THE DOBSON COLLIERY DISASTER.

Grey River Argus, 15 June 1927, Page 6

THE DOBSON COLLIERY DISASTER.

SITTING OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. CAUSE OF EXPLOSION STILL A MYSTERY. Further Evidence of Careless Management.

The proceedings of the Commission set up to enquire into the cause of the Dobson Mine Disaster were resumed at the Courthouse at 10 o’clock yesterday morning. The Commission comprises Messis E. | Page, S.M. (Chairman), John Watson I (Superintendent of the Taupiri Col j lieries), and Mr William Balderstoue (Secretary, West Coast Miners’ Dis trict Council). Mr J. W. Hannan ap pea red on behalf of the Grey' Valley Collieries, Ltd.; Mr W. J. Joyce, for the Deputies 1 and Vnderviewors * Union; Mr A. 11. Kimbell (Under Secretary for Mines); and Mr J. A. C. Bayne (Chief Inspector of Mines for New Zealand N Mr A. J. Davis (District Inspector of Mines) representing the Mines Depart ment. Others present included: Mr J. Smeaton (President of the Grey Valley* Miners’ Union) • Mr K. J. Wearne (representative. West Const Miners’ District Council), Mr C. J. Strongman. Millerton Mine Manager (ex-inspector of Mines"'. Mr I. A. James f Manager of State Mine"', and Mr \\ Leitch (ex Manager of Dobson Mine), and Mr C. Hunter, General Manager of the Heathcote Mine (lluntly) and ex Manager of the Dobson Mine. The first witness called was David Dunwoodie, lampman, who stated (to Mr Leitch) that he was in charge of all lamps in the mine. lie got the oil lamps ready for use, and the deputy tested them. The electric lamps had a number but the oil ones hadn t ] any'. One safety lamp was issued to i every two miners, but no record was , kept of them. There was such a rush 1 by the men at the window, that he i did not have time to check them, and he could not tell if there was one missing when they came in. If they were not brought in by the men themselves, “anybody at all brought them in.” There were a lot to spare, so that he would not have missed any. It was seven months since the electric lamps were first used. They still had plenty of safety lamps. The lamps were usually found in the cabin when he went to clean them of a morning, lie did not remember making complaints to the manager about oil lamps not being brought back, but had done so about the electric lamps. To the Chairman: He left the oil lamps on the window ledge and they helped themselves. Each two miners usually’ had one between them. When the men returned the electric lamps they' were given a token. The safety lamps w’ere now issued by a deputy, underviewer, or the manager. The number on the electric lamps W’as stamped on by the company. He had never complained to an underviewer or deputy about the lamps not coming back.

To Mr Smeaton: He started work at 6 o’clock in the morning, and -was usually there at 11 p.m. It was true that Mr. Smeaton had told him that his life was like that of a Taranaki farmer. To the Chairman: Tie knocked off at four, and went on again at 6 p.m., till 11 p.m. To Mr Smeaton: Details concerning the lamps were entered in a book, but not every day. He had plenty of work to do, but he always saw that there were sufficient lamps there. In reply to the Chairman, Mr Smeaton stated that there was now a check by means of a token on the electric lamps, and the oil lamps were only used by the officials. To Mr Davis: When appointed to his position, he was told to take the numbers of the electric lamps but not of the oil, and -was not told what the lav; required. To Mr Bayne: He had noticed two or three numbers on some of the lamps. The lamps were passed in at the door, but sometimes left on the bench, or put in through the window. When he was not there, the lamps were left at the window. To Mr Kimbell: He had not complained of being over-worked. He could not tell them how many lamps had gone astray. To the Chairman: He did not check the electric lamps thoroughly, but. could tell the numbers that were out. With the oil lamp, there was no check of any sort. He was solely on lamp work. He did not have an assistant, except at odd times, to help clean them. SPARKS FROM THE MOTOR.

