The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, February 12th, 1941 AUSTRALIAN WARNING

Grey River Argus, 12 February 1941, Page 4

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, February 12th, 1941 AUSTRALIAN WARNING

War raises inevitably a wall 01 I secrecy as to the course events may be planned to follow. Only upon such hints as those in posts of responsibility may let fall can the average individual base conjectures as to future developments. The withdrawal of the British Ambassador and staff from Rumania, following so closely upon Air Churchill’s broadcast of Sunday, indicates clearly that this step then had been already decided, upon. The other day, in-

deed, a member of our own War Council let drop an earlier hint, in view of the accuracy of those pointers, similar credibility is apparently due to the statement yesterday of the Leader of the Australian Labour Barty, that attention must now be focused by the people of the Commonwealth upon a quarter much closer than ■ that in which the enemy may be R abqut to make his next move in B south-eastern Europe. Air Coates B in his reference last week to that, ■ probability, predicted for a cerB tainty that British, if not even B Dominion, troops will be presentg Jy engaged in battle in the Bal- ■ kail region. Air Curtin, however, H says that, while nobody thinks of I recalling defenders from over- | sea, Australia to-day has to take g into serious account the danger | of what he calls a back-door entry | to Singapore. This, of course, is | an allusion to the probable policy | of Japan, whom Germany, accord- [ ing to the latest British official S wireless statement, is pressing | very urgently to compromise with | the Soviet, and launch-out on her ’ | serfously-contemplated “south- - I ward movement.’’ It has admit- | tedly appeared that Japan’s main I immediate interest in that direc- • tion has been commercial, rather j than political, and that if she <

9 could be assured of the essential 8 commodities 'she draws from the | East Indies not being cut oft' by I Anglo-American influence in cooperation with the Dutch, Japan would remain content with her f China “affair.” With the Burma • road again as good as blocked.. | .however, it may be conjectured j that Japan, having the Siamese as offsiders, might turn her attention to military action in southeastern Asia with the -object, among other things, of consolidating her economic position. The British view is admittedly that in conjunction with a Balkan drive and other steps to neutralise the Mediterranean situation, and support her ally, Germany, . at the! same time as she attacks Britain more directly, would calculate to provoke also a stroke in the Far Fast occupying the attention of the United States. In the vast; chessboard that this war threatens to occupy in view of the warnings that next year may only see its fuller extension, the advisability of these Dominions thinking of their own safety and of the means of their own defence is not for a moment to be forgotten or ignored. The Home Guard movement, for instance, is beginning to assume greater significance and importance in New Zealand, and it may be taken for , granted that Australia’s resort to

compulsory training for home defence, although inaugurated early last year, had in view a contingency such as would arise were the Malayan Peninsula to become ultimately a theatre of war. On the other hand, the very fact of preparation being undertaken in time to cope with such an emergency would have a tendency to allay the danger that must inhere in it. It thus would appear that every measure in the way of home defence which is adopted by these Dominions deserves the utmost backing from the population, and that oversea service must by no means be regarded as the only really serious service which this Avar is going to call for. It is by some suggested, that a totalitarian political approach to Avar exigencies is for the most efficient reaction a primary condition. There is, nevertheless, the possibility to be guarded against that it might lead to more proximate risks being overlooked through a complete concentration upon risks, which, however serious, are geographically less proximate. It obviously is not without sound and serious reason that the Australian Labour Leader has drawn attention to the Par Eastern situation. Though the situation in Eastern, AVestern and Southern Europe may be critical in a greater or less degree, there is no

ground for the assumption that 1 he situation in the Pacific has not become more instead of less critical. Therefore, here as well as in Australia, it must be taken very seriously into account, and every measure of safety should be encouraged.