TRIBUTE TO GERMAN ABILITY.

Grey River Argus, 20 December 1920, Page 3

TRIBUTE TO GERMAN ABILITY.

(Received December 18 at 5.5. p.m.) LONDON. December 17. The letter, proceeds: — The loss of the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable was due partly to the indifferent armour of the British battle-cruisers and to a disadvantage as regards light, but the German gunnery was of a very high standard. It falls off when they hit, but even then it is very accurate. The German organsation at night tme is very good, and their recognitio.i of their signals excellent whereas ours is practica.il nil. "We have a good deal to loam from them. The*Germau tactics were, as anticipated. The enemy's turning away movement, under cover of destroyers attacks, is difficult to counter. It has been closely studied, but there is no real counter, except a-mple time and superior speed Thus a fight to a finish is almost impossible, unless it begins early ia the day. It would be rendered even more difficult by mine fields and submarines. A feature of the action was the num- ! ber of torpedoes which crossed the i British line. Only one ship was hit It is supremely important not to let the enemy know that his torpedoes tra-cks are visible,^ because it would not be beyond . German ingenuity to prevent a by-track being left. Certain lessons were learnt as the result of dispositions and tatics. Interesting sections are devoted to many thousands of messages and signals between the ships before, during, and after the battle. Tliis shows the Admiralty received news on May 13 indicating that there would be early activity on the part of the German fleet, and .instructing Lords Jellicoe and Beatty to concentrate eastward of the long forties, ready for eventualities. Among the signals stated is one which was much discussed, and which as sent from Beatty to Jellicoe at seven fortyseren _n the evening of the 31st, and received seven minutes later : — "Urgent— submit van of battleships and follow battle-cruisers and we can .then cut of whole enemy's battle fleet." Jellicoe, at 8.14 ordered Jerram, commanding the second battle squadron to follow Beatty, but Jerram art 8.45 reported the battle-cruisers were not in sight. Another signal from the Flotilla Lead er Faulkner, at 1.52= 0n the morning of June Ist announced that he had sighted the enemy battleships, giv- . ing their position, but the Iron Duke (Jellicoes flagship) did not receive the message, which was probably -jammed by the Germans. This is viewed by some almost as a tragedy, as Jellicoe' s battleships were then speeding southward to cut dff Von Scheer and Faulkner's message if received, might have prevented the enemy reaching home. It would have showed Jellicoe. that Von Scheer at about that time, was crossing his track. The critics are busily reconstructing the events in the light of the signals. There are Wo schools, still sharply divided. Some declare the signals uphold the previous contention that Jellicoe in turning away, lost tho chance of a decisive victory. Others say that Jellicoe took a less spectacular, but a logical course, in avoiding torpedoes and they direct attention to the fact that Beatty did not signal before Jellicoe mftnoeufed away, but half an hour later, and Jellicoe completed the manoeure at 7.35.