The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, March 13, 1940. FINLAND’S DECISION.

Grey River Argus, 13 March 1940, Page 6

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, March 13, 1940. FINLAND’S DECISION.

Assuming there is anything iu the enemy cry that Britain and France are anxious to keep Finland in the fighting line, an inference can be drawn that does not betoken enemy confidence. It is that neither Germany nor Russia cares to continue fighting in the Baltic region. The Scandinavian countries manifestly want the fighting in their vicinity to finish as soon as possible, as they do not want to be embroiled. This is a natural and excusable feeling, but they have yet to ask themselves whether they are ready, in order to avert embroil-, ment. to become vassals of the enemy. It has to be recognised, of course, that as things are the enemy has virtually crippled British and other AVestern trade with the Baltic region, and, with Finland acquiescent in the status in which acceptance of Soviet demands would entail, the Baltic region would come more than ever under enemy domination. This consummation would be a realisation of part of Germany’s concentrated attack upon the commercial position of Britain. Jt is desired to destroy entirely British trade with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the lesser Baltic States which crumpled up like tissue paper iu the face of a threat by Russia to subject them to. the same treatment as that to which Poland has been subjected. It may be admitted that secretly the Reich and the U.S.S.R. are enemies, even in the Baltic sphere, but they are there robbers who must meantime make common cause. Finland has stood up gallantly for her independence against the might of a, power whose population numbers 170 millions, but there is among the Allies no desire to see the Finns wiped out, and there will be no Allied heartburnings if the Finns arc now able to obtain a settlement that means the preservation of their independence to such an extent that they would prefer it as an alternative to further warfare. It can be taken for granted, however, that having fought so well uv till now', the Finns will welcome the Allied guarantee, just given by Mr. Chamberlain, of greater help in the event of their independence being so endangered by the Soviet demands as to render it preferable to continue the struggle. Meantime, the ice-free harbours of the extreme north of Scandinavia are still available in a roundabout route for trade with Britain, and it can be judged that the Soviet is unlikely to abandon its objective in that direction. British newsprint is largely cut off in the Baltic, and any available is much dearer, whilst supplies of Danish butter, bacon and other food are no longer going to Britain. The Russian effort against Finland, directed to the possession of icefree harbours in the Arctic, is really a part of a joint enemy plan, and included in that plan is Britain’s economic spoliation. If it can be already shown that the Russians have abandoned hope of reaching the North Atlantic or Arctic ice-free ports of Scandinavia, then to that extent one plan

of the enemy is not being realised. But there is probably another side to enemy strategy in Eastern Europe. Germany still is buffeted by neutral territories, except for the 150 miles of western frontier where she has strong defences, and man power prob-1 ably in excess of the Allies, and she will doubtless aim at a diversion beyond the buffer of neutral territory. As she is apparently anxious to end the Baltic hostilities, from a, persuasion that she has in that quarter largely consolidated her influence, it must be to the south-eastern quarter of Europe that she looks for a new diversion. In fact, she may be apprehensive that the initiative there may be that neither of herself nor her ally, but of the Western Powers in combination with Turkey. The Allies are 'now convinced that the Soviet has embarked on a policy of predatory imperialism, its attack on Finland having been a thrust to the North Sea, the first step in a considered plan worked out between the German and Soviet Governments, and the prelude to an attempt to overrun Scandinavia, especially to open up a line of air and submarine bases along the Norwegian fiords from which an attack on Britain across the North Sea could be pressed. The , Russians, brave soldiers not well led, were set to attack in a badlytimed fashion, and met such a t heroic resistance, that the plan I has been at least greatly delayed, and, it may be hoped, really foiled. Italy manifestly is dead against it, and Herr Von Ribbentrop has evidently gained noth- : ing by his visit to Rome. There indeed may be wider issues involved ii} the present welter of European diplomatic activity. - If so, it may be assumed that the . enemy is now less confident than Herr Hitler has claimed.