HITLER TEMPTED

Grey River Argus, 15 March 1940, Page 10

HITLER TEMPTED

(By

Major-General Sir Charles

Gwynn, K.C.8., C.M.G., D. 5.0.) This week has seen the Low Countries’ fear of invasion rise once more to crisis pitch and then fall away again. I do not suppose this Lie last appearance of this particular scare. .For the Low Countries are a standing temptation to an aggressive Hitlerism. For these reasons: 1. Successful invasion would give th? German armies room for manoeuvre h and when a major offensive against the Allies was undertaken. 2. It would enable them, alter overrunning Belgium, to turn tiyo main Magmot defence and to strike at the portion of the French frontier least strongly fortified. 3. Such a turning movement would the Channel Ports. 4. An attack on the Low Countries would presumably cause th r . Allies to come to their rescue and thus a large portion of their Armies! wouid be drawn out of their prepared defensive positions. This might favour the German army which is highly trained for manoeuvre and possesses a number of Mechanised Divisions —armoured. 5. Possession of the Low Countries would provide advanced bases lor air attack on Britain, particularly for short range fighting aircraft required to escort bombers, e. It would ‘ also provide bases for submarines operating in the Southern part of the North Sea and Cnannel. 7. Air co-operation in sea warfare would be facilitated. British Ports and shipping would be more expose, to air attack. The Port of London in particular would be brought within short range. 8. Even, if the German army were not strong enough to carry through a major attack on France, it might by a limited oper action secure the air and U-boat bases required. Then, standing on the ae--ensive, it would, hold a bargaining asset, . thus repeating the cond tions which for so long prevailed in tne last wa r when much of Northern Franc, was in German hands. 9. To cbS °Jv the German army would be no easy task, and Germany would have th■advantage of ,lighting outside her own territory.

Other Side of the' Picture. But it does not follow that the Nazis mean to strike. There is another side of the picture. 5 If the invasion were only partly successful, and the seaboard not reached then the balance of advantage would be with the Allies both by sea and air. Warnings of air attack on Britain would be longer, and blockade would be absolute. 6 Economically the disadvantages would be great, as Germany would lose important sources of supply. Not on'y the quota which is allowed to pass the blockade to neutrals, but also the produce of the country woul be lost. The cattle, normally dependent on imported cattle feed, could not survive winter conditions, and they make an ' important contribution to German food supplies.

Pressure on the Neutrals. It will be seen that the disadvantages far balance or exceed the advantages which Germany would gain by violating the neutrality of the~Low Countries. Any many good authorities consider the threat, ■ which undoubtedly exists, is no more than « threat intended to induce Belgium ana Holland to accept a German interpretation of neutral conduct rather than that defined by international' law. It may also have been an attempt to induce the Allies to make a premature move to the assistance of Belgium which would provide an excuse for a German invasion. Whether or not that is all that German threats mean, they cannot be ignored. Diplomatic pressure has been applied in support of unreasonable demands. Frontiers have been violated by reconnaissance aircraft and they have photographed defences. A large German army, greatly in excess of defensive requirements, is stationed dose to the frontier in a state of readiness to move at a few hours’ notice. .Moreover, there have been troop movements indicating that this army is receiving important reinforcements.

Low Countries’ Defences.

It is little wonder that the Dutuch and Belgians are alarmed. Perhaps, however, the strongest reason for believing that German threats amount to no more than threats is the state of preparedness in the Low Countries. It is vastly superior to anything that existed in 1914. Then Belgium was taken completely by surprise. Her army was untrained, her fortifications out of date. Moreover then Belgium stood alone • whereas now her fortunes are linked with those of the Dutch. Unluckily, owing to geographical conditions, the link strategical y is somewhat weak. For should r - treat be necessary, the lines of tirement diverge. And ‘ Dutch have a stronghold protected by inundations, it would be more difficult for Me Allies to come to their .rescue than to that of Be B ™' d^er in winter, one cannot put the danger of a German invasion of the Low Countries out of court. It migi - undertaken as a limited operation m signed to facilitate air and U-boat ac tion and possibly as a prelude to an early spring offensive against Franc A major ’offensive against Franc through the Low Countries is, I think, ■improbable in the winter, but an e ar spring offensive to forestall the nval of British reinforcements might be undertaken.