TWO FLEETS

Grey River Argus, 11 February 1938, Page 4

TWO FLEETS

Germany and Britain LIGHT ON THE RATIO TREATY. The necessary time having elapsed since the ratification of the AngloGerman and Anglo-Russian bilateral naval treaties on November 4, both instruments have now come into force, writes Hector Bywater in the “Daily Telegraph and Morning Post.” Their effect is to bring Germany and Russia within the orbit of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, the most important provision of which, apart, from the limitation of ship dimensions and armament, concerns the exchange of detailed information as to shipbuilding programmes. On this point there are certain reservations in the case of Russia’s Far Eastern Fleet, which is peculiarly affected by Japan’s new policy of absolute reticence regarding her naval armaments. Generally speaking, however, the new treaties will largely eliminate the sinister element of secrecy in international naval preparations. The importance of this step is enhanced by the fact that it coincides with an almost world-wide expansion of naval armaments. Meanwhile the first Anglo-German „naval agreement, concluded on June 18, 1935, has been in operation nearly two and a half years, a period suffi ciently long to test its practical efficacy. In British naval circles, at least this agreement is held to be one of the greatest and most beneficial diplomatic achievements of the post-war era. Its antecedents are imperfectly known to the public, but they are both interesting and significant. Immediately after the repudiation by Germany, early in 1935, of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the Reich Government informed the British Government that it was prepared to enter into conversations on the subject of relative naval strength. TO AVOID RIVALRY. It Is now known that Herr Hitler personally initiated this demarche, with a view to rendering impossible a repetition of the naval rivalry which had so gravely prejudiced Anglo-Ger-man relations before the war. It was intimated that although Germany herself would henceforth be the sole arbiter of her defensive needs, she had no intention of competing with Great Britain in the domain of sea power, and would, indeed, Jje content with a fairly modest quota of tonnage as compared with the British aggregate. This voluntary gesture of conciliation could not fail to make an excellent impression in London, where memories of the frustrated efforts of pre-war years, notably the Haldane mission in 1912, to. arrest a building competition of which the fatal sequel could already be foreseen, were still painfully acute. In any case, the British Government’s response was prompt and cordial. Contact was quickly established between the Admiralty, on the one hand, and German naval experts on the other, and the conferences began. Their success was assured at the

outset, for the first German proposal was that the future strength of the German navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of th'e British Commonwealth should be in the proportion of 35 : 100. This suggestion at once placed the good faith of the German Government beyond doubt. Although, as will appear later, the ration will endow Germany with a higher degree of relative strength than the figures indicate, it virtually rules out the possibility of a serious challenge to Britain’s predominant position at sea.

CONTRAST TO 1912. The proposal, eminently moderate in the circumstances, stood in agreeable contrast to the German attitude of 1912, when the Kaiser, prompted bv Admiral von Tirpitz, rejected as inadmissible a proposed ration of 60 : 100. The discussions continued in the friendliest spirit, and so rapid was the progress that within a few weeks complete agreement was reached on all essential points. In fact, most of the time was occupied in working out the necessary arithmetical formulas. Finally, on June 18, 1935, the substance of the agreement was announced to the world in an exchange of Notes by the two Governments. Perhaps the most significant feature of these documents is the emphasis they lay on the “permanent and definite” nature of the compact. That phrase occurs in the British Note and is repeated without qualification in the German counterpart. Further, the British Note summarises the German |iew as follows:— . “The ratio of 35 : 100 is to be a permanent relationship, i.e., the total tonnage of the German fleet shall’never exceed a percentage of 35 of the aggregate tonnage of the naval forces, as defined by treaty, of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, or, if there should in future be no'treaty limitations of this tonnage, a percentage of 35 of the aggregate of the actual tonnages of the members of the British Commonwealth.” And again: “Germany will adhere to the ration 35 : 100 in all circumstances, e.g., the ratio will not be affected by the construction of other Powers.” A QUALIFICATION. The only condition attached is that if the naval equilibrium should be violently upset by abnormal construction In other countries, Germany reserves the right to invite Britain to examine the new situation thus createa.

In the light of these explicit undertakings it is impossible to doubt the genuineness of Germany’s desire to remove, once and for all, what had proved in the past to be the greatest stumbling-block in the path of AngloGerman relations. It was rumoured at the time that the proposed agreement, or at any rate the 35 : 100 ratio, was not popular with the German naval chiefs, but even if this were Irue it did not prevent them from cooperating in the negotiations with complete loyalty. A special tribute must be paid to the late Rear-Admiral Erwin Wassner, who, as German naval attache in London, played a prominent part in drafting of the agreement. The personal qualities of this fine officer won him the esteem of British naval circles, in

which he enjoyed exceptional popularity. Generally speaking, the agreement entitles Germany to 35 per cent, of the British Commonwealth’s tonnage in ship categories, from battleships downwards, but an exception is made in the case of submarines. In this type she may build up to 45 per cent, and may even go up to 100 per cent., though in the latter event she agrees to engage in friendly discussion with the British Government before exercising her right. The establishment, in principle, of submarine equality between the two Powers is due to the fact that the British Navy maintains a comparatively small submarine tonnage, vessels of this type being of limited value for trade defence purposes. FOR TOTAL TONNAGE. It should, however, be' made clear that the ration 35 : 100 applies strictly and permanently to total tonnage. Consequently, if Germany decides to build above the 35 per cent, allowance in submarines, she must deduct the excess from some other category of ship or ships. To ensure the smooth working of the agreement a periodical exchange of information regarding new ships projected or about to be laid . down, their type, tonnage, and date of completion, is necessary as between the British and German Admiralties, and this exchange has been going on for a considerable time. It has inevitably resulted in an extraordinarily close liaison between the two navies, an association believed . to be without precedent in time of I peace. The possible repercussions on, the political situation of this AngloGerman naval entente cannot be wholly ignored. • • Germany at the present time is considerably below the degree of relative strength to which the agreement entitles her, and it is understood that she does not propose to achieve the full ratio before the end of 1942. Her building programme is proceeding at the normal rate; there is no acceleration and ships are laid down, launched, and commissioned in strict accordance with the schedule com municated to the British authorities. the ultimate strength. Owing to the large British programmes of 1936 and 1937 arising ou; of the national re-armament plan, the eventual strength of the British Navy will be substantially greater- than may have been envisaged when the AngloGerman agreement was signed; For various reasons, such as possible discrepancies between the estimated and 'actual tonnage displacement of new ships, it is not feasible to forecast the exact aggregate tonnage of the British Commonwealth navies, even a year or two ahead. However, Germany is regularly furnished with all the data she requires to enable her to keep her own construction .up to the agreed ratio. Further, a working margin of 17,500 tons has been put at her disposal to make good any shortage that might result from the discrepancies referred to. These arrangements are operating smoothly and, it is understood, to- the complete satisfaction of both parties. Two factors, it is true, combine to put Germany in a stronger position at sea than the 35 : 100 ratio would appear to place her. First, her new fleet will consist al- :

most entirely of the most modern construction, whereas, for an indefinite period, the British Navy will include ci large block of obsolescent tonnage. Secondly, while Germany is- at liberty to keep practically her whole fleet in northern European waters, in no imaginable circumstances could the British Commonwealth safely concentrate more than 60 per cent, of its naval strength in any one area. It might even be said, therefore, that at any given moment the actual ratio of available strength would approximate to 35 : 60. At the same time these facts, which are fully appreciated in both countries, in no way detract from the-material and moral value of an agreement which was concluded, and is being implemented, on a basis of reciprocal trust and good will.