NAVAL LIMITATION.

Grey River Argus, 22 June 1927, Page 5

NAVAL LIMITATION.

COOLIDGE CONFERENCE. Opens at Geneva. (Australian and N.Z. Cable Assn.) GENEVA, June 20. The Triparatite Naval Armaments Limitation Conference has opened. Mr. Hugh Gibson, of the United States, was appointed President. Each power submitted proposals as a basis for dis cussion. THE U.S.A. PROPOSALS. The American proposal provides for the following strengths. Cruisers: —Britain, 250,000 to 300,000 tons; United States 250,000 to 300,000 tons; Japan, 150,000 to ISO,OOO tons. Destroyers: —Britain, 208,000 tons to 250,000 tons; United States 208,000 tons to 250,000 tons; Japan, 120,000 tons to 150,000 tons. Submarines:—Britain 60,000 to 70,000 tons; United States 60,000 to 90,000 tons; Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons. The 'Ujnitied States is Wiping, to agree with all the naval Powers to abo lish submarines. JAPAN’S PROPOSALS. The Japanese proposal is:— Firstly —No new building programme to be adopted or new ships to be acquired for the purpose of increasing naval strength. Secondly: The naval strength of each Power shall be determined for surface auxiliary craft and submarines respectively, on the basis of tonnages of the existing effective ships and ships under construction, not taking into con sideration the of ships authorised but not yet laid down, and ships attaining the age limit during execution of the authorised programmes.

Thirdly: —The construction, or acquisition or ships in future, to be lim ited to replacements, due consideration being given to equalisation as far as possible of the amount of annual construction for replacements. Fourthly: Small ships and ships of limited activity to be exempt from the limitation. BRITAIN’S PROPOSALS. The British proposal extends the life of the existing capital ships to twentyIt reduces future battleships from thirty-five thousand to something un der thirty thousand tons each, and their guns from sixteen to 13.5 inches. Tt limits aircraft carriers to twenty- j five thousand tons with armaments to six-inch guns. Britain accepts the existing ratio *or ten thousand ton cruisers carrying eight inch guns (number thereof required for each of three countries to bo the subject of discussion). It limits future light cruisers to 7500 tons, armed with six inch guns, after the number of ten thousand tonners have been decided upon. Britain would limit destroyer lead ers to 1750 and destroyers to fourteen hundred tons, the armament of a destroyer to be five inch guns. Britain’s proposal also limits larger submarines! to sixteen hundred and smaller to six hundred tons each, being armed with five inch guns. PROSPECTS OF AGREEMENT. WASHINGTON, June 20. Administration circles believe that the differences between the American and British proposals for limiting auxiliary naval craft, are not serious enough to prevent an agreement. It is pointed out that the basic American principle of five-five-three ratio is apparently acceptable to Britain while the United States Government will probably accept the British proposal limiting the size of submarines. This is in line w’ith the American delegation ’s expressed willingness to outlaw submarines, if all nations agree, though such step is now impossible because of French opposition. Officials declared that the British proposals to limit cruisers to 7500 ton ships, after the Conference agrees on the number of ten thousand ton cruis ers that may be permitted, will probably be acceptable to the United States. This would allow the United States fifteen to ten thousand ton ships to equal the same number already built, or authorised by Britain.

The Opening Session. BREAKING NEW GROUND. (Received June 21 at 7 p.m.) GENEVA, June 20. The opening session of the Navalh Limitations Conference was not an impressive function. The historic feature was that the United States participated for the first time in any Conference held at Geneva since the formation of the League of Nations. The early proceedings emphasised that the Conference was breaking new ground. It had no precedents to guide it. and no agenda before it, for, though it is ti e sequel to the Washington Conference, it is unlike it, because only three Powers are represented, while th‘ Washington gathering was more embracing, and it assembled in the face of a clear-cut programme. The speeches were entirely devoid of oratory or eloquence, all being carefully read documents. A BRITISH STATEMENT. Mr W. C. Bridgeman (Britain) specially emphasised that Britain’s proposals were made with the consent of all the Dominions’ representatives, but, in accordance with the decisions of the Imperial Conference, any resulting Treaty would be made in the names of