Richard Collins, miner, stated (to Mr Smeaton) that he had worked in No. 1 coal dip, and had seen sparks coming from the motor, where the wires 1 1 fitted in.” It gave him a start for the time. The flames w’cro about a foot long. To Mr. Wearne: He could point out where the sparks came out on a plan. (Witness did so.) To Mr Hannan: He was off a week before the explosion, when he was sick. He had not mentioned about the sparks to anybody, except to Mr Smeaton, who had asked him about it. To Mr Kimbell: Tie was “just passing” when he saw the sparking—“as true as he was standing there.” It did not come from a lamp. To the Chairman: He was about five feet away from the motor. He did not mention it to his mate, as he did not think it worth while, or to anybody else. There were always sparks in a mine—from falling stone. His mate was following him down, nearly a chain away. His mate was “nearly always last.” He had forgotten all about it, but remembered it again on the day of the explosion. He had heard that Black and others had seen the motor sparking—(before the explosion). The sparks came from where the wire went into the motor. To Mr Baldcrstone: He had seen gas in the No. 1 dip, but not very often. The No. 1 dip was not very dusty, and had not a great deal of water. His working place was more than two chains from the fan. To Mr Leitch: The sides of the din were wet. To Dlr Baldcrstone; They did a fair

Job Hughe-. p.ccV.'J? stated (to Mr leiCvh"' (hut. the lamp found in Wutkiu .mJ. Hits hell’s place, had been ivvoiCcJ. b\ ihe under v tower. Witness h.id in>CS--C.I upon the uudevviewer the ".ui'o.i"c<.' ot reporting such mat lets to him. and warned the man con cei tied. et the danger of what would hauee i in a ‘‘gassy mine like this,’’ it hi'.nos were left about. teplv to the Chairman. Mr. Leitch st' : it nn as part of Mr. Hughes’ duty to remedy anything like that. Witness’stated that he had seen a '.amp damaged some time previously, and had asked the lamp-man if he hadn’t any check on the men taking them out. He had done his duty as mine manager in reporting the matter, and considered it was his (Mr Leitch’s) next move. He was satisfied with the conditions at one time. He had nothing to do with the surface, only the underground. He had drawn Mr Leitch’s attention to certain defects in the rise No 1 heading a month or six weeks before the explosion. There was dust there then—“a fair amount.” The bulk of it was near the heading. It was not brought there by ventilation, but by the fair amount of foot traffic.” There was dust in No. 2 dip and the walls there were affected by the climatic conditions on the surface. Witness had not made any particular requests, and ho had not been kept short of material, or refused any request by the manager. Witness had suggested splitting a pillar in Black’s place, with a view to extracting it and getting a circuit of air. but “you (Mr Leitch) had defined what should be done, or where anything should go.” The ventilation was satisfactory and witness considered himself capable of making it so. Witness did not see that any difference had been made by putting in wooden doors, instead of brattice. Brattice had been put in with a view to diverting the air to the east level. He did not measure the east level, but only the “splits.” Witness had gone round the mine with Mr Bayne and Mr Davis, on December Ist. They proceeded to the east level, to the main heading, which was then being fenced off owing to gas. He di<l not remember if he had tested the gas.

To the Chairman: The fence was about 15ft in extent.

DUST IN CARTER’S LEVEL. To Mr Leitch: After leaving there, they went to the second last heading and found a cap of gas (a small quantity). The men were not working there, but were about 20ft away. Instructions were left that no shots were to be fired there. They then went to Nos. 5 and 6 and at the latter place comments were made by Mr Davis about the timbering. Comments wore also made about the dust in Carter’s level. Mr Bayne had kicked the dust as he was walking along the lino, “repeating the operation several times.” No. 1 heading was not dusty, but was inclined to be damp. They went into Reid’s place, and to the goaf, as far as (the fault line, and he understood that they did not find any gas there. The air pipes were still there. In No. 2

a considerable amount of timber had been set. They went to the west side of No. 2 and found an accumulation of gas in a goaf about 20ft wide. The gas was probably about six feet high. “There were no men within three chains of that place.” He had not calculated the number of feet of the gas. In all probability the gas was there when the explosion occurred. They did not find any gas in the No. 3 west heading, or in the west level. Mr Davis and witness went to Brown’s place, and tested it, but did not find any gas there. “Wet time” was being paid the men at the face there. They then went into No. 2 dip and found everything quite satisfactory. They did not see any clouds of dust there, but it was dusty.

