KIPPENBERGER AS WAR HISTORIAN QUERIES POLICY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22817, 11 December 1948, Page 4

KIPPENBERGER AS WAR HISTORIAN QUERIES POLICY

(P.A.)

DUNEDIN, Dec. 11

“In trying to solve the problems of the last war, historians are only facing wha Iheir predecessors have done after every war.” said Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger in an address to tile monthly luncheon of the Civil Service Institute yesterday.

“Today I am not attempting to reach a definite conclusion, but will consider the ‘might end.’ what happened and whether another solution could have been reached had our policy been different in many cases.

"One of (lie first things we might question,” Sir Howard said, “was the wisdom of the policy of forcing the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. Once the decision to insist on these terms had been reached by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. the German resistance was automatically prolonged •

“Much earlier than the date the declaration was made many of the German generals realised the war was lost and were anxious for pence, but they were forced to give up their plans

and the Goebbels propaganda machine was greatly assisted. But the whole matter was just a question of whether another solution could have been reached had the declaration not been made. Was Bombing Sound? “Was the bombing of Germany a sound policy?” Sir Howard asked. ' “Bomber” Harris thought the war could have been won by bombs alone and the American, Chennault, always maintained that China and Japan could be conquered from the air. Approximately half the United States total force was devoted to strategic bombing and about 40 per cent, of England’s, Sir Howard said. These were extremely heavy dimensions of effort, which left barely enough troops to win battles. . The Battle of the Atlantic also ' slowed, he added, as it was on a lower priority. "What were the results of strategic bombing?” he continued. "Up to the middle of 1942 we were told that Germany was being bombed to rubble, but photographs later showed that only 15 per cent, of the bombs dropped fell within five miles of the tar- * gets.” Real Strategy Shown. It was when Lord Tedder attacked the rail and road transport and oil refineries that real strategy was shown, he added. Although he was not _ attempting to express a qualified opinion, Sir How- . ard said he merely wished to point out that Germany was too big for her factories and bases to be attacked successfully and that bombing was very costly in lives. He went on to describe how Generals Montgomery and Alexander had been over-ruled and asked what would be the position if these men had proved to be right, stating that the ' world situation might be vastly different. Cassino Mistake. He also referred to what he considered was a mistake in the Cassino battle to which he himself was a party. After bombing the monastery he said, the Germans were given the unquestionable right to use what was • left, even if it was rubble.

■‘We were all experienced soldiers. Yet we made bomb craters at Cassino over which we later had to build Bailey bridges,” he said. It was an example of muddled thinking which could be found even with the most experienced. It did not do to be too free with opinions, Sir Howard concluded, for after all the war was won without excessive cost of life, especially in comparison to the 1914-1918 conflict.