The Gisborne Herald. IN WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1947. BRITAIN’S LOSS OF PRESTIGE IN JAPAN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22320, 3 May 1947, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. IN WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MAY 3, 1947. BRITAIN’S LOSS OF PRESTIGE IN JAPAN

yyiTH fewer resources at her disposal and labouring under the handicap of wider and more complicated pre-occupations in various parts of the world, Britain has been unable to make a showing in Japan comparable with the prestige-winning policy of the United States. Britons, Americans and the people of the Dominions understand the position and the events that led up to it, and in circumstances other than the need to impress the Japanese there would be little cause for worry on Britain’s part. The British Empire’s record in the world war speaks for itself, and if it is a fact that the Americans bore the main burden of the northward offensive against Japan it is also realised in most countries that our forces were by no means idle elsewhere. Only the advent of the atomic bomb and the merciful shortening of the conflict prevented the Empire’s full participation in a final assault. The Japanese, in their ignorance, do not understand all this. There are solid grounds for the belief that they regard the members of the British occupation troops in Japan as the “poor relations’’ of the Americans. The apparent slump in British prestige has obviously been a source of perturbation among officers of the garrison who sense the general atmosphere. No serious blame for the situation is attachable to General MacArthur and his Americans, who naturally recognise the necessity of impressing the defeated aggressors with a dignified show of strength. It does appear, however, that more could be done —and done quite simply—to raise British prestige. Search for a Remedy

One suggestion has come from Mr. Gordon Walker, the Far Eastern correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, who quotes British authorities in Tokyo as stating that if their country were permitted liaison staffs in the various Military Government sections Britain’s participation in the occupation could be successfully achieved with only a battalion of British troops stationed in Tokyo. Certainly it would be better to have fewer troops.and to give them more conspicuous authority than to put up an indifferent display by forces spread over wide areas outside the larger cities. One of the essentials is that living conditions should be raised to the level of those enjoyed by the Americans and if, as is hinted, the methods of payment arc at fault there should also be some adjustment in that direction. It has become imperative that whatever is done by our representation in Japan should be done well. United States influence in Japan was strikingly illustrated only this week by the announcement that the nation would claim 30 per cent of all internal Japanese industrial equipment and assets available for reparations. Apparently despairing of getting a policy directive from the Far Eastern Commisison on the question of reparations, Washington has invoked the special power conferred on it by the Moscow Agreement to “issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the commission.” Whether the suggested allocation of reparations can be justifiably classified as an urgent matter within the meaning of the clause is perhaps debatable. In taking this unusual course the United States Government was doubtless much influenced by the attitude, of General MacArthur and the American chairman of the Allied Council in Tokyo, both of whom have strongly urged that the reparations question should be settled as soon as possible in order to facilitate the rehabilitation c»f Japan’s tottering economy. U.S. Action Appears Arbitrary.

Next week information on the outcome of the claim. should be available, for it is to be discussed at a closed session of the Reparations Committee of the Far Eastern Commission. The American announcement appears arbitrary and a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Moscow agreement. r fhe Allies may well query the right of one of their number to decide the precise proportion of reparations they are to receive. Besides mentioning America’s claim for 30 per cent, this week’s cablegram said the United States would suggest that China receive a 45 per cent share of the reparations, with the remaining 25 per cent divided among the other nine claimants, including Australia and New Zealand. In extenuation of America’s attitude, it should be pointed out that the case for early sharing of reparations was supported by the committee of industrialists sent to Japan by the United States War Department at the beginning of the year. The. chairman of that body stated that the long delay in reaching a decision was seriously handicapping Japan’s internal cnonomy “because factory workers do not yet know which works they can reconvert to peacetime use.” If it does nothing else, the move will have the effect of speeding up the whole reparations procedure. Nevertheless, the measures taken afford the'latest evidence of the extent to which Allied control of Japan has become American control. This unsatisfactory situation provides additional grounds for hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. General MacArthur himself recently uttered the warning that a long delay would make Japan too dependent on the United States and urged that a peace conference should be held as soon as possible. Britain may not be able to claim a large share of the reparations, hut she is decidedly interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East and therefore in all matters bound up with the control of Japan. The raising of her prestige in the occupied country is something not to be regarded as a side issue.