CAS IN WARFARE.

Gisborne Times, Volume LXX, Issue 11168, 29 March 1930, Page 9

CAS IN WARFARE.

use tear gas in peace time against one’s own citizens, bow could it be wrong to use iij in war against the enemy ?

High explosive shells again, generally produced poisonous fumes which under certain ; conditions would poison men in ' tho, neighbourhood of the burst. Tim Geneva Protocol did not prohibit tho use of high explosive shells that released poisonous fumes, nor did it define in any way what high explosives were permitted in war. The Protocol was certainly inaccurate in stating that the use of chemicals in war had been justly condemned by the general opinion of tlie world.

The casualties of the last war showed that the military results desired eoukl be obtained more easily and with less human suffering from gas than from high explosives, .said Dr. Levinstein. Gas manned or killed a much smaller ' proportion' of those it put out of action than any other weapon used in the war. In proportion to the military results it caused far less human suffering, temporary or permanent. Prom January 1 to September 30, 1918, the number of German gas casualties was, in round figures, 58,000; of those, only 3 per cent. died. Prom August-1. to 10, 1919, ‘the French had 14,478 casualties; of those 2.9 per cent. died.

The total British casualties and deaths- frbm-gas from September Id, 1918, to the end ,oh. the war, were 24,363. centage of deaths 2.5. Of the American gas casualties less than 2 per cent, died and very, fpw were..permanently injured. Out of evory-109 casualties from all form of warfare other- than.-gas : more ftliJin' 211 'died, and of those that - survived two' to five were maimed, blinded .or disfigured for life. It was. ‘ estimated that mustard gas killed one' man for every 40 put out of. action. ■ while shells killed one, for every three. . While' not‘ suggesting-:that gas warfare was anything’ but "dreadful if was less wasteful of human life and •property than older forms of warfare, and 'it was of isuoli' outstandiiig , importance 'that, when .the time came; it would lip used' overt-.if fpfdi ; use were against the' spirit of the.■: Protocol,/ • */ : . v ‘’.

EMPLOYMENT DEFENDED 1 ‘less cm Oman stjffering ’’ The "president of the Society cf Chemical Industry, Dr. Herbert Levinstein, read a paper on “Chemical Warfare” before the London section of the society at the Institution of Mechanical Engineers recently. He criticised the “illusory” character of treaty provisions against gas warfare, contended that the limitation of naval armaments increased the importance of the chemical arm, quoted figures to establish that gas es were less brutal and destructive* of human life and property than shells, and pleaded for the prose eution of chemical warfare research. Dr. Levinstein said President Wilson was the main author or inspircr of clause 171 in the Treaty of Versailles, which forbade chemical Avar fare; yet, fresh from the drafting of this clause, lie telegraphed to the Congress that although the United States A\-ould gladly join in a national disarmament programme, it would neA'ertheless be obvious prim once to make certain of the success fill maintenance of many strong and well-equipped chemical plants. If President Wilson thought this obvi ous prudence for the Unted States, who were not ivar-mongers or panicmongers if avo examined the problem for ourselves and pursued a

similar course. TJio restriction of naval anna meats, the limitation of tin? number and size of ships, was ahnost purely an economy measure, but limiting the size or number of battleships or ordnance did not necessarily make war less likely; on the contrary, by making it cheaper, in a sense it made it easier. In any case, decreasing the relative importance of ships or guns or man power was bound to increase the importance of unv other arm, particularly tho chemical 'arm. Chemical arfaro had in a kind of way been forbidden at Versailles, at Washington, and by the League of Nations at Geneva, and, indeed, ever since tho Hague Convention of July, 1891), said Ur. Levinstein. His object was not to show that the prohibition was illogical, but if it could bo proved to be ineffective, that was another matter, for to rely on ineffective prohibition might he as dangerous in the future as it was in the In -t- -war. The Germans clamed that they did not break the letter of the Hague Convention of 18f«9 when in April, 1915, they let loose a flclod or chlorine over the British lines, at the second battle of Ypres and made a gap eight- miles wide in our line. In the terms of the Convention, the contracting Powers agreed to “abstain from tho use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The gas in April, 1915, was discharged not from propectilcs but from cylinders, an important technical difference'. .Most, if not all, of the gas shells employed afterwards had a high explosive charge, and* their object was not, therefore, “solely the liberating of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The loosing or that stream of chlorine ou the Can* ■adian and French Colonial troops created a gap through which the Germans might have poured through had their General Staff really believed at that time in the efficiency of the chemical weapon.

This surprise attack showed tin. extreme danger of allowing ourselves to neglect defence against chemical warfare, because we did not expect it owing to some inaccurate or indefinite form of words used in a treaty. In article 171 of the Treaiv of Versailles, intended fjo prohibit chemical warfare, there was a proviso at least as vague as that of 1899 forbidding in Germany the manufacture and importation of toxic gases and .analogous liquids. Wlmt exactly did the Geneva protocol of 1925, which Great Britain had promised to ratify, prohibit Y it prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating poisonous or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials or devices, but it did not prohibit the use of screening smokes. We of alt people should be crazy to prohibit their use. Yet, in concentrated form most of the smokes had deleterious effects on the hunian organisation. No one could claim,' lor instance, that clilorosulphonie acid smoke, tluv Zeebruggo screen, was pleasant to breath in high concentration. Those who used it in chemical works know it .to he a most unpleasant substunco to handle. There was no screen smoke which was wholly noudeletorious, and if smoko screens were allowed and not defined or limited the rest of the prohibition lost its virtue.

Again, were tear gasses to he regarded as coming within the ban? Many pooplo would argue that these were not poisonous, for in very low concentration they only affected'the eyes. If tear gas were prohibited, that would prohibit in war tho use of a weapon permitted and used in peace. Tear gas was used ill the United States for dealing with riots and similar disturbances and as a protection' to banks and safe deposits against burglars and 'thieves. If it were permissible to