To the Chairman: It was one of the dirtiest parts of the mine, and a place he had previously treated. The floor from Brammer’s level to the. cutthrough was quite, damp. The dust where the clay had been put on would vary in thickness, and would average about half an inch. In addition to the fine dust, there would lie a certain amount of rubbish. He did not think they would meet all the requirements of the act, because the roof and sides had not been treated. He did not remember having tested the sump at that time. He considered the mine to be then in good condition and there was nothing to make him anticipate any trouble. It was not as safe as\it could be made, and needed stone-dusting in the place he had (previously) indicated. It was in his opinion, almost impossible for any large accumulation of gas to be in the mine. He had no doubt whatever that the flame (at the time of the explosion) did come out of the tunnel.

To the Chairman: “There was a deposit of stone in the intake airway. To Mr Leitch: Dust would not be likely to accumulate in the main drive. If the separation doors on the west level had been left open, there would have been a short circuiting of air, and gas would accumulate in the whole of the rise workings. If left open for an hour, it would ha w e brought the men out. Mr Leitch: “I do not think so — while the fans were -working. ” In reply to the Chairman, Mr Leitch said the doors would slam to, with the draft.

Witness, in reply to Mr Leitch, said he did not support the theory that the opening of the doors had resulted in the gas accumulating and causing the explosion. To the Chairman: He had seen thick coal dust —up to one’s ankles— in the main drive, after the explosion. It was in the form of soot, and had evidently been exploded. To Mr Leitch: He did not see signs of any coking on the sides at the

time ho went down after the disaster. In reply to the Chairman, Mr Leitch said that if there had been coking on tho sides, it would indicate that the dust had exploded. Wit ni‘s shad come out of the mine about I o’clock on the day of the inspection (referred to). He did not see Little at 3 o'clock, going on. Mi Leitch: 1 put it that you were not at tho mine at 12 o’clock, and did not give instructions to tho man going on, and I am going to call evidence to show it.

To Mr Smeaton: Witness stated that during tho inspection of Brammer’s place, .since the explosion, Mr Smeaton had remarked that grunching had taken place, but ho (Mr Smeaton) d,id not implicate Purdy or b.is mates. Witness remembered Mr Smeaton stating that there was always trouble with gas (here. To Mr Wearne: A person working in (ho vicinity of tho winch could not: help but notice if anything was wrong there. AUTHORITY RESTRICTED. To Mr Hannan: Hi' was never advised that he was manager, before Mr Leitch returned. He was told that his duties wore confined to tho underground, when he went there. Witness had mentioned the lamp system to Hill and he told him he had started a system of tagging them. Witness had reported the damaging of a lamp to Mr Leitch, and ho (Mr Leitch) did not say much about it, but had rebuked the men concerned, the next morning.

To Mr Davies: There was such a circuit of air entering Dobson, that it was quite capable of clearing the faces. To the Chairman: You could not put brattice close to the face, as it would get shot full of coal. To Mr Davis: Automatic doors would be simple to work -with people going through, but would be difficult to work with trucks going through. To Mr Bayne: He had not said that in putting clay on the dip, that he was complying with the instructions of the mine inspectors. He had put clay on because it was the quickest way of doing it at the time. To Mr Kimbell: He was not able to employ what men he preferred, at the time of the explosion, and was not empowered to alter the system of mining, or to start stone dusting on his own.

To Mr Baldcrstone: Mr Leitch had not given him any instructions ie stone dusting, when his (Mr Leitch’s) attention had been drawn to the matter. No steps were taken to clear the gas out of the goaf which was fenced off. To Mr Watson: The ventilating doors on the west level, complied with the regulations, but did not close automatically. He was doing what he could to see that the lamps were brought up, but would be impossible to see that none of them were left in the mine. To the Chairman: The staff comprised a general manager, mine-man-ager, one electrician, one underviewer, and two deputies. He held a minemanager’s certificate. He could supply an extract of the duties and places when gas was reported, during the last six months. The instructions given by the inspectors was given verbally at fiust—they being given a chance to carry them out, before receiving other notice. They had not received written instruction for stone dusting. To Air Kimbell: The correspondence received by Mr Leitch would not be shown to witness. He had no doubt that a portion of the severity of the explosion was due to coal dust. His theory as to the original cause of the explosion was that either a safety lamp had been left in the mine or that it was due to sparks caused by a fall of stone. Ho thought it had started in the rise workings. The second explosion undoubtedly came out of the dip section. He would assume that the explosion had travelled all through the mine. The only other place it might have started was Carter’s level. It might have also been caused by a “blown-out shot.” such as evidence had been found of, in Brammer’s and Noakes’ place. Noakes’ place had since been dug out, and it had been found that a blow-out shot had taken place there. He did not think a blowout shot had taken place at Brammer’s working place. The proceedings were then adjourn ed for the lunch interval.

