THE LABOUCHERE LIBEL CASE

Globe, Volume XXII, Issue 1842, 17 January 1880, Page 3

THE LABOUCHERE LIBEL CASE

After two days of elaborate and learned argument, involving reference to precedents as old as the time cf Fort esc ao, the Court of Queen’s Bench—composed, for the time, o) the Lord Chief Justice, Mr Justice Lush, and Mr Justice Manisty—has refused Mr Labouchere the mandamus for which he applied, and has dismissed his application with costs. Commenting on this decision the “ Standard” says:—“The point of law now raised for the first time in Westminster Hall is one of interest to all classes of the community, more especially when we consider the intolerable length of soma recent preliminary investigations, amounting, in fact, to trying a case twice over. Mr Labouchere, it may bo remembered, was originajly charged before Sir Robert Carden with wilfully publishing a false and defamatory libel. The charge did not go on to state that the accused know the libel to be false. It was confined to the simple fact of publication ; and as to the publication there could DC no matter of doubt, for the defendant himself admitted it, and insisted that what was alleged to ba a libel was in fact only a true and fair comment, justified by the circumstances of the case, and published for the public good. In support of this contention, Mr Labouchere, on the hearing before Sir R. Carden, proceeded to examine the plaintiff as to various matters which he contended would furnish sufficient matter of justification. After the cross-examination had continued for some little time, the Attorney General, on behalf of the plaintiff, objected that any such cross-examination was altogether irrelevant ; that the sole question before the magistrate was whether the libel had been published ; that its truth or falsehood would be matter of justification upon the trial, but could not bo inquired into before committal ; and that it was the duty of the magistrate, if he were satisfied that there had been a publication of matter prima facie libellous, at once to commit the accused to take his trial. In questioning the authority of the Queen v. Townshend, and inviting the Court of Queen’s Bench to reverse the case, Mr Labouchere did no more than he was entitled to do. There were many strong points of law in his favor. More especially Mr Charles Russell, to whom Mr Labouchere’s interests were entrusted, relied on the fact that the Queen v. Townshend decision had been virtually reversed by Russell Gurney’s Act, in which it is provided that defendants accused before a Magistrate of a criminal offence may call witnesses in their behalf, and that the Magistrate shall bo compelled to take the evidence of such witnesses and make it a part of the depositions. The legal niceties raised by thus balancing a statute admittedly somewhat obscure in its wording against a precedent of doubtful authority were fully discussed before the Court, They are, however, of but small interest to the general public, which, as far as all such subtleties are concerned, will be sufficiently content with the final j udgment of the Lord Chief Justice and his learned colleagues on the Bench.”