The Gisborne Herald. IN WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MARCH 23, 1946. INFLUENCE OF OIL ON SOVIET POLICY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 21978, 23 March 1946, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. IN WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, MARCH 23, 1946. INFLUENCE OF OIL ON SOVIET POLICY

THE week is ending on a more hopeful note in regard to relations between Russia and the western Powers. True, there is every indication that the United States, supported by Britain, has no intention of giving way to Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres for postponement of the Security Council meeting in New York. Persia, after some hesitancy probably arising from an element of duress has asked that her case should be heard immediately. This spares America the task of introducing the subject herself and running the risk of being charged by Russia with interference. If Generalissimo Stalin’s answers to questions asked by a press agency correspondent form a reliable guide to Soviet reactions — as they no doubt do—the atmosphere seems to have been cleared on the vital point as to whether Russia will stand by the United Nations and the decision of the Security Council. Stalin has acknowledged the organisation as an instrument for peace. There lias not been the slightest sign in the midst of all the recent argument and uncertainty that the Russians intend to reject the principle of international conciliation whenever it suits them or when decisions are not favourable to themselves.

The outlook a few days ago was described as “stormy, with a good deal of thunder,” and it was considered that the danger point would come only if Russia withdrew- from UNO. Next week’s business in the meetings of the Security Council will afford the most conclusive test yet of Soviet sentiment towards the United Nations. In the meantime Stalin’s statement can he regarded as highly encouraging. Silence Causes Distrust

Another interesting feature of the Security Council discussions should be the light thrown on the Avhole Persian scene, with a possible explanation as to why Russia committed a breach of the occupation treaty by failing to withdraw her troops by March 2. Russia’s big fault to-day—one that has intensified Anglo-American distrust—is the continuation of the stringent press censorship oyer matters of foreign policy. She has also been accused of distorting British and American news, and there is no doubt whatever that her persistent criticism of capitalism and of Britain in particular has not endeared her to .her wartime allies. Neglect to reply to the British and American Notes on the Persian question, moreover, would he one of the reasons for the western nations’ decision to permit no postponement of the Security Council talks. Little or nothing has been said in overseas messages on the subject of oil, Avhich may provide the real key to Russian foreign policy, especially as applied to Persia. According to a writer in the Christian Science Monitor for February 9, Russia needs every drop of oil on which she can lay her hands. Her oil industry, particularly in the Caucasus, suffered far greater war damage than lias appeared in the official records. It is learned that, in addition to the Maikop oilfields in the northern Caucasus, which temporarily fell into German hands, the oilfields at Grozny also had to he' destroyed. Altogether, 3000 wells, with a normal production of 5,000,000 tons of crude oil, were lost. In addition, the Germans destroyed the refineries at Grozny, Odessa, Kherson and Krasnodar, demolished sections of the Grozny-Trudoyvayab pipeline and scorched more than 700 storage installations with a large capacity. Concern for Baku Region

It hardly needs this corroboration by the reliable Christian Science Monitor to make it easy to believe that the Soviet oil industry has indeed been sorely stricken. In the course of the war battlefront reports indicated plainly that widespread destruction was being wrought throughout the country. In view of the losses elsewhere, it should he a matter of no great surprise if the Russians are showing deep concern for the Baku region, which is near Persia. During' the war the Baku region contributed 80 per cent of the total oil output of the Soviet Union and its predominance in oil production occasioned Avide political as well as strategic influence among the Russians. The trouble now appears to he that the output of these fields, once classed among the richest, oldest and most exploited in the world, has been steadily declining. As a result of the Avar drillings Avere reduced materially and . it is expected that the shrinkage in output may soon reach major proportions. Faced thus hv a declining domestic yield from a region which is strategically the most exposed of the entire Soviet Union and faced at the same time by an increased domestic demand to make up for the Avar losses, as avcll as to supply the neAvly-incorporated States of Eastern Europe and to maintain the armies of occupation, Soviet foreign policy appears to he in some Avay concerned Avith the supply of oil. Seen against this background, the acquisitive oil policy pursued by the Russians makes sense. What, is needed hoav, however, is more frankness from our fighting ally. If there had been adequate response to Mr. Bovin’s appeal for all the cards to be laid on the table,‘there Avould have been less misunderstanding and distrust. If the need for more oil Avith Avhich to. carry out domestic reconstruction and fulfil military obligations is Russia’s main Avorry, a direct appeal for sympathy and help Avould not go unheard among the United Nations.