Grey River Argus and Blackball News MONDAY, JULY 10, 1922. PROFITS BEFORE WAGES!

Grey River Argus, 10 July 1922, Page 4

Grey River Argus and Blackball News

MONDAY, JULY 10, 1922. PROFITS BEFORE WAGES!

, Dci.vercd eve-, j m', ninM in Gr -util jo -a, i H •. •■j V.’allsend, Taylo. ,-illc, Cromidon, . NgaLere. : . all Melson Creek, Brunner. Te i Kingba I<vtoiuanu, Poerua, Inchbonnie. Patara, J Ruru. Kai-nita. Kotukv- Moana, Aratika. Bunanga, Dunoilic, Cobden, Baxter s, Kokiri, Ahaura, Ikamntua, Stulwater. Waiuta, Reef ton, Ross. Ruatapua, Mananin, Hari Hari, Waiho Gorge, Weheka, Rewanui, lnimgahua Junction, Westport, Waimangarna* Denniston, Granity, Millerton. Ngakawau. Hectog, SeddonvilLi, Cape Foul wind, and Karam

i EVERY student of political economy I during the last half century has been . taught to regard the ancient wagc- ' fund theory as an exploded fallacy. It j therefore seems peculiar to find it rc- ’ surrected by the President of our Ar- ! bitrhtion Court. The oth,t>r day, | splitting hairs in an argument with a : workers’ representative, Justice ? Fraser made a very peculiar, not to » say humorous declaration. lie affirmi ed, with due legal solemnity, that in | fixing wages, the Court was guided by ’ two primary considerations. He negi lected to observe, though we do not say ; he failed to perceive, that they were > guiding principles that cut right across I each other. He said the Court u.tlcu | lated wages in accordance with the I cost (;f living, but also in accordance • with what each industry was able to i pay. Now we submit it is either a cast; ! of one or the other principle, but not ’both. If the cost of living is to be [ the governing consideration, thou the [ Court’s notion of what an industry can (“pay” in wages must not be allowed, j to vitiate the calculation in any way. j Conversely, if the Court admits it fixes I wages according to what the employers j say they can afford to pay, it is utter j nonsense to plead that the cost of liv- ■ ing has anything whatever to do with J the Court’s decision. The plain truth ■ is that the Court knows it dare not » defend its decisions solely on the score ’ of the cost of living, because it knows that prices have not in reality fallen in the proportion which it is reducing and hopes to go on reducing wages. Therefore, feeling that a cross section

in the argument is its only chance to camouflage the unfairness of the cuts, and especially those in the industries whore work is most arduous and intermittent, the Court brings in what it terms the ability of the industry to pay so much. This is the exploded fallacy, the antiquated fable, of the wage fund theory, only that it is insinuated the employers nowadays are less arbitrary, and that they are so philanthropic that they oiler ’every penny they can spare in wages. As we ail kiit-w, however, the truth is that the margin of profits to-day is far higher on the average than it was in the day of the wage fund theory. What data or criterion has the Court in fixing its notion of how much an industry can pay in wages? Does it set out with the basic idea that the war time rate of profiteering should be enthron-ed as a. standard rate of remuneration for capital? If not, what is its criterion? I’hc fact that employers refuse to engage their capital or land in productive activity is no guide to-day. The combines have seen to it that there shall be no real competition, aiid that no production shall go on without a conventional rate of profit is allowed. Look at all the pools and combines! The worker is morally bound to claim that the cost of living is the very lowest basis upon which the Court can base wages. It is only a hope that the Court will fail to do this which disposes some employers to delay production. The Court does at times suggest the worker has too high a standard of living by alleging single mel\ have a “good time” when they get a holiday—or the sack. What a rotten defence for wage cuts! If the worker’s few amusements are to be used “as evidence against him “in the Arbitration Court, shall the gilded idlers who batten on profits go unnotired when the legitimate rate of prolits is being computed? The Judge of the Arbitration Court aptly put the case when he urged the simile that the Court kept one eye on the cost of living and one eye on the capacity of an industry to pay wages. No man can direct one eye to one- thing and the other eye to another thing at on-o and the same time. So, also, when the Court turns one eye upon what it considers the wage-paying limitations of any industry it is morally certain that at that very moment its other eye cannot from the very nature of the case be taking any notice whatever of the cost of living. The head ol the Court could not have more aptly illustrated the impossible task it has undertaken in trying to reconcile two principles or tendencies that arc* mutually hostile. In short, ii' has agreed to consider profits as more important than wages.