AUSTRIA’S VALUE

Grey River Argus, 27 May 1938, Page 7

AUSTRIA’S VALUE

To Nazi Germany COAL AND IRON. SURVEY OF GENERAL CONDITIONS. Austria is in a position to provide a number of raw materials that are needed in Germany, especially iron ore and timber, which are two of those commodities in which the Reich is most deficient. Between one-half and one-third of the superficial area of Austria is forest land, and the annual growth of timber is estimated at 9.3 million cubic metres. Almost 1.7 million tons of timber were exported in 1937, of which 460,000 tons went to Germany. The Importance attached to timber is shown by the fact that export to countries other than the Reich was forbidden on the first day after the Anschluss. Aijstrian timber, however, is unlikely' to solve Germany’s problem, as the total import into the Reich in 1937 was over 5X100,000 tons, and it would need a very great increase of felling, which is already carried on rather improvidently, to supply' the whole of the German requirement. IRON ORE. The bulk of the output of iron ore In Austria is in the hands of the Alpine-Montan Company, which has ‘long been German-controlled. The monthly' production of this company had been increased in the last months of 1937 to 200,000 tons, and it is thought that it might eventually reach 300,000 or 350,000 tons a month. Most of this ore has been going to Germany' for' some time past, but it will now be available without any' inconvenient foreign exchange _ problems This will be a welcome addition to the domestic ore supplies of the Reich, which are now only about 7,000,000 tons per annum. But the Austrian ore will be no means solve the German iron ore problem, since the total consumption of the Reich in 1937 was in the neighbourhood of 28,000,000 tons, and might well be more in time of war, while the Austrian production, even on the most. optimis- | tic estimates, cannot be more than 4,000,000 tons per annum. The Austrian steel output is very small, being only about 600,000 tons per annum, in comparison with Germany’s 1937 production of 19,000,000 tons. But German-Austria inherited from her Dual Monarchy days certain heavy industrial centres and armament factories which will be of some assistance to Germany. NO OIL AVAILABLE. Austria can give Germany no assistance in the solution of her oil | shortage. The production of oil in Austria is microscopic, and as for oil-from-coal, Austria has neither the coal nor the conversion plant, Her lack of coal (which she now obtains from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Ge;«>nany) is partly compensated for by the abundance of water power.

The export of hydro-electric power to Germany is already valued at about 20,000,000 schillings per annum, and as only about one-fifth of the available water power has yet been harnessed there is plentiful scope here for German energy in seeking alternative sources of supply. The subject of raw materials should not be concluded without mentioning magnesite, for which Austria is one of the world’s chief sources of supply. There is also some lead and small quantities of copper and gold. Finally, Austria provides an in-

crease of Germany’s reserves of man power. In the last analysis this should be proportionate to population, in which case the ultimate reserve for the German Army has been increased by 10 per cent. In the more immediate future, however, trained men are chiefly required. Compulsory military service was restored in Austria only three years ago, hut in this period 150,000 men have passed through the ranks, and the annual contingent of recruits is between 35,000 and 40,000 men. These figures are not large, but when added to the tenfold larger figures of the German Army an

increased margin over any of its potential rivals, excepting only Russia. _ JsLjsi REICH DENOMINATION. These are the chief contributions that Austria can make to Germany’s war potential. What, in summary, do they add up to? It would be. too much to expect that the annexation of a single small country would completely solve any on of the problems that Germany will have to overcome before she is completely self-sufficient for war. But in fact the actual contribution is small, The nest-egg of gold and foreign exchange looks imposing only in comparison with the emptiness of the Reichsbank locker. In the matter of food, Austria is probably on balance a source of weakness. Possibly the most valuable material contribution is the timber which Herr Hitler can cut from the hillsides of his native land. Moreover, another consideration must be borne in mind in assessing the value of Austria to Germany in the event of war—namely, that an independent Austria would either be allied to the Reich (in pursuance of Dr. Von Schuschnigg’s “German - ’ foreign policy) or else largely or wholly occupied by German troops. Whatever economic resources Austria possesses would therefore, in any event, be available to Germany in time of war. The economic ' value of the Anschluss rests only on the contribution that Austria can make to the feverish preparation for war. On balance, it may be concluded that the strategical value of Austria to the Reich lies less in what she herself brings than in her position on the map of Europe and the door that she opens to the domination of the Danube valley, with its wheat, its livestock and its oil.