EX-MANAGER’S EVIDENCE. On resuming, Mr Walter Leitch, con suiting mining engineer and ex-man- . 'ager of the Dobson Mine, gave evi dence that he had been engaged in mining operations for 38 years. He had been at the Dobson Mine almost : since its inception, and had been manager there for three years. ,He had had sick leave from November 6th to about December sth, during which time Mr Hughes relieved him as general ; manager. While he was ill in bed, Mi Hughes used to come to see him about various matters. Witness was responsible for the electrical installation, and he was directed not to spare anything to make the plant safe. Excepting the >. motors, the plant would cost between five and six thousand pounds. It was customary to use electricity in mines, where it could be obtained. It was quite safe, and was used very extensively in America and also in Australia —where he had been. He was not an electrical engineer himself. He had not examined the motor which was said to have given off sparks, since the explosion. He did not think it was likely to give off sparks. Tho output was increasing rapidly, and it was just possible that the underviewer and deputies were overworked. They had one underviewer and three deputies. He did not recollect Mr Hughes saying that they should have another underviewer, and that he said they “could not run it.” The Company’s capital was about £lOO,OOO, and it was amply capitalised. It would be preferable to give a deputy a larger number of mon to look after, and relieve him of other work. Ho did not consider the mine was any more gassy than others on the Coast. He thought that tho mine was one of the best ventilated mines in New Zealand. A mine of \that sort was giving off gas all the. (time. The coal was of an average kind, so far as dust was concerned.’ He had received a circular letter from

the Minister of Mines last September re taking samples of dust, and when in Wellington he saw the Inspector about for that purpose. He did not know if anything had eventuated since then about the matter. The only place he could get a sample was in the main heading. The samples had to go through a sieve of a certain mesh. ,It was just like mud in No. 2 dip, but that was not the reason why they could not take samples there. He had sent the results to the Inspector, and did not then take any further action in the matter. He was last in the mine on November sth. He was only in No. 1 dip heading, and there was no dust there then. He thought (he dust contributed towards the explosion, but could not say to what extent. lie had had no practical experience in coal dust explosions. Ho did not think that the explosion went right throughout the mine, but could not say [definitely, because he had not been all over the mine at the time. He thought that the first explosion was general. If gas was making to a dan gerous extent, it might ignite, if a lamp was left there. The friction of ■i. fall might generate a spark, but there had not been an explosion due to that cause while he was there. WHERE THE EXPLOSION STARTED.

Witness was of the opinion that the explosion started in the dip sections. The idea of it being caused by a safety lamp was remote, as the deputy tested the lamps before they were used. lie did not think it likely that it was? caused by faulty shot firing. The deputy carried the detonators with him, and also placed the amount of explosive he thought was needed. A piece of derelict cable was left after the shot was fired. The law did not require them to search the men daily, to see if they had any matches. Mi Hunter on one occasion searched all the men when they wero coming up. He could not form any definite theory as to how the explosion occurred. “The electrical man” initiated a system of checking the electric lamps, but they did not carry it out. The inspector on an average visited the mine once a month. Witness consider cd the system of inspection was adequate. From what he had seen of experiments in rescue work, in vitiated atmospheres, in Australia, he did not think that rescue appliances were likely to save lives, though they might help to save property. The rescue apparatus in most places was substantially gas masks. There was more danger in putting a gas mask on a man who was not used to it, though it would be a benefit if the men were properly trained. He had seen several instances of improper shot firing. , To Mr Smeaton: Witness denied that it was some considerable time before the Department would approve of the electrical equipment. He did not re member telling Mr Smeaton that he was taking the electrical gear down be- • low. From what he knew of Black oi , Collins, he did not think they were likely to make the statements that they ' had made if such' had not been tho < case.

