ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN ASIA.

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1842, 17 January 1880, Page 3

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN ASIA.

[“ Saturday Review.”]

The conditions of the military and political contest in Afghanistan hare within a few days been materially altered. The abdication of Yakoob Khan deprives the Indian Government of its character of ally or protector of an actual ruler, and reduces Sir Frederick Roberts to the position of commander of a foreign army of occupation. An unfounded report that Merv had been taken by the Russians caused for a time an additional feeling of uneasiness. The Russians would have been nearer to Herat at Merv than the English at Oabul, and there was reason to appre hend a race for the possession of the fortress, if not an immediate collision. It is not yet certain whether the Russian army has returned for the winter to the shores of the Caspian j but the capture of Merv, though it will no doubt ultimately be effected, has probably been deferred for some months. Even at Merv a Russian army would still bo separated from Herat by a distance of two hundred and fifty miles ; yet the figurative expression that Merv is the key of Herat has probably a sound practical meaning. Diplomacy moves in advance of armies, and the comparative proximity of a Russian force may probably exercise an influence over the politics of Western Afghanistan. In anticipation of the early occupation of Merv it becomes more than ever urgent to secure the possession of the only one of the three Afghan capitals which has not yet received an English garrison. If it is true that the Indian Government is surveying a railway line to Oandahar, it may be inferred that an attempt will be made to profit by the alleged goodwill of the local chiefs to maintain a connection with the city which will not necessarily assume the form of sovereignty. It is only during occasional periods in the brief history of the Afghan power that the whole of the country which was governed by Dost Mahommed and Shore Ali has been united under the same dominion. The importance of Herat as a military position renders it expedient to reduce, if possible, under subjection to the ruler who may be established at Cabul. On this account and for other reasons the abdication of Yakoob Khan is highly inconvenient, although there may have beenjj reasons which rendered it impossible that he should retain his post as Ameer. A nominally reigning sovereign who has through oircumstances been reduced to dependence is ordinarily a more efficient instrument than a pretender or a mere nominee. It is probable that Yakoob Khan may have lost courage on finding that he was trusted neither by his English patrons nor by his former subjects. His refusal to accompany General Roberts in his solemn entry into Cabul probably implied his resolution to abdicate. He may perhaps have hoped that his son, who was allowed to join in the procession, would be appointed his successor. Nothing is known in England of the character, or even of the age of the young man ; nor is it certain that his claims would bo supported by any section of the Afghan chiefs. The recognition by the principal Sirdars of his title to the throne would remove many difficulties. In the meantime Sir Frederick Roberts has undertaken the arduous task of governing the country, or at least the capital. It is satisfactory to find that he expressed in his address to the chiefs and people of Cabul no intention of injuring the town, except as fur as it might be necessary to remove buildings which impede the defence of the Bala Hissar. The explosions which have since taken place may possibly effect his plans, though for the present he, in his published despatches, attributes the catastrophe to accident. The uncertainty of the present and it the immediate future in a great measure supersedes the interest of controversies on the former policy of the Government. A writer in the “Edinburgh Review” apparently ap proves of the acquisition of a now frontier in India, and, in direct opposition to the loaders of his party, ho admits that the policy of the Government prevented the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. He contends that the threatening movements of Russia in Central Asia were designed only to promote European objects, and that consequently a cessation of resistance to Russia in Europe would secure India from aggression. As he would probably not be disposed to surrender Constantinople to a formidable and ambitious rival, the practical inference to be drawn from a theory in itself paradoxical is not altogether obvious. It is possible that in certain oircumatanoea on invasion of India might be pre-

vented by maritime operations in the Dardanelles or the Black Sea ; but it is more probable that the designs of Russia would be simultaneously and independently prosecuted in Europe and in Central Asia. According to the Reviewer, “ the fact is clearly established that down to the time when Lord Northbrook left India in Ap;i 1876 tbe Indian Government had not the least reason to suppose or believe that there were any Russian intrigues in Oabul connected with the Kaufman correspondence or otherwise.” L >rd Salisbury, who had not read the article in the “ Edinburgh Review ” when he spoke at Manchester, directly contradicted tbe statement as to Russian intrigue. Ho also reminded his hearers that Shero Ali’s refusal to admit English agents had not been resented until he allowed a Russian mission to enter his country and resile in his capital. Mr Childers’ criticism on this part of Lord Salisbury’s speech war no be.tor than a quibble. Lord Salisbury’s remark on Lord Northbrook has been misunderstood. Ho suggested, not that the Viceroy hud disobeyed the orders of the Government, but that his dissent had so far prevailed as to cause postponement of action. Both the Liberal critic and the late Secretary of State for India were really addressing themselves to English political parties with a view to the general election. One of Lord Salisbury’s statements has scarcely received the attention which it deserves. It. appears that during the negotiations at Qundumuk the Viceroy would lave preferred that his rtw .'sontalive should reside at Oandahar, and that the final arrangement was made in deference to the wishes of Yakoob Khan. The Ameer requesled that the Mission should bo sent to Cabul rather than to one of the provincial capitals, on the plausible ground that he would be better able to protect a Resident in his own immediate neighborhood. Lord Salisbury seems to have furnished a conclusive answer to the charges of rashness which have been lately urged against the Government with extraordinary violence of language. He showed a due regard to his own dignity in not noticing the accusation against himself of having cirectly caused the death of Cavagnari. It is possible that Yukoob Khan may have been sincere in his confidence that ho would bo able to protect the mission at Cabul. His father had found no difficulty in compelling or inducing the people and the army to tolerate the presence of the Russian strangers. Ho may also have reasonably thought that the English Envoy would give importance to the city which might be selected for his rosiden e. The most dangerous enemies of the rulers of Cabul have generally been their lieutenants at Oandahar and Herat; and Yakoob Khan may not have been without suspicion of foreign intrigues. The anxieties which now press on the English and Indian Governments might probably have arisen if there had been no previous Afghan war. There would almost certainly have been a disputed succession after the death of Shere Ali, if he had not been forced or induced by tbe approach of the English army to liberate Yakoob Khan from prison. The advance of Russia to the borders of Afghanistan, which siems to have been temporarily chocked, has long hern meditated. The Russians themselves explain the movement by the supposed necessity of subduing the Turcomans, although their real motives may have had a wider range. It may be hoped that the policy of England at the present crisis will not be regulated by considerations of party convenience.