddle—it is a phrase full of meaning to-day when people are making slighting r^ er " ances to Brasshats and Old School Ties. Too many books have been written about the Far East and its administrators for people not to suspect that among the many officials trying unimaginatively to perform their duty, there are many others whose main work has been to refrain from mixing with the natives. Whatever gallantry and sacrifice was to be found in Hong Kong—the name itself had become a by-word for ostentatious gaiety and cynical disregard for the people’s struggle.

It is painful to consider the weak and ineffectual attempts made to strengthen Indo-China in the last years before Japan moved. Muddle, apathy and misdirected energy resulted in half-finished fortifications and insufficient equipment, but human lives were sacrificed. The story of Indo-China may not have been without parallel in the Far East. Bland assurances and expressions of regret, tributes to bravery and promises of future strength are not to be compared with frankness and selfcriticism, the appointment of efficient administrators and technicians, and the confidence of the people if Victory is to be won.

But if the cause of every failure •has been insufficient production of war material, if appeasement was necessary because England and America were not ready, if the backdoor to Singapore was not strong enough through lack of equipment, if the scorched earth policy could not be put into practice through lack of equipment, then why not production for victory and not for profit? And if you want to follow out the implications of the last phrase, I suggest you should read carefully “Production for Victory, Not Profit,” by Maurice Edelman.