WHY THE BRITISH LOST BURMA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22584, 12 March 1948, Page 5

WHY THE BRITISH LOST BURMA

WAVELL’S STORY OF WEAKNESS & ERRORS USE OF A.S.F. DIVISION REFUSED (N.Z.P.A. —Reuter —Copyright.) (10 a.m.) LONDON, March 11. The loss of Burma was strategically the most serious reverse of the Far East war, says Field Marshal Wavell in a War Office dispatch, issued today, on the 1941-42 operations in Buima. When the Australian Government refused his request that the Seventh Division of the A.I.F. be sent to Burma, the last hope ot holding Rangoon practically vanished.

Field Marshall Wavell says the loss* of Burma deprived the Chinese of the flow of munitions to continue their long resistance, made the establishment of air bases within effective range of Japan extremely difficult, exposed India to serious invasion and had a disastrous effect on British prestige in the East.

The Burma defence preparations had concerned him greatly. Mot® might have been done if Burma itself had placed the country on a war -footing. Defence Not Taken Seriously

Political consideration, climate, un-der-estimation of the enemy, overestimation of the natural strength of the frontiers and the complacency of many years’ freedom from external threat all combined to prevent the defence problem being taken sufficiently seriously. Field Marshal Wavell reveals there was never a sufficient naval force. The air force was out-moded and small. Although skilfully and boldly handled, it was more than a match for the enemy as long as good airfields and warnings were available.

The troops were always outnumbered in the field. The enemy was allowed to gain cheap initial successes through bad handling by local commanders, lack of training and, in some instances, lack of fighting spirit. The Burma Rifles, who comprised the bulk of the troops, were undependable. They consisted of Chins, Karens, Kachin’s. and Burmese.

Field Marshal Wavell admits he was guilty of an error of judgment in minimising the danger to Burma. When he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific in January. 1942. Burma was included against his wishes. Error of Judgment Admitted

‘‘l admit I did not at this time consider the threat to Burma serious," he said. "I over-estimated the natural difficulties of the wooded hills on the frontier nor did I realise the unreliable quality of the Burma units nor the lack of training of British and Indian troops.” Commenting on the allegation that he had refused General Chiang Kaishek’s offer of two Chinese armies (■equivalent in strength to two British divisions). Field Marshal Wavell sn.vs he accepted at once the offer of two divisions of the Sixth Chinese Armv. but asked that the Fifth Army should be held in reserve ■"ear Kunming and not be moved into Burma.

General Chians Kai-shek made a condition of the offer that the Chinese troons .should have a separate line of communications and shou’d not be mixed with the British troops. A separate line of communication could not be provided for the Fifth Armv but could be provided for one division of the Sixth Armv- Tie was satisfied that his qualified aceenta” r ’c of the offer was justified by Ihe military situation as he saw it at the time. No Difference In End Obviously, also, it was desirable that Burma should be defended by Imperial and not by foreign troops. Admitting that, as things turned out, acceptance of the offer wholeheartedly and at once would have saved much criticism in China and the United States, he did not, however, think it would have made any difference in the end to the defence of Burma.

Field Marshal Wavell pays tribute to the American Volunteer Group (A.V.G.) equipped with P4O fighter aircraft and led by General Clare Chennault. The air defence of Burma, especially the vital port of Rangoon, would have been overwhelmed but for them.

Generally speaking, the standard of Army leadership was high. Field Marshal (then General), Alexander, who assumed command in Burma on March 5, 1942, took over an extremely difficult situation and a somewhat shaken and disorganised army. Alexander’s Grim Picture

Field Marshal Alexander’s report is included in the dispatch. He says the technique of jungle lighting was virtually non-existent in his force. In addition, the infantry were not sufficiently well trained in modern tactics. There had been no training with tanks which meant that armoured units did not receive the infantry support they needed. Instead, the infantry came more and more to rely on the tanks to get them out of a tight corner. Rangoon was about to fall when Field Marshal Alexander took command. He had to fight a delaying and withdrawing action with numerically inferior forces.

His report tells in simple language something of his difficulties in fighting over sandy tracks, through fever

jungles, crossing thickly wooded, high mountains and badly .bridged swollen rivers, contending with hostile Bur mans, carrying his wounded with him, helping thousands of refugees, many wholesale desertions of Burmins from the Burma Rifles. When the campaign ended, only two battalions of this division remained—one composed of Chins and the other wholly Indian. He highly praised his British and Indian troops-the 17th Indian and First Burma The 17th fought for five months without a rest.