the heads of the various Dominions agreeing to participate. He also went out of his way to stress that Britain’s proposals were formed to make it easier, and not harder, for Fram e and Italy to join the Conference. He added that he believed the success of the Confer 1 ence depended more upon plain language __ a statement of what, each nation wanted in the shape of a Navy, and why —than in rhetoric. Britain is represented by Mr W. C. Bridgeman, Lord Cecil, and V icc-Ad-iniral Field. New Zealand is represented by Sir James Parr, Lord Jellicoo, and RearAdmiral Beale. There are 150 journalists present, representing newspapers in all parts of the world. THE CONVENOR. The Conference has cabled President CooJidge, expressing its most profound appreciation of his humane and wis<

initiative, and stating that it is hopeful of having satisfactory results. President Coolidge has replied, stating that an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement, preventing Naval competition, would lastingly cement present good relations, 'and would constitute a definite step towards a general limitation of armaments. America would make the utmost effort to ensure au agreement. After fixing the times for the Committee meetings, the Conference adjourned. American Schedule Detailed (Received June 21 at 9 p.m.) GENEVA, June 20. Tn his speech at the Naval Conference the American, Mr Gibson, prefaced his speech with a message from President Coolidge, declaring that the U.S.A. President was only interpreting the overwhelming sentiments of the American people in stating that the United States would do its utmost to make an agreement possible. Air Gibson added that it could be assumed that the Conference was starting in agreement on the following points, namely:—That, in the interest of an international undertaking, there should be no competition bet ween the three Powers in Naval armaments; that their respective Navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security, and should never be of such a size and character as to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent; that future constructions should be kept at a minimum. . The methods and principles of limitation set down by tin* Washington Treaty ,he said, should bo extended to all the categories of combatant vessels of the three Powers. The United States had no intention of maintaining! a force as a threat to any Power. It] did not desire to initiate a competitive programme. The American suggestions were based on the following considerations:—

That the ratio principles of the Wash ington Treaty should be applied to cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. That any agreement of the three Powers to limit the building of auxiliary vessels should be co terminous with the Washington Treaty, and should contain a provision respecting revision in the event of an extensive building programme by any Power not a party to the agreement.

That for the purpose of future limitation auxiliaries should be divided into four categories, three of which —namely, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines—should be subject to limitation, with the fourth class, of negligent combatant value, not subject to limitation; the cruiser class to include the surface com batant vessels of from three to ten thou sand tons; the destroyer class to include all the surface combatant vessels of from six hundred to throe thousand tons, and of a speed above 17 knots per hour.

T he United States, he said, recognised that Naval requirements were relative, and that if these limits were adjusted for one Power, they should be so adjusted for all. If any of the Powers proposed to lower the tonnage levels of the auxiliary craft, the United States would welcome them, to obviate the scrapping of comparatively new vessels in one class simultaneously with the building of vessels in another class Air Gibson added that the question of the abolition of submarines must be universal between all the Naval Powers in order to be effective.

British Plan Lauded. BY BRITISH NAVAL EXPERTS. AS SUPERIOR TO THE OTHERS. (Received June 21 at 8.30 p.m.) GENEVA, June 21. An examination of the proposals made by the British naval .experts puts them in a different light from .'bat which the actual speeches convey to a layman. Interviewed, one expert declaret;: “The British proposals are far .lore

comprehensive than the American scheme, The proposed extension of the life of capital ships alone would effect an important lessening of tKE bunlri of naval armaments on the tnxpiv-

Wo suggest a definite limit to the number and power of cruisers, and wo fa-> vour a clear statement from every nation of its actual requirements __ in cruisers, destroyers and submarines. .America does not propose to reduer- 11“ power and size of the capital ships. While the suggestion for the maintenance of the 5—5—3 ratio for cruisqrs, destroyers and submarines leaves a wide range of sizes, theoretically. It allows smaller Powers to build accord-

