BRITISH QUEUES

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 21605, 6 January 1945, Page 3

BRITISH QUEUES

NAZI OFFENSIVE CAUSES ANALYSED ALLIES TOO CONFIDENT? (By Telegraph—l’i-m Asati. —Copyrii'hl. i (Special CnrreaponiicnL} LONDON, Jan. I. Why did Rundstodt break through; why did he fail in hi.: attack: me there going 1.0 bo changes at Supreme Allied Headquarters; were (lie Allies over-confident; why should winter delay our forces and. let Rundstodt win the battle? Those are some of the questions now being asked about the Western Front, and several attempts are being made to answer them. It has long been admitted that the Allies were completely surprised by Rundstedt's attack in the locality used by the Germans not only in 1940, but also in .1914. The Daily Express’ commentator, Mr, Alan Moorehcad, discussing the queries, says that after the Normandy break-out General Eisenhower made two prodigious decisions —first, to take the field command himself, and secondly, to bring all his armies up to the Rhine together. While the German line was solidified. Allied armies toiled painfully up to the Rhine and Supreme Allied Headquarters fennel itself conducting a battle from 150 miles away. From the Mediterranean to the English Channel, six armies were deployed and there was no real cutting edge anywhere. Soon individual commanders found that even if they did make a breach in the German line, they had no reinforcements on hand to back it up and go through. Faced with this even-spread pressure, the German line was able to hold intact, which was the state of affairs by I lie end of November. Panzer Annies Marshalled

It then became difficult for the Allies to get news out of Germany and follow the rear movements ot the Wehrmacht while Rundstedt, with Germans and German sympathisers behind the Allied lines, found i.t easy to get information. He marshalled the GOth Panzer Army north of Ardennes and discovered that green American troops had moved into the line in the First American Army. In the second week in December, when there was no moon, he took the Fifth Panzer Army from the line opposite Liege and slipped it quietly down to opposite Luxemburg while the Sixth Panzer moved into positions vacated by the Fifth. When the weather was suitable he struck at a weak spot in the American line and, largely due to our policy of keeping our divisions well forward, lie found he had. at once burst through into the comparatively vacant rear areas. Mr. Moorehcad praises the reaction of the Americans. “For many months now, we have abandoned the use of surprise in our planning. We have simply packed troops up to the line and slogged ahead in fairly obvious directions,” he says. “There is much support for two ideas —first, the appointment of a field commander, British or American, would do a great deal towards getting quicker decisions and more adaptability into the line; secondly, the need one day to mount and supply one definite spearhead to pierce the German front and exploit beyond.’’ Fighting Command Urged

Other correspondents also comment on the fact of the Supreme Allied Command being too far back, and on the dispersal of Allied strength. It is pointed out if the earlier system of the fighting command being in the hands ot a specialist like Field Marshal Montgomery, as in Normandy, had been maintained, the setback might have been averted. At the same time, it is generally remarked that there is every confidence in General Eisenhower. Discussion on these lines seems to be fairly general, but messages from New York declare that the chance oi Field Marshal Montgomery being promoted commander ot the Allied land forces under General Eisenhower are “remote.” As regards other questions, “Strntegicus,” in The Spectator, remarks;

“What was at fault was the absurd self-confidence which lias characterised the Allied outlook ever since tlie exploitation of the battle of Normandy,” and tendency to be convinced by one’s own propaganda. “What, save this self-confidence, can explain the ease with which the Germans concentrated in secret and then over-ran some 70 miles of Allied front?” Enemy Drive For Petrol Correspondents on the Western Front and Switzerland are expressing the opinion that the Germans "fooled” the Allies about their petrol shortage and, by using horse-drawn traffic, deliberately built up a reserve for the offensive which aimed at capturing enough Allied petrol and oil to sustain the drive through to Antwerp. It is declared that petrol was, in fact, one of the chief objectives of the offensive, but tnere is no doubt that after three months’ hoarding, the Germans had enough for the present battle plan. Berne reports state that observers in Berlin are convinced that the Germans had far greater stores of petrol than the Allies believed, whiie synthetic oil is still being manufactured. At the same time the Wehrmacht is “thirsty” for petrol. It is likely that questions on Rundstedt’s offensive will be asked and answered when the House of Commons re-assembles on January IC.