ONLY TWO DEPUTIES. Witness admitted that, now he came to think of it, there were only two deputies. He thought that au under-{ viewer and two deputies were sufficient. He did not remember as many as 58 shots being fired by a deputy. The joints in the pipes were fairly well made in most places, but sometimes only a piece of brattice was wrapped around them. He assumed from what he had seen, that the force of the explosion was very severe. The doors would have to be propped open, otherwise they would shut of their own accord. He did not think, from what he had heard of the evidence, that there was much gas in Reid’s place, or that an accumulation of gas there had caused the explosion. If Noakes had fired a shot in his working place, he would expect him l|o refuge around the corner, but if an explosion occurred he would probably be killed there. ,

Mr Smeaton said that Noakes’ body was found inside the place. Witness did not think Noakes had fired a shot there. A detonator was easily fired with two cells. He did not know if the batteries of a lamp had ever been used for that purpose. To Mr Wearne: He did not think that the coal dust had assisted the explosion. If lie had seen the mine previously, he might have had a better idea, and he “defied any man to go into the mine now, and form any de finite opinion.” He had had no personal experience of coal dust explosions

DUST AND EXPLOSIONS. Witness said it would require about - a pound of dust to every 30U cubic feet to cause an explosion. He did not . think there was sufficient dust in the . Dobson Mine to create an explosion, ; and he did not think there was sufficient gas, unless anything went wrong , with the ventilation. There was no "coal dust in the stone drive, but an , explosion there might be caused by fire damp, but it would be possible for a coal dust explosion to propagate itself up there, though he did not think the disaster was due to coal dust. He did. not think that a cloud of dust . would be possible, and thought the statement to that effect was exaggerated. All dust was dangerous if it could be driven into a cloud. The coal dust there was composed of 38 per cent, volatile matter. They had taken the same precautions as in other mines. He had in mind that the mine should be dusted some time before the disaster, and had endeavoured to obtain supplies of stone dust. He did not see why a workman’s inspector should not be present when an analysis was made of the coal dust, but they ,-hould pick a man who had a knowledge of such an analysis. To Mr Davis: The agreements with the officials were made in writing. He had given the officials advice re the presence of gas, and also told the shot iirers to be. very careful. They had put two stoppings across a heading, and considered that “to be the end of it ” but he had been considering a now system, which ho contemplated placing before the Department. I To Mr Strongman: He had no knowledge that men were smoking in the, ‘mine. The report about a drunken man smoking in tho mine was “after

all, only hearsay, and originated in a hotel. ’ ’

DEPARTMENT ’ S THREAT. Mr Bayne quoted from correspondcnee between the Mines Department and the Dobson Mine manager, which showed that the Department had threatened to take action, if the regulations regarding the coal dust were not complied with within two months. Witness said he did not remember receiving the letter to this effect od the Bth of November. To Mr Kimbell: He had initiated a system of recording the issue of the safety lamps. Dunwoodie was only put on when the electric lamps “were put in.” Dunwoodie was evidently negligent in his duties.” Witnes. shad worked in two gaseous mines in New South Wales. He had taken a sample of coal dust from the roadway. The dust which had accumulated on the brattice was cleared out. He did not get the authority of the Inspector to let Dunwoodie work on Sundays. Mr Kimbell: I don’t understand yet why you did not have the mine stone dusted, to comply with the regulations.

Witness said he did not think the mine was dangerous, and he had endeavoured to get stone dust, but without success. They had not got it at the State Mine. lie did not knovy then that he could get inert matter at Boss. He had only taken the one sample of coal dust. It was only a small mine six months prior to that time, and he did not think that the regulations in this respect applied to Dobson. Witness did not think that sealehing was of any use, because “if a man wanted to carry anything into the mine, he would do it.” Witness had only instituted the one search. Wit ness was granted three months’ leave of absence, and if Mr Hughes received the letter re stone dusting, it was Mr Hughes’ duty to carry it out. He thought that the regulations were quite all right.

