The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED DAILY. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1920. THE OFFICIAL STORY OF JUTLAND BATTLE.

Gisborne Times, Volume LIII, Issue 5666, 21 December 1920, Page 4

The Gisborne Times PUBLISHED DAILY. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1920. THE OFFICIAL STORY OF JUTLAND BATTLE.

r L'he public will be somewhat surprised at the character of the extracts that have come to hand from the British official account of the Battle of Jutland. All the good points that were displayed by ; the Germans are stressed** but most of. the references to the Royal Navy deal . with weaknesses that handicapped, its efforts. In short, it represents an elaborate apology for the fact that .the German navy managed to escape complete annihilation on the occasion , oif the greatest naval 'battle in modern times! The report is, however,.-bo.urid .to satisfy those .who, at .the time, came to the 'conclusion that Viscount Jellicoe did all that was possible in the circumstances :.under which we famous engagement took pl ace : > As the position new stands—the menace of a powerful German - navy 1 being removed—uvhat dobs- it. .matter that one school of naval thought at Home —the opponents of ‘Viscount. Jelliepe—still maintains that - ,he "ought to have forced the battle - to the point of overwhelming disaster' for Ger-many?*-We would remind our readers that, in launching the attack, the Germans had many initial .advantages'. iNot onl’y-- is it true that they chose the date for the attack, but it us' also- beyond doubt that they made the choice of tfie' battle area. If that were all, it would show that the Royal Navy waG under very big handicaps. But, in addition, it must not be . overlooked that the Germans came into contact' with the main British naval forces only at a time when visibility was all in their own

I favor and ran Back home just when I it suited them! There would, assmcdly have been a very different , to relate if the Battle had bee fought out in a wide stretch of ooea - instead of close handy to the Gmman mine-fields protecting the enemy,coast line. In such circumstances, it is extremely improbable that any crippled German vessels would have succeeded <in limping back to-port. Ihe Germans, too, were extremely fortunate in that they were ab.e to concentrate, on Beatty’s fleet •ol battle-cruisers for such a lengthy period before Jellicoe’s big fldot came on the scene. We cannot, perhapsexpect the anti- J ellicoo naval “school” at'Heme to admit anything in his favor. The fact remains, however, that, shortly after his arrival on the scene, the German fleets headed for home—a decision which amounted to the greatest tribute that could have been paid not only to the ships and men under his command; hut also to his qualities as a naval lighter. It is, (no doubt, regrettable that there were heavy losses on the British side. The truth has, however, still to be told as to the real extent of the German losses and also as to tne disastrous effect which Beatty’s brave fleet fiad on the German morale. Let it never be forgotten that the German High Seas Fleet never again dared to quit port, excepting, after the Armistice, under British escort! We cannot understand why the cabled extracts from the British official account of the battle contain so little about the splendid manner in which the Boyal Meets, in the circumstances, acquitted themselves. Is that to be left to the German naval historians to make plain to the whole world? From all accounts, ihe German naval leaders admit that their side got off very much better than it deserved. Yori Hase, who was the chief gunnery expert aboard the Derffiinger, makes no secret of the fact that the German battle cruisers were, at one time, cut off from their base, and almost entirely surrounded. ,If Viscount Jellicoe had not been prevented from receiving a very important. signal—so his naval critics now assert—the action would have been continued, with every chance of enormous success, just at the point when it was broken off. But, seemingly, Jellicoe did not become acquainted with the actual position until he had about completed an extensive and necessary manoeuvre to enable the British main fieet to avoid a combined enemy attack by submarines, whose operations were covered by destroyers. As far as can be gathered, German naval critics reckon that Jellicoe adopted admirable strategy. That is praise which Jellicoe will appreciate, seeing that its authors admit that their own strategy went astray and that a big section of their own fleet was saved more by good fortune than by good management. Whilst the Battle of Jutland did not, unhappily, result in the destruction of the German naval forces, it will, we think, be admitted by the naval historians of all nations that, as the upshot, British supremacy of the seas remained undisputed. ,