The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, August 17, 1937. THE INVASION OF SHANGHAI.

Grey River Argus, 17 August 1937, Page 4

The Grey River Argus TUESDAY, August 17, 1937. THE INVASION OF SHANGHAI.

There may be heavy loss of life and of property during the present hostilities around China’s main port, but Shanghai is not the main objective of the Japanese operations in China. That, is perhaps the reason why the invasion is being regarded, for all practical purposes, by the Western Powers in the same way as was the previous Japanese military action in the same region. Indeed, it may be recalled that when previously Japan was segregating Manchuria from the rest of China, she was ready to exert military pressure at the same time in southern parts of . China. It may be found difficult, in view of the present operations, at Shanghai, to reconcile the situation. with the view of Western commentators that neither China nor Japan desires war on the major scale. Such, however, is quite probably the case. Japan has taken radical steps already to alienate two provinces from the republic governed, more or less, from Nanking, namely Hopei, to the south, and Chahar, to the west of Pekin. But the threatened advance of the armies of Nanking into the Pekin region has indicated to the Japanese that their operations in the North must encounter great obstacles unless they can divert the threatened opposition. Other reasons have officially been assigned for the Shanghai expedition, but those have been no more than incidents, except, of course, for the renewal of the Chinese boycott against Japanese goods. As for justification of the plan to set up separate and more or less independent States in Hopei and Chahar, the Japanese declare that Communist elements have . there rendered conditions unsafe for settled trading, and have particularly disturbed Japanese interests. No doubt, there is antagonism in policy as between Japan and the Soviet in the Far East, but Japan claims the right to exercise a greater influence there than any other Power and her action has been along that line for more than forty years past. Since she succeeded, with British backing, first in skittling China s navy in the last decade of lasc century, and later, with further British backing, in defeating Russia, Japan has gradually brought more territory under her sway, including Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria. It is certain that most of the Western Powers are very much against Japan s present moves, but none of them is prepared for any direct action to thwart those moves.. . “The Times” is quoted as giving the warning that Britain, America and France are in consultation, but there is no sign of any tangible outcome. The present position at Shanghai is that, while the Chinese forces far outnumber the Japanese, the latter are better equipped mechanically, and' the reinforcements being sent indicate that Japan expects finally

to dictate to the Nanking regime. ' The latter has certainly been for years building up its armed forces, which may be expected to fight well, and have already captured positions from the Japanese. But China can be only a loser from operations in and around her greatest commercial centre, and this anticipation may be counted upon by the Japanese to hasten such a compromise as they wish to secure, leaving them free to complete their northern venture. That diplomatic action is in progress behind the scenes on the part of other Powers is probable, even though it may not appear to be having much evident effect. What is very clear is that Japan is the dominant Power in the Far East, and is determined to exercise her influence over China independently of any other outside influences. In the past, particularly along the maritime provinces, other Powers have set precedents for this intervention, securing* territories and concessions, as well as indemnities. Nobody indeed could say that any foreigners could expect to gain a permanent hold upon China as a whole, but the Japanese have gone far ahead of any others in gaining partial feonttol, doing so in a piecemeal way, that has proved lasting so far as it has extended. Tire Shanghai hostilities are unlikely to prove very protracted, because the real issue concerns that quarter far less than the Pekin quarter. As soon as the Japanese are able to divert opposition from the North, they may be expected to withdraw from Shanghai. If they arc Arise, they will not go too far.’