SOME REPARATIONS

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22438, 19 September 1947, Page 6

SOME REPARATIONS

PLANT TREATY SUPERVISION NO UNDUE INTERFERENCE (P A ) WELLINGTON. Sept. 18. The report on the Canberra conference, tabled in the House of Reprcsentatives states that New Zealand will support the payment of lions by Japan from excess industrial capacity arising out of industrial dis* armament. There is already sufficient agreement in the Far Eastern Commission on what should be the nature of these removals to raise hopes tlint final agreement may be reached in advance of the peace treaty. A limited number of ships should also be available for reparations, the report adds

Japanese external assets should be made availaole (or reparations but it is not considered that any reliance should be placed on reparations being leceived from current production, lhc first charge on Japan's exports must be to pay (or essential imports and, in the present depressed state of Japanese economy, it is extremely dubious whether reparations from current production would be available for many years.

The treaty should include provision for the payment of occupation costs, but the nature of such provision must inevitably depend largely upon the attitude ot the United States Govern ment as the largest claimant. Supervision of Whaling

Japan should be required to sub scribe to all international conventions to which she is not a party, but by which it is in the Allied interest that she should be bound. In view ol Japan’s past reoird in whaling it will be desirable not only that Japan should subscribe to the International vVhaling Convention but that caretul supervision should be exercised over Japan’s whaling activities.

A further section of the report discusses the post-treaty supervision ol Japan upon which the effectiveness of the treaty provisions must depend. The system ot control must be both durable and workable. To be durable it must contemplate the continued enforcement only of such provisions as are likely to command long-term support on the part of the supervisory Powers. To be workable i.t must involve neither undue strain upon the Powers, nor undue interference with Japanese affairs. Control System Urged New Zealand advocates that a super visory auihorny should be set up consisting of those powers actively interested in the continued observance ot the peace treaty by Japan and prepared to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that result. These obligations would be the pro vision or representation on the supervisory authority and of a due share of the staff and inspectorate, air undertaking to join m enforcement action il necessary, and the provision of a share of such patrol forces might well be upon. These Powers might well be members of the Far Eastern Commission. Japan should admit in advance the validity of supervisory or enforcement action. No member of the supervisory authority should have the right to veto any decision as this would prevent the authority from making the clear and speedy pronouncements necessary for the smooth working of the system. The decisions should, therefore, be some form of majority vote.

The supervisory authority, upon de termining that a breach of the treaty obligations had occurred, would normally instruct the Japanese Government to remedy the breach. The failure of the Japanese Government to do so would be followed by the application of appropriate enforcement measures.

The control system will need to include methods of obtaining information upon the degree to which the Japanese Government is carrying out the treaty. Such information could be gathered by the inspectorate staffed by and worked under the supervisory authority. Definite Treaty Provisions

Even if it were desirable, however, no general permeation of Japanese life by inspection is a practical possibility, and the inspections must relate to definite treaty provisions. New Zealand considers that it is not possible to contemplate a continuous and detailed inspection of Japan for an extended period, except of the provisions directly related to physical security. A limitless field of dissension among the supervisory Powers and with the Japanese Government might be opened up, leading to a breakdown of the whole arrangements and jeopardising the vital security objective if an attempt were made to enforce the more intangible provisions. The control system will not operate successfully unless the instructions of the supervisory authority can be enforced. The simplest method of ensuring their enforcement would be for the supervisory authority to have military forces at its disposal, but while force must be the ultimate sanction, it will be advisable to provide for some 1 sanctions in addition to that of force, 01even the threat of force.

One method of doing this would be to exercise some control over Japan’s application to join international bodies. The intense desire of the Japanese to stand well with the world might well be an effective spur to acceptable behaviour, at least until full membership of the United Nations had been achi'ev■ed, and the peace treaty might provide that this event should occur only with the concurrence of Ihe supervisory authority, and only after a stated number of years.