ing to their capacity. Judging from the experience after the Washington Treaty, the size permitted would become the standard. A close examination shows that the maintenance of ratios is only in the total tonnage, instead of in the numbers of vessels. It means that America would be enabled to add considerably to her cruiser ton■mage. Britain would have to reduce hers, and Japan -would remain unchanged. Yet the effect would be that America would be able to scrap many | of her old, worn-out cruisers, and replace them with new and more powerful ones, America’s programme would be really to increase, and not reduce, naval armaments; because her proposed reductions do not apply to new ships Our concrete proposal to limit the number and size of ships constitutes a .real step forward in the dn ection of disarmament. America s does not. Similarly, Japan proposes a shorter life and quicker replacement of ships than we do.. Under the Japanese proposition, Britain would have sixty-two cruisers of aW mzes; 'Hu. United States fifteen; and Japan 29. The figures for destroyers would be. Britain 173, America 280, Japan 104, for submarines, Britain 64, America 114, and Japan 71. The United States is unlikely to accept these, lortun ately, Japan has intimated that she is willing to view sympathetically - suggestion that the Powers should openly state .heir actual requirements in the various categories of ships. Replying to a question the expert said that Prance and Italy would be welcomed with open arms n they were willing to join the Conference, even • now. In any case, Britain was anxi--1 ous for their adherence to any agree ’ meat that the three Powers might reach.

BRITAIN’S STANDPOINT. (Received Juno 21 at 8.15 P- m >) GENEVA, June . 20. The British proposals fix the life of the eight inch gun cruisers at twentyfour years; that of destroyers at twenty years; and that of submarines at fitteen. . . Mr W. C. Bridgeman (Britain), in thanking President Coolidge for his invitation, mentioned that the British

Admiralty proposals were actually in the hands of Mr Baldwin before the invitation was received. He regretted that France and Italy were absent. The time was ripe of an extension of the Washington principle of limitation. He thought the Conference would be successful if each country frankly stated what naval force was wanted by it, and why, based purely on defensive considerations, lie defined the British Empire’s position according to the following factors:— Firstly: The insular position of England, being dependent for raw materials and food, and for its very existence, on the free passage of the seas, which rendered the discussion of naval disarmament more difficult for hei than for any other country, Secondly: The length of her trade routes.

Thirdly: The extensive coastline of the British Empire and the long lines of communications to be protected. Mr Bridgman emphasised that he spoke with the consent of the Dominions’ representatives. Whatever treaty might result from this Conference would be made in the names of the heads of the States participating, the several parts of the British Empire being shown by appropriate geographical entities, in lieu of plenipotentiaries, The object of Britain, he said, was economy, but she made a resetfvation, namely, that owing to the position of Britain in relation to Europe, it was necessary to guard against any increase of naval strength of non-signatories to any agreement relating to the United States, Japan and the British Empire. Therefore, provision for reconsideration would be needed, but he hoped the European Powers would adhere to any agreement reached.

DEFENCE OF BRITISH PROPOSALS GENEVA, June 20. It is pointed out that un'der the Washington Agreement, Britain and ( America must lay down fifteen n*-.w capital ships during the decade commencing in 1941. The British proposal reduces this, but it retains the o —3 ratio, lowering the first cost of the maintenance charges. While fixing the life period of the auxiliaries, it reduces the cost of replacement. Moreover, a reduction of the battleships from thirty-five to thirty thousand tons, and of the guns from s«xteen to 13.5 inches, arc logical curtailments, not affecting the relative strength, while aircraft carriers ot twenty'cfivd thousand dons are fully practicable, as also a reduction of their guns. It is logical to apply the 5—5—3 ratio to the ten thousand ton cruisers which operate with battle fleflets. The possibility of producing seven thousand five hundred ton vessels, with six inch guns, with the qualifications of cruisers, will be considered, also the checking of the increasing size of capital ships or cruisers it is thought desirable, while submarines are retained, to introduce two types one for harbour defence and the otner for more distant operations.

NEW YORK PRESS OPINION. NEW YORK, June 20. Editorial opinion here expresses satisfaction at the frankness with which the programmes have been advanced at Geneva, and shows the confidence that an important agreement will be rea ed I The New York World says: The proposals contain few surprises, but tne frankness shown promises a business like dispatch, The. British suggestion to cut the battleship tonnage ma; objected to, as it means reopening th Washington Treaty, but it reopens it 5n the rieht direction. The Now York Times says: The hope that the second Naval Limitation Conference will end in a harmonious satisfying agreement is not unwarranted. Each delegation will contend for what it believes that its own national interests require, but the cause is So important that a working agreement will be found.