The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, September 7, 1939. “NO MAN’S LAND.”

Grey River Argus, 7 September 1939, Page 6

The Grey River Argus THURSDAY, September 7, 1939. “NO MAN’S LAND.”

There has been so far a comparative absence of news of direct armed conflict as between the forces of Germany and those of France and Britain. This does not mean that there is an absence of actual conflict itself. Reference is made to the point in the latest cables, which explain that on the Western Front this campaign has commenced very differently from the way in which that of 1914 began. Then enormous forces were moved quickly over great areas of country in the initial stages, when the army of General Von Kluck advanced alarmingly into French territory, and the British Army made history in its retreat from Mons. This time there seems likely to be little or no retreating in the face of the armies of the Reich. Both sides have taken up their stand within strongly fortified positions. Thus the strategical stage of operations remains paramount, and it is only when tactical movements have further developed that there will he news of a nature such as the

= average person can readily e.nnH prehencl. There are some German is advantages which characterise the ee present great Avar as much as they j= did the last one. The Germans EE can operate from a. centre towards il either frontier. The Allies, on the ;= other hand, are divided to the ex- || tent that, at anyrate up to the prell sent, little or no aid can be sent to ee the Poles. Their only expedient ” is therefore to shorten their lines and pick out the best strategic, ground for a sustained stand. lf| Warsaw presently is reported to have fallen, the average person might imagine it to signalise the defeat of the Polish forces, and their virtual elimination as a vital factor in the war. Social, indus-j trial and political considerations, however, are not the same by any < means as military ones, and it may be said that in Poland the opening of the campaign has been of a far looser character than its continuation is likely to be. Indeed the latest calculation is that the resistance to the Germans is steadily stiffening, and is such as will oblige them to act much more methodically than 41, .... 1 'l-1 i ’ 1

they have yet needed to do, as well as compelling them to coordinate more carefully their strategy . on their two fronts. Hence arises an advantage for the Allies. The latter have many other advantages in the way of supplies, and especially also in the respect that they are in a position to take the initiative on the Western Front, thanks to the existence of the Maginot Line. Belgium has declared her neutrality, and if she is able to preserve it, the Anglo-French forces will have their line shortened to the extent of the Belgian frontier. The lack of news, however, is particularly noticeable in regard to British niilitary action. This is reassuring in a certain sense. It can. be taken for granted that such action is being taken, but on this occasion it is not merely defensive, as it had to be in 1914. The necessity for so great a risk I as that taken then by the forces under General French in rushing! | into the northern breach has. not! I arisen. Moreover, the French official reports are so extremely brief and colourless as to indicate i that details of the classes of troops manning particular areas are designedly being withheld. That. French strategy under the conditions existing will be equal to the needs of the situation mav confidently be expected. The French are a niilitary nation. They may rely in a greater degree than the German on the human factor, but they are remarkably united when it comes to the grim business of war. Indications are that, while the German Air Lorce will probably measure up to any other, the lack of anything like the former navy must prove a source of weakness, since the i opposing forces will lie embolden- i ed to harass Germany in ways 1 which a quarter of a century ago appeared much more risky than they do now. British preparedness is far greater than in 1914. there being only one respect in < whit'll a parallel remains, and that i is the lack of a trained army com- ' parable with those of the * other 1 combatants. The recruiting re- ! ports generally go to indicate that , there is iioav no lack of the raw i material for such an army, Bn- <

listinents have rapidly been increasing, but the transformation of men into soldiers is a matter of time and organisation. The average British recruit is able quickly to master the handling of the implements of war. That, however, is not the most important element. Where the conscript, countries have an advantage is that their men have undergone training to the degree that they have acquired the military mind. Those veterans of the Great War who are still available for service will certainly be of great assistance in the formation process through which so large a proper tion of the eventual British forces are destined to pass. If the last war is any guide, the trial is going to be a long and arduous one. That is by all accounts the light in which the matter has thus early come to be generally regarded, and it is well. It is the surest guarantee that nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of ultimate victory.