The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, August 1, 1940. MAIN AND SIDE ISSUES.

Grey River Argus, 1 August 1940, Page 6

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, August 1, 1940. MAIN AND SIDE ISSUES.

Since operations, at least insofar as they are widely published, have become mostly aerial in character, the Avar has not focused interest as directly as former ly. Propaganda has played an increasing part, ! 'and people in time begin to discriminate bctiveen that and the more factual reports. It has, nevertheless, been inevitable that attention should be diverted from the main question, that of the threatened invasion of Britain, because the bearings of the Avar are worldAvide, So much is indicated both by the action in Japan against British' residents, and -the action in Havana regarding the possessions of France and Holland in the West Indies. The reactions, indeed,' of America, Japan and Russia have not only an important influence on the course of the campaign itself, but a mutual effect on their oavu respective policies. ■■ It is unquestionable that the United States has been able to influence other American republics in Britain’s favour. The Havana. Conference decision amounts mainly, so it v.-ould al present seem, to a determination that the United States shall have the sanction of the others represented in preventing any German acquisition of territory extending beyond Europe to possessions of occupied countries in the West Indies. It does not, otherAvisc, go beyond the Western Hemisphere, and therefor? not as far as the Dutch Indies, the acquisition of Avhich earlier had been canvassed as a likely object of- Japanese policy. As it turns out, Japan, Avhile satisfied if the East Indies remain as they are, on a free trade basis, is suspicious of British policy in the Far East, and has acted within her OAvn confines Avith discrimina tion against Britain, and appar ently in favour of Germany. As a sympathiser Avith the Axis, Japan may be countering America’s sympathy Avith Bri- , tain, but until more of the facts 1 are known, it is too soon to draw a definite conclusion. The idea of a “soutliAvard movement” is said to be apparent in the Japan ese plan for Far Eastern con solidation, but lioav far southAvard Japan might plan to extend her direct influence docs not appear to have yet been defined by anyone. A deal of the international controversy is doubtless but diplomatic, and it remains a matter of guesswork lioav far, for! instance, Russia may have designs on India or other territory. folloAving her latest acquisitions; hoAv far, also, the United States ultimately ma.A’ go in support of Britain; and lioav far Japan’s designs may extend beyond China.i What is of far more vital importance is the prospect of an, at tempt to invade Britain. Without doubt, the restrictions on information shroud this issue meantime with uncertainty. The censorship is prone to allow the broadcasting of even conjectures about such issues as that of an attack' on Gibraltar, a campaign in the Near East, and the possibility of the Nazi-Communist pact coming undone. That policy

has doubtless- its merits, but experience during the last eleven months goes to indicate that the British public is best suited when as little as possible of vital information is withheld. This is not to say that valuable knowledge could be given to the enemy, or that secret Parliamentary sessions, if- thcikj must be discussion on war policy or strategy, are not advisable. Bil where things of which the enemy has knowledge are hidden from the people by the British censorship, it is very doubtful if any apparent advantage is a real one. The morale of the British Coni' monwealth is good enough to withstand any minor shocks, especially in view of the la<-t that the outlook is one which threatens nothing at all in the way of a big shock. The British spokes i men are abundantly right when they stress so frequently and emphatically the importance of, our supremacy, because there is l every sign that the enemy is losing the hope of it. It is not. however, so convincing yy hot equal stress is laid on the fact that the bulk of the world’s oii supply is cut off from Geimany. AVhat matters is not the oil Ger many cannot get, but the oil that she does get. If she continues to have sufficient, the past predictions of her shortage can only tend to destroy confidence in other and less questionable items of propaganda. The British block ade is hoyv being tightened so that no European neutral country shall have supplies in excess of ttvo months’ needs. It might, hoYvcvcr, be a mistake to conclude that the result will be entirely an anti-German reaction. Privations might cause the opposite effect. These things can only be judged in the light, not of prophecy, but of experience. The main point at this juncture. yvliether or not the enemy is ready for an attempt, is that an invasion of Britain looks a harder proposition than ever. The way in which the people have faced the prospect holds out a good hope an attempt may actually see the enemy broken by it.