The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, January 17, 1940. THE POSITION OF THE LOW COUNTRIES.

Grey River Argus, 17 January 1940, Page 6

The Grey River Argus WEDNESDAY, January 17, 1940. THE POSITION OF THE LOW COUNTRIES.

The fear that Holland and Belgium may presently be invaded by Germany is natural, but those who seriously say it would be dictated by any but military reasons, or. would be the issue oi a sheer sense of desperation on the enemy’s part, must imag in J that the German General btatt has no say at all in the conduce of the war. Certainly the propaganda connected with the possibility of such an invasion as this juncture is notable for giving political reasons prominence ove? military ones. It is said, for instance, that the Germans, having a million men at the front, have massed a great proportion near the frontiers ot Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. But a great many Germans had been so disposed from the outset. Aachen, for instance was early in September reporte. as a point where an enormous concentration had been _ made, but it was explained as being the nodal point for men moving into the valley of the Moselle, which, whatever the developments elsewhere, must remain a sector as vital at least as any between Switzerland and the sea. However, the emphasis on the neutral frontries, and it is lent colour by the extra mobilisation ot Dutch and Belgian forces, is now explained in part by the sugge .- tion that the enemy wishes to influence those countries, also _ to learn what would be the Allied reaction to an invasion, and other strategical possibilities; while there is also a statement that Germany and Russia are jointly threatening; the northern smaller powers because of a disdain for their rights and an intention to infringe those rights as a matter of permanent ; rather than merely military, policy. On the other hand, the enemy declares that the Allies have created'a scare in order to bring the Netherlands and Belgium into closer association with them,, and, perhaps, induce them into active participation in the war. A denial comes both from the Allies and Dutch. No doubt, each side is at pains to find out by feelers and straws in the wind as early as possible what may be the plan of campaign of the other side. That is the real explanation, and it is a reasonable one simply because a German advance by the right is a logical military expedient. It is conjectured by military experts that such an advance would probably . affect directly only a corner of Holland, but, as in the last war, and as now indicated by evacuations from the Liege region, it would sweep right across Belgium, taking in, if possible, the coastline, from which base attack on Britain could be more directly undertaken. Yet if such an invasion is soon to begin, a diversion, not only in the centre along the Moselle, or about Karlsruhe, but also further south near the Black Forest, is to also be expected. The enemy has several alternatives—to attack via Switzerland, which would be too difficult among the Jura ranges; to attack further north in a direct line towards south-eastern France; to attack centrally via the Moselle; to attack by the north through the neutral area; to stand pat where he is and await ultimate reaction in Allied and neutral quarters; or, finally, to open an offensive in the customary Prussian style on both the right and left wings, as in the last war. The last-named alternative is considered by some "chroniclers the probable choice of the German General Staff, and •the increased dispositions on their right opposite the Low Countries, where they can be discerned, is an integral part, though

only a part of such a plan. Thus the invasion might be intended, though not yet; the concentration, .might be merely the first preliminary. What is intended is doubtless decided in the main already, though it may be contingent on certain other possibilities, and these require to be ascertained as fully and as early as possible. It is conceivable that the enemy troop movements are designed as a peace, as much as a war move, as being calculated to render the latter more terrible to contemplate. At the same time, the Germans face a tough problem in the shape of the Maginot Line. They may now be convinced it cannot be penetrated by direct assault, and must be outflanked if it is at all to be negotiated. So much, indeed, is becoming a reasonable inference, and the military on the margins of the Low Countries would strengthen that opinion. In that case, whatever anxiety it may mean for the neutrals concerned, it is for the Allies by no means a bad sign.