THE POLISH PROBLEM

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 21633, 9 February 1945, Page 2

THE POLISH PROBLEM

Among the political questions certain to be discussed at the conference is that of the rival Polish Governments. One of these, on Polish soil, is recognised by the Soviet Union, while the other, in London, is recognised by Russia's allies. For a number of reasons the settlement ot the Polish problem is considered extremely important. If no agreement were reached, the Lublin Government. now in Warsaw, would be hailed by the Russians as the logical

administration and there is reason to believe that, rather than lot such an issue stand in the way of a peaceful European, settlement, Mr. Churchill would acquiesce. The Russians, who have liberated the country, will believe that sooner or later the Lublin group will be accepted by the Polish population as the only possible Government.

Yet failure to bring about some form of conciliation between the two Polish organisations might tend to perpetuate political instability and unrest in Poland. This is recognised by both Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin, who at the Black Sea conference are probably doing an immense amount of preliminary work in the effort to bring about an agreement. These leaders deserve to have their labours crowned' by success and, if an agreement is not reached, it will certainly be the fault of the Poles themselves. Up till the present extremists on both Polish sides have been uncompromising and at times abusive towards one another. The Russian view is said to be that the exact personnel of the Polish Government is not very important, provided it does not include members definitely opposed to the policy of joint security with Russia. Poland is an essential part of the eastern security bloc and Russia’s claims for consideration have been greatly enhanced since the battle of liberation,

THOSE BOUNDARIES

Apart from the establishment of an efficient and harmonious administration, the fixation of. frontiers is the outstanding issue. The situation in litis respect again requires realism, and fortunately .there is every sign that the major Powers represented by the "Big Three" will be in agreement. In a speech, a large portion of which dealt with Poland, Mr. Churchill made it clear that the British Government believed the Russians to have a solid and equitable claim to the lands east of (lie so-called Curzon Line. Therefore Poland is expected to agree to the cession to Russia of what is known as the "kresy”—land east of the Curzon Line with a pre-war population of about 13.000,000. Territory east of the Oder has been promised Poland as compensation. Since this would mean Poland's acquisition of the greater part of the German provinces of Pomerania and Silesia and would reduce Berlin almost to the status of a frontier town, it may be argued that such a drastic step would make another war inevitable. It is likely, however, that, no matter what is done, Germany will remain a menace to civilisation unless she is unremittingly curbed by the “permanent international organisation to maintain peace" reported to be under consideration at the conference of the Allied leaders. Possession of highlyindustrialised Upper Silesia would, in any case, place Poland and her friends in a much bettor position for discouraging a revival of German warmongering. The future of East Prussia will also be debated. There is a great deal to be said for rounding off Polish territory with the incorporation of this old stronghold of the Junkers. The danger of war on Germany's eastern frontiers will not ho averted by any degree of moderation, and, if war again came in eastern Europe, it would be much better that East Prussia should be in Polish rather •;han in German 'hands —in the interests of sheer self-defence.