The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, September 11, 1940. ECLIPSE OF FRANCE.

Grey River Argus, 11 September 1940, Page 4

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, September 11, 1940. ECLIPSE OF FRANCE.

The position of France, which is halved by the German occupation of the northern portion, is a sorry one at the present juncture. Frenchmen abroad are in a great degree showing their sympathy with Britain and to signify it are ranging themselves along with General De Gaulle, who, in London, has called on them to rally under him in support of Britain. Probably it is still too early to obtain an accurate idea, of the course of events within France since the defeat of her arjnies. It is known that, before the capitulation, they were outnumbered by two to one, and that resistance in an effective manner was becoming impossible. There is criticism of the present regime, but whatever else may be ftaid for this criticism, it is not convincing, insofar as it 'makes out the surrender itself to have been an object one. It comes, indeed, from those who themselves had set out for foreign soil before the armistice. To. find the real cause it is necessary to go back much further, and the responsibility lies mainly with the politicians who misled the nation into a false sense of security. The Maginot Line was represented as a sure safeguard, whereas munitionment and supplies were left incomparably below those of Ger many. General De Gaulle,. a young staff officer, had himself called attention years previously to these grave shortcomings when advocating more powerful army mechanisation, and it can be believed that he now feels himself to have a case when, he speaks in condemnation of his former seniors. A point, however, that is not mentioned at all when the Petain Government is criticised, is that unless it had taken over control in the debacle, there most probably would have been an alternative regime playing entirely into the hands of Germany throughout the country. Resistance by arms had be come an impossibility, and had there been a decision to set up a Government outside of the country, in the same way as had been done by Holland and Belgium, then France to-day would have been as absolutely under the Nazi-heel as are Holland and Bel gium. It is a fair assumption that Petain had at heart the interest of France rather than any 'other interest, and it may also be inferred that when there is an opportunity' to serve Prance at the expense of Germany, it will not be missed. This, of course, is not to say that General De Gaulle’s action is not most com mendable. He is in a position where he can exert a very real influence on the struggle against Germany and Italy, and as a focus for a French colonial rally to Britain he plays an important part. The action taken m France as against the politicians who held power when the conn try was misled, is. characteristic of French tradition. Yet the blame must be shared almost gen orally. The politicians nevci have been popular for genera tions, because their manipulation of the Parliamentary machin.. had been utterly selfish in pur suit of their own sectional objects and quarrels. The pimple despised the legislature. Yet the people cannot deny Petain’s own lament that the defeat of

France arose largely through customs leading to the decline oi the nation, to depopulation There had been too feu; children, he said, and there were half a million fewer soldiers available in this war after it had gone much less than one year than there were in the field in the last war after it had gone three years By contrast, the British have been able to muster an army which is comparable with that they had in the last war, due in part to certain factors which were absent from the last war. Tier whole force was nearly al! able to return to her own shores, and to the threat of invasion her people have risen as never before, while her resistance has been strengthened by support from, oversea, including the ma ferial aid being obtained from the United States. It lias been indeed a bitter disappointment that it should have fallen to the lot of Britain to fight with the aid only of a section, and com paratively a small section, of flu French nation. The main section must put up with the consequences in the way of privation arising from the British block ade, as must all other enemy oc cupied regions. At the same time, it is no advantage for the cause of Britain when some people act so as to antagonise the bulk of the French. As a matter of fact; the great majority of British people have shown magnanimity, and the French cannot ignore this. At a later stage, when the initiative in this war passes out of enemy hands, and Britain may be able to utilise French support in ways not yet possible, there is no reason to doubt that such support will be increasingly and heartily made available.