The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, September 8, 1939. THE NEUTRALS.

Grey River Argus, 8 September 1939, Page 6

The Grey River Argus FRIDAY, September 8, 1939. THE NEUTRALS.

Though conjectures are already being made Regarding the duration of the war, too little is yet. I known to justify any conclusion. • The attitude of. several Powers H'which meantime remain neutral is H natuially to he taken into consid- = eration. The most important, of = these are the United States, Italy, s Japan, Russia and Turkey, but H Ronmania. Greece. Hungary s and Yugoslavia cannot be left out | of account, British influence is f very considerable in the United i States, where the English langs uage and. to a certain extent, the = Press of Britain is the main med- | ium through which popular ideas | of the European situation are de = rived. Tn addition the financial interests of Britain with America, including Canada, arc an im- ; portant factor. It may be assnm-’ | ed that, while probably the great I; majority of the United States f populace prefers strongly not to I be involved in European hostili- | ties, there is far less objection to | the supply of war material, which I this time should prove more pro- | fitable, as Americans are unlikely | to afford the same measure of | credit that they did before. Ger- I many is, of course, in no position to secure delivery of munitions, but the most influential classes in the United States are in any case disposed to side against her, so that interest and sympathy alike go to make for a. revision of the embargo on materials of war. Active participation in the war itself by the United States is not j as yet a question of practical poliI tics, although it might occur in the event of the campaign being a lengthy one. Italy is taking what her spokesmen call an objective view of the matter, which means a dispassionate view, her own policy being her main preoccupation at the present time. Japan is in a like position, with the qualification that she is asking that Britain shall alter her Far Eastern policy to the extent of al-' lowing that of Japan to predomiI nate. This may be expected to be agreed to, for Britain has now . enough on her hands in Europe, and is very unlikely to risk antagonising such a powerful nation ] as the Japanese in such a crisis, i Russia will probably remain neu- 1 tral, because her internal situa- 1 tion is such that neutrality should, j be decidedly the best policy. < There is not as yet any indication i of her sharing part of Poland I ’ with Germany, whose outlay in ‘ men and material in that country will doubtless induce her to seek j for herself alone whatever terri- ( tory she may expect the Poles to i give up. Turkey will be a conn- 1 try worth watching. It is con- * ceivable that to strengthen the t Allied Eastern Front, and also to j keep out of the war countries t there which remain more or less ? neutral—that is to keep them i: from being drawn in on the side c of Germany—an effort might be made to send troops through the t Bosphorous. The smaller’ Powers * that might be involved probably t ] are mostly anxious to keep out. p There then remains the chance E that Germany may be left to t] carry on alone. In that event, it & would apparently be to her dis- e tinct interest to seek as early a n settlement, consistently with her a design in making war on Poland, £ as she can obtain. Therefore u some credence may attach to the C reports that on the Western a; Front the Germans will act on / the defensive only, trusting that, if they speedily conquer Poland, a that accomplished fact may in- E duce Britain and France to con- cl template negotiations on that basis. "The Times’’ declares that the Allies are now out to put an oi

end definitely to the Nazi regime, and that, sentiment will probably be very widely prevalent. It is nevertheless early to say whether it would remain adamant in the

event of a state of stalemate being reached on the battlefield, It remains to be seen if the Germans are able to maintain a struggle in the manner they did before. It is, at least, doubtful. The rapid advance in Poland may indicate the efficiency of the German Army, but it does not demonstrate. the political solidarity nor the economic self-sufficiency of Germany herself. The new elements in her realm are in a state of more or less unstable equilibrium, and under any undue strain there might be an internal explosion. If the Nazi system is the tyrannical thing which the world outside holds it to be, it cannot be as good a moral backing for war as even the former regime of Kais'erdom. The youth of Germany are largely with it, hut. the older and more reflective elements are largely dubious about it. Thus the test it must sooner or later undergo will find the influence of the more mature section growing, and it will be no surprise if the dictatorial element lose their hold. . In the light of these possibilities, as indeed in any other light, it is not for the Allied Powers to show meantime a disposition to compromise. They are out to stop the use of force as a policy, and cannot compound with Germany on that issue.