The Grey River Argus MONDAY, March 20, 1939. CHAMBERLAIN TURNS ON HITLER.

Grey River Argus, 20 March 1939, Page 6

The Grey River Argus MONDAY, March 20, 1939. CHAMBERLAIN TURNS ON HITLER.

A definite change in the means, although not necessarily in the ends, of the foreign policy pursued by the British Government during the past year is indicated by the Birmingham speech of Air Chamberlain. The method, no less than the object, of the German action towards the Czechs, is challenged by him. He says Britain now must consult other Powers,] and review front a new angle l every aspect of the national life. The Germans, in reply, reject protests from both Britain and France, denying they had an obligation to consult the other parties to the Munich Agreement, before taking control of Bohemia and Moravia. It is a typical Prussian reply, the only case to be offered for which would be that it was not on. German, but on British, initiative that there even was . a .Munich Conference. Underlying that contention would be the traditional Prussian custom of re- | garding every other interest as subsidiary to what the Prussian State regards as its own advan-1 tage. However, the change of I front on Air Chamberlain’s part] may be actually more apparent than real. Probably such an 1 eventuality had been foreseen or at least considered by him, for his I reaction and that of his Cabinet has been so quick and so great that it scarcely could have been entirely unpremeditated. It might, be said, of course, that the means of counteraction remain the same as they were previously. That is scarcely so. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia has not been the only outcome of the dispute ( between Czechs and Slovaks, for the territory of the former has been annexed by the Reich. Upon world opinion the effect of this is bound to be so deep as to give an I impetus previously lacking for counteraction in the case of there] being any further exploit of the kind. News now comes that Ru-| mania has received something in the way of a demand from Ger-| many to co-operate in economic policy. In view of denials from Bucharest that there has been any] ultimatum, it would be hasty to] credit reports that a German in-' vasion is intended, but it appears' that apprehension of German pressure is not without justification. It all depends, of course, upon what may be the answer to Mr Chamberlain’s question: “Is this the end of an old adventure, or the beginning of a new?” That he should put that question, knowing what he does, is perhaps no less important than the actual answer. The situation thus goes once more to emphasise the crucial fact in the European situation, a fact that is not new, but one which finance capitalists in Britain or elsewhere are apt to forget in the quest for fat rates of interest. The fact is that nobody can tell what may be the vagaries of Prussian policy. There does not seem to be any doubt that Herr Hitler is is no more than a pawn in the Prussian game. Germany is issuing reminders of the unilateral actions whereby the British Empire largely was extended in the past, but only because she is conscious her present action is an exercise of nothing except force. The British Government had honestly been endeavouring to replace the use of force by the exercise of conciliation and the negotiation of agreements. It had admittedly been at the same time going all out on armament expansion, but was ready to agree to a halt. It now looks as if the chance of that

lias at least been indefinitely postponed, with a consequent growth in the terrible burden of arma ments. There is, no doubt, the chance that Germany does regard her latest exploit as the end of the adventure whereby she set out to make hay with the Versailles Peace Treaty. It may be that she does not contemplate further military action, and will be content with economic action for what she considers the consolidation of her position. An advance of her leg ions to the Rumanian borders, such as the latest reports would suggest, would not prompt the hope that merely economic ends are those alone remaining in her policy, even though the sole wish

should be economic co-operation ) on the part of Rumania. The use < of force as an instrument of na- ] tional policy, or, in other words, j the use of war, could alone be in ; ferrod from the employment of i troops to back up an economic de- ] mand. Germany has already a dominant economic position, in , Eastern Europe, but the anticipation mav be, shared abroad thai she has an eye to extending it by : means of a reunion of the Ukrainians. However, the upshot, is now more than ever likely to be on Britain’s part the raising of a more adequate, land force. That has been in contemplation, and | this exigency will offer itself as an opportunity for translating the concept into reality. Co-operation with other Powers is indicated, but it must be on a more realistic basis than at any time since the European War.