A MINE MANAGER’S DUTY. To Mr Hannan: He would swear that he had never seen the circular letter sent by the Mines Department. lie did not control the underground, only in a general way. The mine manager had full charge of the men, and he (the mine manager) had interviewed the Inspector when lie came. If lamps Were left in the mine, it was the mine manager’s duty to see that they weie taken out. Witness denied that he was trying “to shift the blame on to anyone else.” Witness had not been restricted in any way in the spending of monev. He had not complained to the directors that Mr Strongman wanted him to carry out things Hint were

unnecessary. } To Mr Baldcrstone: He had seen Brammer’s and Noakes’ place, but would not fix the blame or. anyone in regard to the bad firing of shots. Mr Richards was a very strict man, and was not likely to fire an improper shot. So far as his instructions were concerned, there should have been no grunching going on. Witness denied that there were accumulations of coal dust, except in No. 5 heading, and “even there it was not in dangerous quantities.’’ To the Chairman: lie did not think the hours worked by the Jampman (Dunwoodie) were' excessive. The lampman was paid a weekly wage. To Air Smeaton: Witness admitted that the lampman had not at one time a cabin, and that the lamps were issued from a place behind the winch. He did not know that it was the custom to search the men at the State Aline, and did not think it would be effective. ,

Air Smeaton: Assuming there were 300 lamps at the State Aline, how many lampmcn should you think they employed Witness replied that he thought they would employ two men, and “would be surprised to hear that they employed four men” for that purpose. UNDERVIEWER’S EVIDENCE. Edwin E. Hill, underviewer of the Dobson Aline, stated (to Air Bayne) that he had only found a safety lamp on one occasion at the working face, and once in the stone drive. Brammer’s place was damp, including the sides. To Air Smeaton: He would not say that grunching was going on in Brammer’s place, but there was evidence of bull holes (shots not made properly prepared). He would not consider the No. 2 dip to be dusty, but “Carter’s level was the worst place in the mine.” Water was running all the way down No. 1 dip. He would not have fired a shot such as he had seen evidence of in Noakes’ place, and would have sent a man out of the mine if he had caught him doing it. If conditions were favourable, it would have caused an explosion. It was possible for the “country” to emit a large quantity of gas, but it was improbable. He had seen large quantities of fine dust at Brunner, but not at the Dobson Aline. To Mr Hughes: Witness stated that

Mr Hughes was in the mine practically during the whole of a shift. The duties necessitated Air Hughes being there six days a week. Air Hughes had told him that he should keep the ventilation up well, and Air Hughes had also said that he did not consider that ah underviewer should do shot firing. Air Hughes had relieved witness of that work, and had also relieved a deputy of doing truck work. A deputy had told him about the door being opened, stating that a prop had been put against it. Witness had spoken to the man who had done it. The defect in the hinges was remedied. Witness concurred with Mr Hughes regarding various improvements which had been carried out under the manager’s supervision.

To Air Joyce: Witness had been underviewer ever since he had worked at Dobson, and knew the mine well. He did not think a fall of stone was likely in Reid’s place, or that gas would accumulate there. To Air Watson: Noakes’ place was clear of gas and coal dust. He could not form an opinion as to how the explosion occurred. , To the Chairman: He had found the lamp hanging on a prop in the main heading. The lamp was still alight, and in good order. He found it six hours after the men had knocked off — on the day shift. When he found the lamp, no one was working there owing to the fan having broken down. Witness had had 20 years’ experience in mining. He did not consider the Dobson Aline to be dusty. He had had no experience of coal dust explosions. He considered the present staff to be sufficient. They now had Two deputies and two underviewers. He had taken it on himself to try a system of checking the lamps before the electric lamps were used, because there was always a shortage* lie. considered the more pro-

bable place where the explosion occurred would be where the men were working. He had not heard of men smoking until after the disaster. Witness had made live or six searches. Every man had been searched, as one shift was going on and one coming off. He could swear to having taken part in three searches at least. The searches were carried out uu the day shift. , To Air Smeaton: He was not in favour of every man having two lamps. He thought that “the regulations covered everything.” He had not refused to fire more than two shots, while he was shot firing, but other cases had been reported to him.

To Air Wcarne: He believed that every man should be able to test gas. but a man should either carry a safety or an electric lamp, and not both, as they were inclined to leave the safety lamps behind. To the Chairman: If a lamp was turned up high the gauze would become overheated. To Air Strongman: From his experience, a safety lamp required attention, the same as any other lamp. ,He had never seen a flame come out of one. The proceedings were then adjourned until 10 o’clock the following morning. The Chairman intimated that the Commission would not sit during to-mor-row afternoon.