The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT. 31, 1944. ANXIETY OVER CHINA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21549, 31 October 1944, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES" GISBORNE, TUESDAY, OCT. 31, 1944. ANXIETY OVER CHINA

News of the 'war in the Pacific grows brighter almost day by day, but the same cannot be said about the war in China. To arrive at the truth of the situation in that vast and harassed land is not easy. There are, so many conflicting reports, expressions of opinion and attempts at speculation that the task of arriving at an accurate assessment of the position is nothing if not bewildering. Military leaders, who are no doubt in j possession of the full facts, cannot i speak outright for publication, while j diplomats are naturally bound to: semi-secrecy by the limitations im-1 posed upon them by their profession, j It may be, however, that the recall to ' Washington of Lieutenant-General J.! Stilwell, for many years a great battler in China, will bring matters to a head and be the means of throwing some light on the one theatre of the World War which is still causing serious anxiety. If the background to the news has not been at all clear, it is only too obvious from a study of the day-to-day cablegrams that the land fighting is not going well with the Allied arms. The Japanese, with probably the largest army concentrations possessed by them in any theatre, are making a terrific bid to gain full possession of the invasion coast of China and at one stroke neutralise American air bases and furnish .themselves with a through communication line between Manchuria and their interim conquests in Burma and Malaya. The greater the set-backs inflicted on them by the Americans at sea and in the Philippines the more urgently do they need this command cf the land areas. Most of the American airfields are built along the railway line that connects the South China coast with the Japanese industrial and army centres in the north, and it is the Chinese lack of effectiveness in protecting these fields of activity that has been the chief.source of worry. The American fighting services have adopted the slogan: “The difficult v.re do at once; the impossible takes a little longer.” In China,, however, Lieutenant-General Stilwell and his air force colleague, Major-General Chennault, have been up against a problem which may take more than “a little longer” in its unravelling. “VINEGAR JOE” What is it that has gone wrong? Why has the old warrier, Stilwell, an expert in all matters Chinese, been recalled? • Has the ■ personal quality that earned him the rather unflattefing name “Vinegar Joe" been getting him into trouble? From time to time there have been rumours that he has not always co-operated in friendly fashion with high British, officers of the South-east Command, but, whatever differences of opinion may- have arisen on points of strategy, no real proof has been furnished of difficulties on that score inimical to the war effort against . the Japanese.. It is surely significant that the anti-climax in his China career should have come at a time when • all is not well with the Chinese;'..is.Everything points to the fact that the crux of the trbuble lies in his relations with MarshaJ Chiang Kai-shek. Dealing with this point, the Associated Press has a story to tell that Stilwell and Chiang have been at swords’ points ever since the battle for the Burma Road. That, may be so, but we are inclined to the belief that the matter goes much deeper. Suppose, for instance, that Stilwell has been trying in vain to persuade Chiang to come to an agreement with the Chinese Communist Army in the north and unleash the whole of his country’s forces at the Japanese in protection of the sorely-needed bases in South China, It has been -reported that a considerable proportion - of the troops operating under the Chungking command have been assigned to the task of blockading the Communists. At a time when Communist organisations. are givirtg excellent service in other theatres of war it seems illogical that their well-trained army in North China should not be allowed to help in repelling the country’s invaders once and for all. That should be the first essential. The political situation can be dealt with later. RUSSIA’S INTEREST The plain implication of the deterioration in the Chinese military situation is that the final defeat of Japan—that is, through the land-fight-ing—will be a lengthy affair unless the Red Army intervenes. And if the Red Army intervenes the first thing it will do will be to ensure that the Communist forces are given their chance to march into the battle-line. Russia, a great land Power, has always held to -,the military doctrine that destruction of an enemy’s armies is a prerequisite to victory, and the Soviet press has more, than oncepointed out that, although the Japanese are proving vulnerable to Allied sea and air blows, their land forces remain strong. The present comparative disinterest of Russia in the war against Japan can be construed in no way other than as a measure of expediency adopted only for the duration of the war against -Germany. The feeling is growing in many quarters that Russia will take a hand in the Far East war as soon after the German capitulation as she can regroup, and that the intervention will go further than the granting of air bases to the Allies. Soviet newspaper articles have given the impression that the Russians believe that their contribution to the defeat of the strongest member of the Axis entitles the Kremlin, to a voice at the Asiatic peace table. The Japanese surrender of the Sakhalin oil and coal concessions and the acceptance of a fishing agreement with steeply-raised license fees show that the Red Army already has prestige enough to give Russia her way in many respects without further resort to arms. On the other hand, there is a body of Soviet opinion which considers that the country’s influence will be increased still further if Russian troops have a part in the storming of Tokio. It may yet transpire, therefore, that the future of the military position in China is largely bound up with the actions of the Soviet Union.