U-BOAT BASES.

Gisborne Times, Volume XLIX, Issue 4757, 3 January 1918, Page 6

U-BOAT BASES.

WHY THEY CANNOT BE TAKEN,

MINE AND NET BARRAGES HAVE LIMITATIONS.

In France, where one comes into contact with the . army chiefly, an impression lodges in the mind that this war might be brought to and end it only the Allied navies would ‘go to it,” writes Charles H. Grasty to the New York Times. In London the atmosphere is distinctly naval. I did not get a chance to advance the characteristic land-lubber viewpoint more than about a minute before tlie argument was taken up in vigorous sailonnan fashion. vVhy don’t the English and American ships go in and clean them up? If success or failure right now hinges on tlie U-boat why not send naval forces to batter to bits the bases of the Channel coast? Expensive, yes, but what are ships for but to he risked ajnl lost ? The counter attack was so sudden and sharp that I am afraid I put rather more of tlie onus upon tlie absent army critic than was altogether fair, whereas a navy man, who does nob think meanly of Ids own literary accomplishments, undertook to prepare for my signature a letter stating the case in such simple terms as” to leave no room for misunderstanding, and- here is what he wrote: — “Since my return from Switzerland a few weeks ago I have been looking into the submarine situation again. You may have seen in The Times some of my articles concerning the present shipping situation, which is, as you doubtless know, still so serious that no effort should be spared to diminish the loss and increase the amount of tonnage.. “1 intend; to pound away at this until its significance is more generally , understood in America, where the political speeches of Mr. LloydGeorge tend to create a dangerous optimism. - MOB STRATEGY AND PUBLIC OPINION.

“In the meantime there is another feature of this business which exercises no inconsiderable influence upon public opinion, and that is the influence of the inevitable mob strategy that manifests itself in all cases of prolonged and serious war operations.

“Few persons refrain from expressing opinions as to how the enemy could be routed. All respectable newspaper editors must suppl v their readers with such; opinion and with criticism of the responsible military leaders.

“Many suggestions as to how’ to end the war are published. Theso are variations of schemes implied by various catch-phrases. Of these Winston Churchill’s ‘Digging the rats out of their holes’ is the chief. Another very sedtictive one is, ‘Why not stop up the hole in the nest instead of chasing the wasps after they are out ?’

“The influence of these and similar phrases is such _ that even educated men d:o not hesitate to criticise the strategy and even the common sense and courage of the Allies, and as this tends to diminish efforts already under way, I made up my mind"-to obtain some facts and authoritative opinions on the subject. These have proved so very illuminating and are so readily. comprehended, even by the civilian mind, that I am sure, that they will interest you: “1. In order to dig the rats out, or stop up the hole in the wasp’s nest the German bases of their fleet and submarines must be taken by attack from the sea. “2. This can be done only by reducing by bombardment the fortifications protecting the bases. “3. The guns of modern land defences are not visible from the sea. Many of them are powerful mortars at the bottom of pits, Ships, of course, are clearly visible from shore batteries and their captive balloons and airplanes. “4. The effective range of these guns is over twenty-three miles. This has been shown by actual shooting at ships in this war. “5 No men-erf-war’s guns have a range of more than seventeen miles, and the enemy target is invisible. “6 It is therefore apparent that a naval attack from the sea would be even more sucidal now than in Nelson’s day. “7. It might be compared' with a blind pugilist wjth arms two feet long trying to fight one with good eyesight and with arms three feet long. “8T Coast positions. Large areas (like Bruges, Zecbrugee,) are bone harded) from time to time, but this can be done onlj r at very infrequent intervals when the wind is in ; the right direction for screens to be laid to mask the bombarding vessels. “9 Few civilians know the above facts. Many irresponsible officers are equally ignorant, as the essential facts liave been developed during this war, but T have yet fo meet a sjugle responsible officer who belives that it is possible to reduce land defences by a sea attack.

HELIGOLAND AN OBSTACLE

“10. But even assuming that this were possible, a glance at the map will show that the German fleet and submarine bases could not be approached' by shipping unless the powerful defence of Heligoland were destroyed and the island captured and held.

“11. But even assuming that this island were turned over to the Allies with all jts defences intact, it could not he held as a base by them, because, being but a few miles from the German bases, it could be attacked every night and all night by numerous airplanes carrying bombs of over 200 pound's. Heligoland is one mile long by one-half mile wide. “12. There is practically no defence against such night raids. In the recent midnight raid only two of the numerous anti-aircraft guns ever saw the planes. , “13. Moreover, the island could be successfully bombed bv daylight, because the Allies could not bring to bear enough fighting planes to resist those that could be sent from the nearby German bases to protect the bombing planes, mg planes. “14. There lias been a recent naval conference in London in which all the principal allied countries were represented. Their conclusions have not been published, But there can be no doubt that no member present believed that the rats could' be dug out of their holes. “15. Many schemes have been proposed for building a mine or net barrage, or both, to prevent the German submarines from coming out .or going in to their .bases. Many attempts have been made, but up to tlie present time it has not been found possible to prevent submarines passing through the narrow strip of water between Calais an f i Dover, yet it lias

seriously been proposed by all sorts and conditions of people 'to build a barrage from Scotland to Ndr way, over a distance of about 230 miles, m very deep water and across a strong tide. “It is, of course, unnecessary to state that the assumptions of sufficent knowledge to decide how the naval war should be conducted on this side pre-supposes a condition of mind that I cannot well understand. The allied nations have been fighting three years for their very existence. When the civilian sees that his particular idea of the strategy of the situation lias not been carried out, ought he not naturally to assume that there must he impelling reasons why this is so? “But the civilian critic makes the opposite assumption. He is absolutely convinced that his ideas are right. They could only be right on the assumption that the combined military experience of all the Allies was not sufficient to comprehend! what seems so apparent to him, or else seeing the situation as he does, they lack the energy and courage to carry it. out. No other conclusion would appeal" possible to a man who knows anything about history.” in view of the divergence of opinion between the two services, to say nothing of the irrepressible conflict of theory within tlie navy, the foregoing statement of the ideas upon which present policy is grounded should he interesting.